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Abstract The recent debates in economics, following the 2008 crisis, have pointed out a ne-
cessity for micro-founded macroeconomic modelling approaches for policy analyses. Agent-
based models (ABM) have been adopted to address two underlining aspects of a micro-founded
macroeconomic approach. On the one hand, this methodology enables to accommodate hetero-
geneous agents with limited perception of market information that corresponds to bounded ra-
tionality concept in economics. The essence of its micro foundations is established by conceiv-
ing economic phenomena as the emergent results of these interactions in a bottom-up manner.
On the other hand, ABMs have proven to be able to accommodate top-down policy experimen-
tations such as fiscal and monetary interventions. However, ABM practices are criticized at
lacking a methodological maturity that clearly offers such bidirectional value towards scalable
and re-usable models.
This dissertation as a whole is an effort at fulfilling this necessity. It is composed of a number
of interrelated studies. Specific research questions are raised around the debates on monetary
unions, housing markets and interbank networks. The overall objective in these works is to
be able to address policy questions while employing sound and reusable stock-flow-consistent
models. A common methodological practice is elicited at reaching this objective: delineating
the design of a top-down policy experimentation set-up from the design of individual agent
behaviors for a bottom up emergence first, and then coupling them back to reach a conceptual
coherence between the policy issue and the assumptions on agents’ behavioral choices.
The research on monetary unions has led us to re-factor an advanced yet closed single
country macroeconomic model in such a way that the model sub components and certain agent
behaviors can be selectively added for a desired multi-country policy experimentation. From a
methodological point of view, the work introduces a novel approach on both vertical scalability
(flexibility as of markets, mechanisms and behaviors) and horizontal scalability (flexibility
in population design and configuration). The set-up enables us, for instance, to analyze the
impact of a fiscal pool within a monetary union under varying labor mobility constraints and
technological differences.
Our multiple studies on housing markets demonstrate prospects of a model re-usability.
Different subsets of behaviors and mechanisms selected from the same model library on hous-
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ing markets serve for different policy experiments: (i) examining stylized relation between
mortgage credits and business cycles, (ii) experimenting with alternative and prudent mortgage
regulating instruments, (iii) examining macroeconomic impacts of different mortgage types,
and (iv) investigating impact of policies towards green finance when speculative lending chan-
nel via housing market is prevalent in the system.
The work on interbank markets introduces a novel ABM simulation set-up in order to study
the role of balance sheet structures and network topologies at interbank markets with respect
to their resilience against systemic risks. Its parsimonious set of configuration parameters can
create different interbank network models and balance-sheet configurations with varying de-
gree of concentration, connectivity and capitalization without violating stock-flow consistency
(SFC) of its constituents.
In this dissertation, results of these studies are summarized and discussed briefly along with
methodological novelties that have been introduced or applied at each one of them. Relatively
more space is dedicated to major individual contributions: (i) design, analyses and discussion
on mortgaging regulations, (ii) design and development of a scalable multi-country experiment
set-up, (iii) design and development of a financial contagion model, (iv) and an outline of a
methodological guideline that has been consolidated through the studies within this disserta-
tion.
Results on housing markets: First, our models confirm that the dynamics of mortgages are
supporting the theory of endogenous nature of credit money giving a contribution to a debate
that has grown stronger over the last two decades. In general, regulations allowing a high lever-
age of the banking tend to inflate asset bubbles and boost the economy in the short run, while
tend to result in bubble bursts and economic depression in the medium and long run. Second,
we suggest that the stimulating impact of mortgage credits can sustain a long term growth and
stability when regulated via complementary instruments: a stock control regulation that targets
households net wealth combined with a flow control regulation that targets households debt
service. Besides, we demonstrate that stock control regulation exhibits the interesting property
to directly affect mortgage distribution among households. Third, we suggest that inflation-
indexed mortgages can mislead households’ expectations of risk encouraging them to buy more
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housing due to their low initial amortizations which, in turn, increases housing prices. The re-
sults further hint that in long-run inflation-indexed mortgages create relatively more uneven
housing wealth distribution among households. Last, we examine macro-prudential policies
that may help to stimulate the banking sector to shift from speculative lending to an energy
efficient production technology. As of the regulatory instrument, we introduce a differentiation
of capital requirements according to the destination of lending, demanding higher bank capital
in the case of speculative lending via mortgages. Results suggest that the proposed regulation
is able to foster investments and capital accumulation in the short term, improving the energy
efficiency of firms. However, reducing mortgages with a restrictive banking regulation has
a negative impact on total private credit, and thus on endogenous money supply, weakening
consumption and aggregate demand. In the long term, the contraction of total credit becomes
stronger, and the negative outcomes on aggregate demand also affect investment making the
energy efficiency become negligible.
Results on monetary unions: The work on a scalable multi-country experiment set-up en-
ables us address the conditions under which two or more countries can benefit from becoming
part of a monetary union. Our results suggest that for similar countries, it is always beneficial
to join in a union, although a lack of mobility frictions can weaken its performance. Even if
countries have different productivities, the performance of the union is in general better than
the performance of the isolated countries. The exception is when the productivity gap between
member countries and labor mobility across borders are both too high. In this case, the union
can even exacerbate the gap between the member states. We devise and test a fiscal pool pol-
icy to measure to what extent it could alleviate the effects of structural differences, such as
high tech and productive member versus a low tech and underdeveloped member. Our findings
suggests that stronger fiscal integration via transfers from surplus countries to deficit countries
helps reducing inequality between such members, supporting a sustainability of the monetary
union.
Results on interbank networks: Our initial results suggest that a medium density of con-
nections in regular networks is already sufficient to induce a ‘robust-yet-fragile’ response to
insolvency shocks, while the same occurs in star networks only when the centralization is very
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high. From a policy perspective, we suggest that the resilience of interbank networks can be
increased by a complementarity between concentration and connectivity. Our findings suggest
that a sustainable resilience to external shocks can be achieved if there is more interbank trade
among peripheral nodes of the second tier banks while there is less debt exposure among the
money centers of the first-tier core banks. This implies a moderation towards reducing the
connectivity within the core while increasing the connectivity between the peripheral nodes.
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Resumen Los recientes debates en economía tras la crisis de 2008, han señalado la necesi-
dad de utilizar modelos macroeconómicos micro fundados para el análisis de políticas. Se han
utilizado modelos basados en agentes (ABM, en en inglés) para abordar dos aspectos destaca-
dos dentro de los modelos macroeconómicos micro fundados. Por un lado, esta metodología
permite acomodar agentes heterogéneos con una percepción limitada de la información de mer-
cado que corresponde al concepto de racionalidad limitada en economía. La esencia de su mi-
cro fundamentación se establece al interpretar los fenómenos económicos como los resultados
emergentes de estas interacciones de abajo a arriba. Por otro lado, los ABM han demostrado
ser capaces de acomodar experimentaciones de políticas de arriba hacia abajo, como las inter-
venciones fiscales y monetarias. Sin embargo, las pr acticas de ABM son criticadas por carecer
de una madurez metodológica que ofrece claramente ese valor bidireccional hacia modelos
escalables y reutilizables.
Esta tesis es un esfuerzo para satisfacer esta necesidad. Se compone de una serie de es-
tudios interrelacionados. En ella se plantean cuestiones específicas en torno a los debates
sobre uniones monetarias, mercados de vivienda y redes interbancarias. El objetivo gen-
eral de estos trabajos es poder abordar diferentes cuestiones de política económica, a la vez
que se utilizan modelos sólidos y stock-flujo consistentes reutilizables. Se utiliza una misma
metodología para lograr este objetivo: primero, delinear un entorno de experimentación de
políticas de arriba hacia abajo a partir del diseño de comportamientos de agentes individuales
para una emergencia ascendente, para luego unirlos de nuevo para alcanzar una coherencia
conceptual entre la cuestión de política introducida y los supuestos sobre las elecciones de
comportamiento de los agentes.
La investigación sobre las uniones monetarias nos ha llevado a reformular un modelo
macroeconómico avanzado pero cerrado de un solo país, de tal manera que los subcomponentes
del modelo y ciertos comportamientos de los agentes se pueden agregar de forma selectiva para
una experimentación política deseada en varios países. Desde un punto de vista metodológico,
el trabajo introduce un enfoque novedoso sobre la escalabilidad vertical (flexibilidad en cuanto
a mercados, mecanismos y comportamientos) y la escalabilidad horizontal (flexibilidad en el
diseño y configuración de la población). La configuración nos permite, por ejemplo, analizar
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el impacto de un grupo fiscal dentro de una unión monetaria bajo diversas restricciones de
movilidad laboral y diferencias tecnológicas.
Nuestros numerosos trabajos sobre el mercado de la vivienda demuestran las perspectivas
de una reutilización del modelo. Diferentes subconjuntos de comportamientos y mecanismos
seleccionados de la misma biblioteca de modelos en los mercados de vivienda sirven para
diferentes experimentos de políticas: (i) analizar la relación estilizada entre los créditos hipote-
carios y los ciclos económicos, (ii) experimentar con instrumentos reguladores de hipotecas
alternativos y prudentes, (iii) analizar los impactos macroeconómicos de diferentes tipos de
hipotecas, e (iv) investigar el impacto de las políticas hacia las finanzas verdes cuando el canal
de préstamos especulativos a través del mercado de la vivienda prevalece en el sistema.
El trabajo sobre los mercados interbancarios introduce una nueva configuración de sim-
ulación ABM para estudiar el papel de las estructuras de balance y las topologías de red en
los mercados interbancarios, respecto a su resistencia frente a los riesgos sistémicos. Su par-
simonioso conjunto de parámetros de configuración puede crear diferentes modelos de red
interbancaria y configuraciones de balance con diversos grados de concentración, conectividad
y capitalización sin violar la consistencia stock-flujo (SFC, en inglés) de sus constituyentes.
En esta tesis, los resultados de estos trabajos se resumen y discuten brevemente junto con las
novedades metodológicas que se han introducido o aplicado en cada uno de ellos. Se dedica
relativamente más espacio a las principales contribuciones individuales: (i) diseño, análisis y
discusión sobre regulaciones de hipotecas, (ii) diseño y desarrollo de una configuración es-
calable de experimentos multinacionales, (iii) diseño y desarrollo de un modelo de contagio
financiero, (iv) y un resumen de una guía metodológica que se ha consolidado a través de los
trabajos incluidos en esta tesis.
Resultados sobre los mercados de vivienda: en primer lugar, nuestros modelos confirman
que la dinámica de las hipotecas respalda la teoría de la naturaleza endógena del dinero de
crédito, lo que contribuye a un debate que se ha fortalecido en las últimas dos décadas. En
general, las regulaciones que permiten un alto apalancamiento de la banca tienden a inflar las
burbujas de activos e impulsar la economía en el corto plazo, mientras que tienden a generar
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estallidos de burbujas y depresión económica en el medio y largo plazo. En segundo lugar, sug-
erimos que el impacto estimulante de los créditos hipotecarios puede sostener un crecimiento
y estabilidad a largo plazo cuando se regula a través de instrumentos complementarios: una
regulación de control de stock que se dirige a la riqueza neta de los hogares combinada con una
regulación de control de flujo que se dirige al servicio de la deuda de las familias. Además,
demostramos que la regulación de control de stock exhibe una propiedad interesante que afecta
directamente a la distribución de hipotecas entre los hogares. En tercer lugar, sugerimos que
las hipotecas indexadas a la inflación pueden confundir las expectativas de riesgo de los hog-
ares, alentándolos a comprar más viviendas debido a sus bajas amortizaciones iniciales que, a
su vez, aumentan los precios de la vivienda. Los resultados sugieren que, en el largo plazo,
las hipotecas indexadas a la inflación crean una distribución de la riqueza de vivienda relativa-
mente más desigual entre los hogares. Por último, examinamos políticas macro-prudenciales
que puedan ayudar a estimular al sector bancario al pasar de los préstamos especulativos a
una tecnología de producción con mayor eficiencia energética. A partir del instrumento reg-
ulatorio, introducimos una diferenciación de los requisitos de capital según el destino de los
préstamos, exigiendo un mayor capital bancario en el caso de los préstamos especulativos a
través de hipotecas. Los resultados sugieren que las medidas propuestas pueden fomentar las
inversiones y la acumulación de capital a corto plazo, mejorando la eficiencia energética de las
empresas. Sin embargo, reducir las hipotecas con una regulación bancaria restrictiva tiene un
impacto negativo en el crédito privado total y, por lo tanto, en la oferta de dinero endógeno,
debilitando el consumo y la demanda agregada. A largo plazo, la contracción del crédito total
se vuelve más fuerte y los resultados negativos sobre la demanda agregada también afectan a
la inversión, lo que hace que la eficiencia energética sea insignificante.
Resultados sobre las uniones monetarias: el trabajo en una configuración de experimentos
escalable en varios países nos permite abordar las condiciones bajo las cuales dos o más países
pueden beneficiarse de formar parte de una unión monetaria. Nuestros resultados sugieren que,
para países similares, siempre es beneficioso crear una unión monetaria, aunque la falta de
fricciones de movilidad puede debilitar su desempeño. Incluso si los países tienen diferentes
productividades, el funcionamiento de la unión es en general mejor que el funcionamiento de
los países aislados. Encontramos una excepción cuando la brecha de productividad entre los
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países miembros y la movilidad laboral a través de las fronteras son demasiado altas. En este
caso, la unión puede incluso exacerbar la brecha entre los estados miembros. Diseñamos y
probamos una política fiscal para evaluar en qué medida podría aliviar los efectos de las difer-
encias estructurales, como la alta tecnología y el miembro productivo frente a la baja tecnología
y el miembro subdesarrollado. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que una mayor integración fiscal a
través de las transferencias de los países con superávit a los países con déficit ayuda a reducir
la desigualdad entre dichos miembros, apoyando la sostenibilidad de la unión monetaria.
Resultados sobre redes interbancarias: nuestros resultados iniciales sugieren que una den-
sidad media de conexiones en redes regulares ya es suficiente para inducir una respuesta “ro-
busta pero frágil” a los shocks de insolvencia, mientras que lo mismo ocurre en redes estelares
solo cuando la centralización es muy alta. Desde una perspectiva política, sugerimos que la
resistencia de las redes interbancarias se puede aumentar mediante una complementariedad en-
tre la concentración y la conectividad. Nuestros resultados sugieren que se puede lograr una
resistencia sostenible a los shocks externos si hay más comercio interbancario entre los nodos
periféricos de los bancos de segundo nivel, mientras que hay menos exposición de deuda entre
los centros monetarios de los bancos centrales de primer nivel. Esto implica una moderación
hacia la reducción de la conectividad dentro del núcleo, al tiempo que aumenta la conectividad





This dissertation is composed of a number of interrelated studies. The common objective is
addressing policy questions in macroeconomics or finance while employing sound and reusable
agent based models (ABM). Specific research questions have been raised around the debates
on monetary unions, mortgage markets and interbank networks.
I have carried out the work collaborating with different teams. An enlisted summary of
publication outcomes is below in Section 1.3. My contributions within the teams are two
sided: conceptual and methodological. At the macro economic theory side, I have lead our
discussion on housing market regulations; at the economic network theory side, I have lead our
conceptualization of network formations at Interbank markets. On the other side, primarily, I
have lead the research methodology in design and implementation of our agent based models
and analysis of their simulation outcomes.
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More specifically, I have lead the design and implementation of housing markets within two
ABM models: Eurace1 and Iceace2. The housing market in Eurace has served us to examine
(i) a stylized relation between mortgage credits and business cycles (Raberto et al., 2017), (ii)
investigate policies on green finance (Raberto et al., 2018), and (iii) experiment with alternative
and prudent mortgage regulating instruments (Ozel et al., 2016). The housing market in Iceace
model enabled us to examine macroeconomic impacts of different mortgage types within a
stylized context of Icelandic economy (Bjarnason et al., 2015).
The most prevalent methodological contribution that I have lead is within the multi-country
simulation set-up that we have created for the analysis of monetary union models (Petrovic
et al., 2018). The flexible and modular set-up enables us to conduct very complex yet controlled
policy experiments. With the help of novel computational methodology, we are able to create
a variety of economic systems from an isolated national economy to a global economic system
with various heterogeneous unions and union types, isolated or trading national economies. It
is an ABM framework where we are able to study circulation of labor, goods and financial
capital under various political, technological and later possibly cultural configurations.
Another methodological novelty that I have lead is in our work (Ozel et al., 2018) where we
have addressed the resilience to financial contagion under varying interbank network structures.
We have developed an ABM simulation set-up where not only stylized network models such
as star, fully-collected, or circular topologies but also random core-periphery graph models
of interbank networks can be studied. Its parsimonious set of configuration parameters can
create different interbank network models with varying degree of concentration, connectivity
and capitalization without violating stock-flow consistency of its constituents. At a follow up
work (Gencer and Ozel, 2018), we have developed a computational model on interaction and
integration of multiple interbank networks.
1Eurace is a stock-flow consistent (SFC) computational model, grounded on the agent-based methodology,
which has been used for studying a range of macroeconomic issues by researchers from various institutes. Its
initial design and development has taken place during a EC funded projects: EURACE project between 2006
and 2008: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/79429_en.html. Further enhancements on the model
have taken place during another consortium, namely the SYMPHONY project between 2013 - 2016: https:
//cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/110002_en.html. I have taken part in both consortium as one of its re-
searchers. Gencer and Ozel (2011) disseminates our modelling experience within the first consortium.
2Iceace is another SFC macroeconomic model that is inspired by Eurace model. For the project details, its
documents and source codes, please see http://iceace.github.io/home/.
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1.2 A brief on agent based modelling
An agent based model, in very general sense, is one of the simulation techniques on complex
systems. Its adoption in the analysis of macroeconomic phenomena goes back to the early years
of the availability of digital computers (Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018). ABM is specifically used
for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous agents. The ABM models or systems
are decentralized. That is, there is no centralized and hierarchical control on agents’ actions and
interactions. These autonomous agents usually don’t have a full global view of the system. The
systems for which ABM models are employed are too complex for an agent to make practical
use of such global level complete knowledge. This limited perception of global information
corresponds to bounded rationality concept in economics. Agents are not expected to take
globally optimal decisions. Besides, agents in such systems may have different characteristics
and behave differently from one another. In ABM terms they are heterogeneous with respect
to their attributes and their actions or behaviors.
These foundations of ABM models reflect reality of human behaviors within complex social-
economic systems (Secchi, 2017). For instance, consumer choices at buying smartphones are
personal yet are influenced by their social circles. In ABM terms, consumers are autonomous
but yet they interact and are influenced by their local social environments. In addition, the
odds that one collects full information of all smartphones and maximizes the universal utility
of a smartphone is extremely low. And utility of a smartphone by itself is subjective. Again
in ABM terms, there is also heterogeneity in tastes and limited (bounded) view of the full pic-
ture of smartphone market. Besides, agents use simple heuristics and computations in their
decision making processes. This simplicity in behaviors or decisions is what differs ABMs
from multi-agent systems (M.A.S). Agents in ABMs don’t necessarily need to be “intelligent”
compared to agents in M.A.S models that are mainly used to solve difficult engineering prob-
lems using methodical, functional, procedural approach, algorithmic search or reinforcement
learning. In other words, agents in ABMs are not necessarily computationally complex imple-
mentations. For instance, in Schelling (1978)’s social segregation model, which is one of the
first known agent model, autonomous and adaptive behavior rules are quite simple, yet patterns
of interaction and the overall emerging outcome is very powerful at explaining a range of so-
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cial phenomena. The model shows that a simple preference rule of an agent may result in an
interesting and a complex outcome. In the original model, the colored agents move to an empty
space on a grid when they observe that more than a certain ratio of their neighbors have a differ-
ent color than themselves. This simple rule leads to a total segregation at the community level.
Likewise, agents in a model on macroeconomics are not expected to have a full understanding
of the highly complex outcomes and processes of the entire economy (Branch and McGough,
2018). Like in reality, the agents have limited information on the entire economy and they may
not necessarily take optimal decisions.
An agent based model designer aims to understand the decision rules of individual agents in
certain environments at certain actions. However, extracting simple and sound decision rules is
not an easy task. Understanding behaviors of agents in an economy may require the collection
of survey data, investigations on market transactions, the analysis of large set of balance sheets
and income statements, the conduct of controlled social experiments in the labs, etc.
Depending to context agents can be individual entity or a collective entity such as an or-
ganization or a group. The main motivation of employing ABM is to observe and assess ef-
fects of simultaneous agent-agent interactions on the system as a whole. ABMs are typically
implemented as computer simulations to create a virtual laboratory and test how changes in
individual behaviors will affect the system’s emerging overall behavior. ABM simulations at-
tempt to re-generate a complex phenomena first to justify validity of the computer model and
later use the simulator to predict other appearances of a complex phenomena. The process
is called emergence from the lower (micro) level agent-agent interactions to a higher (macro)
system level outcome. This notion that simple behavioral rules generate complex behavior
is extensively adopted in the modelling community. It combines elements of game theory,
complex systems, emergence, computational sociology, multi-agent systems, and evolutionary
programming. Monte Carlo methods (Metropolis and Ulam, 1949) are used to introduce ran-
domness. ABMs are used in scientific domains including biology, ecology and social science,
and relatively more recently in economics.
ABMs of macro economy are generally developed to be able to run certain policy scenarios
(Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017; Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018). Conceiving economic phenom-
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ena as the emergent results of agents interactions in complex socio-economic and ecological
environments, agent-based simulations may improve the understanding of the individual and
joint impacts of environmental policies, fiscal policies, monetary policies, banking and finan-
cial markets regulation augmenting their capacity of dealing with the profound effects of the
financial crisis in an increasing interconnected world, and allowing the policy maker to com-
pare different strategies (Farmer and Foley, 2009). In particular, agents’ expectations may
considerably reduce or amplify the effects of policy interventions. Economic agents’ decision
processes are also characterized by bounded rationality and limited information gathering and
computational capabilities (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). Agents’s behavior follows adaptive
rules derived from the management literature about firms and banks, and from experimental
and behavioral economics of consumers and financial investors.
ABMs, in general, have shown to be able to investigate very important real world features
of our economies, such as the link between the real economy and the financial aspects. For
example Riccetti et al. (2013) embody both the credit network and the firms’ leverage cycle.
Delli Gatti et al. (2010) represent characteristics like the networks of credit and ownership
relationship among economic agents. In the studies via Eurace model credit networks are
formed by the balance-sheet inter-linkages among firms and banks Cincotti et al. (2010a);
Teglio et al. (2012b). The Eurace experiments are able to capture rationing, the non-equilibrium
outcomes, in markets, in particular the credit rationing. These features have demonstrated the
capacity to be able to explain bubbles and crashes in financial markets as well as credit rationing
and bankruptcy waves in the real economy.
ABMs can be used to test how different economic policies or regulations could impact the
economy. For instance, Cincotti et al. (2010a) investigate the implications of the monetary
policy on the dynamics of output and prices, while Russo et al. (2007) analyze the role of fiscal
policy in promoting R&D investments that may increase economic growth, Dosi et al. (2010)
study the influence of economy policies on business cycles fluctuations and long-term growth,
and Neuberger and Rissi (2012) analyze the effects of macro-prudential banking regulation on
financial stability. ABMs are further adopted to examine information asymmetry and herding
in financial markets (Todd et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017).
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(a) Contributions to Eurace model.
(b) Relations across models.
(c) Co-authored papers.
Figure 1.1: Co-authored articles and contributions to the designs and developments of agent-based models in economics. Fig. 1.1a
displays contributions to Eurace model from a refactoring work on the base model until creation of a scalable multi-country setup.
As upper panel in Fig. 1.1b implies, Iceace model is inspired by the base version of Eurace model. Lower panel in Fig. 1.1b refers
to a future research direction where interactions between interbank networks and macroeconomic systems are to be examined. The
work reported in Gencer and Ozel (2011) is relevant to the design and development of the very first version of Eurace model which
took place prior to this dissertation study. Eurace and Iceace models are implemented in C using FLAME framework; Interbank
networks’ contagion models is implemented in R adopting and extending its native ‘sna’, ‘network‘ packages; Interbank networks’
fusion model is implemented in Python using ‘NetworkX’ module. Monte Carlo simulations are run on super or cluster computers.
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1.3 Relevant publications
This section lists the contributions in the area during the study that has lead to this disserta-
tion. Figure 1.1 is a graphical summary of the contributions and their relevance to each other.
1.3.1 Housing market regulation
Reference: Bulent Ozel, Reynold Christian Nathanael, Marco Raberto, AndreaTeglio, Sil-
vano Cincotti, 2016. Macroeconomic implications of mortgage loans requirements: an agent
based approach. Working Papers 2016/05, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castel-
lon (Spain).
Summary: In this work we have extended the Eurace agent-based model by designing a
housing market with a related mortgage lending device. Our results show that mortgage credits
generally helps to increase and stabilize aggregated demand in consumption goods market, thus
improving the main economic indicators. However, if the mortgage lending regulation is re-
laxed too much, by raising the debt-service-to-income ratio (DSTI), then the additional supply
of mortgages does not increase the macroeconomic performance any more, and undermines
the stability of the economic system. Following some recent discussion, a stock control regu-
lation that targets households net wealth (a stock), instead of income (a flow), is designed and
analyzed. Results show that stock control regulation can be effectively combined with DSTI
in order to increase the stability of the housing market and of the whole economy. Moreover,
stock control regulation exhibits the interesting property to directly affect mortgage distribution
among households.
Publication status: The work was submitted to Journal of Evolutionary Economics within
2017. The paper is accepted with minor revisions. It’s under a final revision round.
Role and contributions: In this work, my primary role has been designing, implementing
and integrating the housing market model within the Eurace model; doing primary research on
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the literature; and laying out policy experiments. For the written form of the work, I have cre-
ated the first drafts on motivations, discussions of relevant studies, description and calibration
of housing market model, introduction of stock-flow control policy instruments and conclusion
sections. Analyses and revisions of the results have been conducted with other co-authors.
1.3.2 A multi-country simulation setup
Reference: Marko Petrovic, Bulent Ozel, Andrea Teglio, Marco Raberto, Silvano Cincotti.
“Should I stay or should I go: an agent-based setup for a Monetary Union” Working Papers
2017/09, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellon (Spain).
Summary: In this work, our primary objective has been to create a simulation set-up in order
to be able to study, for instance, the conditions under which two or more countries can benefit
from becoming part of a union. Combining state-of-the art software engineering methodologies
and agent-based computational economics, we have designed a complexity-wise scalable and
flexible multi-country model, which is able to consider a wide variety of union configurations.
In other words, the model enables us to create and control the economic characteristics of the
countries joining a union, i.e., the level of integration of its markets, regulations, and institu-
tional bodies. In this first paper, specifically, we have focused on a monetary union structure
inspired from the Eurozone. Our results suggest that for similar countries, it is always benefi-
cial to join in a union, although a lack of mobility frictions can weaken its performance. Even
if countries have different productivities, the performance of the union is in general better than
the performance of the isolated countries. The exception is when the productivity gap between
member countries and labor mobility across borders are both too high. In this case, the union
can even exacerbate the gap between the member states. We have devised and tested a fiscal
pool body to measure to what extend it could alleviate causes of a structural difference, such as
high tech and productive North versus a low tech and underdeveloped South, between member
states. Our findings suggests that stronger fiscal integration via transfers from surplus countries
to deficit countries helps reducing inequality between countries, supporting a sustainability of
the monetary union.
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Publication status: The first paper out of this work has been submitted to the Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control.
Role and contributions: In this work, my primary role has been leading the design and
implementation of a modular and scalable agent based model. An extended version of the
closed economy Eurace model has been used as the base model. However, a significant amount
of initial effort has been dedicated to re-factor, re-design and re-implement a large part of the
base model aiming a theoretically and computationally modular core model. Thus we are able
to decouple markets or replace, for example, fiscal policies without a necessity of model re-
implementation from scratch. The resulting architecture enables us to configure and initialize
a large spectrum of economies. We are able to instantiate economies from a closed economy
with or without housing markets, energy sector or financial markets to a global economy of
multiple unions, trading or isolated economies where each union or country may have its own
housing markets, energy sectors or financial markets. In the first research paper, for instance,
we have limited the model to two isolated control-state economies and a two-country monetary
union where housing sector and energy sector are turned off and secondary financial markets
of securities are excluded.
1.3.3 Housing sector and green finance
Reference: Marco Raberto, Bulent Ozel, Linda Ponta, Andrea Teglio, Silvano Cincotti,
2018. From financial instability to green finance: the role of banking and monetary policies in
the Eurace model. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, pp. 1-37, Springer3.
Summary: In this work, we study macro-prudential policies that may help to stimulate bank-
ing sector to shift from speculative lending, the cause of asset bubbles and economic crises, to
an energy efficient production technology. Housing market in the adopted model functions
as an important destination of speculative credit in the economy. Eurace model in Ozel et al.
(2016) is further enhanced for the work. A stylized energy sector is added to the model and
3See https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-018-0568-2.
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energy efficient capital investment is made possible. In other words, the enhanced model has
heterogeneous capital goods, allowing for different degrees of energy efficiency in the produc-
tion technology. Credit money is endogenous and limited by Basel capital adequacy regulation
on the supply side, while on the demand side it is determined by firms’ loan requests for invest-
ments and households’ mortgage requests for house purchasing. As of the regulatory instru-
ment, we have introduced a differentiation of capital requirements according to the destination
of lending, demanding higher bank capital in the case of speculative lending via mortgages,
thus encouraging banks to finance firm investment. As up-to-date capital goods have better
energy efficiency in the model design, a higher pace of investment implies also a positive en-
vironmental effect. Results suggest that the proposed regulation is able to foster investments
and capital accumulation in the short term, improving the energy efficiency of firms. However,
reducing mortgages with a restrictive banking regulation has a negative impact on total private
credit, and thus on endogenous money supply, weakening consumption and aggregate demand.
In the long term, the contraction of total credit becomes stronger, and the negative outcomes
on aggregate demand also affect investment making the energy efficiency become negligible.
Publication status: The paper is accepted and published by Journal of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics, see Raberto et al. (2018).
Role and contributions: In this work, my primary role has been adopting, calibrating and
validating the housing market model that I have lead the design and implementation within the
Eurace model (Ozel et al., 2016). In this work, mortgage debt for house purchase is served as
a proxy for speculative investments that diverts the credits from productive investments.
1.3.4 Money creation via mortgage credits and business cycles
Reference: Marco Raberto, R.C. Nathanael, Bulent Ozel, Andrea Teglio, Silvano Cincotti.
2017. “Credit-driven business cycles in an agent-based macro model”, in H. Hanappi, S.s Kat-
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sikides, M. Scholz-Wäckerle (Eds) “Theory and method of evolutionary political economy”,
pp. 182-192. Routledge4.
Summary: In this work, we have particularly focused on the interaction between credit and
business cycles. A part of the features of the model that is described in Chapter 2.1 is employed.
Here we primarily address importance of mortgage credits from the real estate market on the
economy and business cycles. The dynamics of credit money is endogenous and depends
on the supply side by the banking system, which is constrained by Basel capital adequacy
regulatory provisions, while on the demand side depends on firms financing production activity
and households indebtedness for housing needs and speculation. Results point out a non-trivial
dependence of real economic variables such as gross domestic product, unemployment rate
and aggregate capital stock on banks’ capital adequacy ratios; this dependence is in place due
to the credit channel and varies significantly according to the chosen evaluation horizon. In
general, regulations allowing for a high leverage of the banking tend to inflate asset bubbles
and boost the economy in the short run, while result in bubble bursts and economic depression
in the medium and long run. Results also point out that the stock of money is driven by the
demand for loans, therefore supporting the theory of endogenous nature of credit money. The
study then also clarify the nature of endogenous money, giving a contribution to a debate that
has grown stronger over the last two decades.
Publication status: The work is accepted and published as a book chapter, see Raberto et al.
(2017).
Role and contributions: In this work, my primary role has been designing and adopting the
model to be able to examine the interplay between mortgage credits and business cycles. In col-
laboration with the co-authors I have contributed to the discussions, analysis of the simulation
outputs and initial drafts and further revisions of the written material.
4See https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315470214
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1.3.5 Impact of mortgage instruments on wealth and regulations
Reference: Thorir Bjarnason, Einar Jón Erlingsson, Bulent Ozel, Hlynur Stefánsson, Jón
Thor Sturluson, Marco Raberto, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of varied mortgage instru-
ments studied using agent-based model simulations". Working Papers 2017/10, Economics
Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellon (Spain)5.
Summary: In this paper, employing Iceace6 model of a credit network economy we have ex-
amined macroeconomic implications of three mortgage instruments. They are (i) an adjusted-
rate-mortgaging (ARM) where interest rate follows the rate of the Central Bank plus a constant
2% spread; (ii) an inflation-indexed-mortgaging (IIM) where interest rate is fixed throughout
the term and principal indexed to consumer price index (CPI); and (iii) a fixed-rate-mortgaging
(FRM) where interest rate is fixed. The Central Bank rate at the moment plus a constant 3%
spread is used. Our results suggest that inflation-indexed mortgages can mislead households’
expectations of risk, encouraging them to buy more housing due to their low initial amor-
tizations which, in turn, stimulates housing prices. The results further hint that in long-run
inflation-indexed mortgages create relatively more uneven housing wealth distribution among
households. We also find that the effectiveness of standard monetary policy tools is diminished
when inflation-indexed mortgages are used. Banks partake in the interest rate risk with fixed
rate mortgages but bear little or no risk with adjustable rate or inflation-indexed mortgages.
Publication status: Working paper. Disseminated via UJI, Economics Department, Working
Paper Series. To be submitted to JEIC.
Role and contributions: Iceace is an agent-based computational macroeconomic model that
utilizes the balance sheet accounting of economic agents (Erlingsson et al., 2014). The model
was inspired by Eurace model however it differs in a number of ways such as firms’ production
decision schemes and replacement of financial markets with a generic Equity Fund agency. For
5See https://ideas.repec.org/p/jau/wpaper/2017-10.html.
6The FLAME implementation of the model is used. See model description, documentation and implementation
at http://iceace.github.io/home/.
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this work I have designed and implemented the model from scratch adding new mortgaging
features that forms the basis of this work. The modelling and implementation details and the
source is made available at the project Web site7. The first draft of the work was lead by first
and the second authors. I have contributed to the later revisions and discussions around the
outputs from the simulations.
1.3.6 A simulation model and setup on financial contagions
Reference: Bulent Ozel, Mario Eboli, Andrea Teglio, Andrea Toto. 2018. “Robust-yet-
fragile: A simulation model on exposure and concentration at interbank networks” Working
Papers 2018/??, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellon (Spain).
Summary: For this work, we have developed a layered financial contagion simulator that
provides a modular and flexible simulation set-up. It decouples the steps of a research on
financial contagion where a cascaded procedure from the network creation to the data analysis
is made possible. The current version enables researchers (i) to create an interbank system of a
desired network structure, (ii) to initialize bank balance sheets where the network in previous
step can optionally be used as an input, (iii) to configure a controlled or randomized sequence
of exogenous shock vectors, (iv) to simulate and inspect detailed process of a single contagion
process via tables, graphs and plots generated by the simulator, (v) to design and run automated
Monte Carlo simulations, (vi) to analyze results of Monte Carlo simulations via tools from the
simulation analysis library. We have created a range of stylized and complex network models,
such as, star-networks or core-periphery structures with certain network level connectivity and
centralization. The simulation results confirm the theoretical conjectures that a medium density
of connections in regular networks is already sufficient to induce a ‘robust-yet-fragile’ response
to insolvency shocks, while the same occurs in star networks only when the centralization is
very high.
Publication status: Working paper is in second revision by the co-authors.
7http://iceace.github.io/home/.
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Role and contributions: My primary contribution in this work has been designing, imple-
menting and documenting the entire simulation set-up based on the discussions with co-authors
and personal desktop research on similar studies in the field. Besides, I have lead the controlled
experiment design and analysis which yielded current results. I have also lead the draft of the
first complete version of the working paper.
1.3.7 Fusion of economic and financial networks
Reference: Mehmet Gencer and Bulent Ozel. 2018. "Multi-level Fusion of Random Net-
works". Working Papers 2018/??, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellon
(Spain).
Summary: This paper concerns the problem of creating random network structures as one
of the essential requirements for realistic simulations of complex networks. While the study
of random networks is a long standing area of research available methods have significant
shortcomings in terms of producing structures that correspond to real networks. Real networks
tend to have a ‘multi-level’ structure which does not lend itself to modeling with a single
algebraic scheme. Computational, rather than algebraic, approaches have been explored to
address this problem more recently. Our study adds on to this emerging research thread by
addressing the problem of abridging multiple levels in random network creation. We focus on
the problem of interconnecting two micro level random networks to create a larger network at
the macro level. In approaching this problem we develop a method which is driven by certain
parameters which represents the characteristics of the final network that results from fusion of
lower level networks.
Publication status: Working paper is in final revision by the co-authors.
Role and contributions: My primary contribution has been at problem definition and re-
search design. My collaborator has taken the initiative at its initial implementation and gener-
ation of the first draft.
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1.3.8 Other published technical reports
• Bulent Ozel, Marko Petrovic, Andrea Teglio, Linda Ponta, Marco Raberto, Andrea Maz-
zoccheti, Silvano Cincotti, Mauro Gallegati, Ruggero Grilli, Annarita Colasante, Anto-
nio Palestrini, 2015. "Final version of large-scale multi-country agent-based model of
the macroeconomy", SYMPHONY Deliverable D3.3: Orchestrating Information Tech-
nologies and Global Systems Science for Policy Design and Regulation of a Resilient
and Sustainable Global Economy. Contract no.: 6118758.
Relevance and role: Conceptual model of a multi-country set-up has been discussed in
this project deliverable (Ozel et al., 2015). A major part of the multi-country modelling
features from this work has been realized in the work that is presented in Chapter 3.
As part of this work, individually, I have lead the conceptualizations of labor mobility
dynamics and integration which is to be added to the future versions of the Eurace multi-
country set-up.
• Nikos Dimakopoulos, Anna Triantafillou, Panagiotis Kokkinakis, Kostas Giannakakis,
Richard Mark Brown, Miha Papler, Luis Rei, Bulent Ozel, Efthimios Bothos, Lex Robin-
son, Linda Ponta. 2014. "Definition of System Architecture" SYMPHONY Delieverble
D52: Orchestrating Information Technologies and Global Systems Science for Policy
Design and Regulation of a Resilient and Sustainable Global Economy. Contract no.:
6118759.
Relevance and role: The relevant part of my contribution to this system architecture of
the SYMPHONY game platform (Dimakopoulos et al., 2014) is the novelty that is pre-
sented in Section 3.3.2. In brief, the novelty has enabled us to accommodate real agents’
decisions, for instance policy decisions of a human player of the platform, to take over






the role of an artificial agent such as one of the centralbank agent from a multi-country
set-up. An early version of the multi-country model has been developed and integrated
to the platform serving as a turn-based game engine. Another novelty that is introduced
in this work has been combining big-data analytics and agent based modelling. Large
sets of publicly available social media data has been analyzed by consortium members
where a proxy measure for central bank credibility is measured. The measurement is
used while calibrating the trading behaviors of households in financial markets.
1.4 Organization of the dissertation
The next Chapter 2 initially discusses details of the primary work as part of this disserta-
tion which is a complete research on the role of housing market in economy at large and its
regulation from an ABM approach. It mainly highlights the computational methodology while
giving a summary of findings from that first study where we have employed the methodol-
ogy. Research findings and methodological novelties from the other housing market related
works are reported in the rest of the chapter. The second primary work is presented in sub-
sequent Chapter 3. The chapter mainly focuses on the novel modelling design approach for
large scale ABMs. Nevertheless, the research findings from the very first study where we have
employed the methodology are discussed briefly. The third major contribution is presented in
Section 4.1 where a novel model of interbank networks is presented. The results from its initial
employment is discussed. Chapter 4, in general, introduces a novel approach with parsimo-
nious modeling parameters to study risk and contagion at interbank networks. Novelties and
state-of-the-art methodological experiences from all research activities that are presented in
detail or in brief within this dissertation are summarized within Chapter 5. More specifically,
the chapter aims to outline design patterns and validation practices for complex, large-scale
and reusable ABM models. I conclude summarizing the findings and pointing out a research
direction beyond this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Housing market linkages: business
cycles, mortgage regulations and
types, and green finance
This chapter primarily discusses the role of housing market in economy at large and its regu-
lation from an ABM approach. Details of the base housing market model within Eurace model
are presented in Section 2.1. The subsequent sections within the chapter presents summary
of results from our other housing market related studies where the base model is employed
or adopted. We have specifically examined impact of mortgage credits on business cycles,
summarized in Section 2.2. We have investigated macro-prudential policies that may help to
stimulate banking sector to shift from speculative lending, the cause of asset bubbles and eco-
nomic crises, to an energy efficient production technology, summarized in Section 2.3. Finally,
we have examined impacts of mortgage types on housing bursts and booms, summarized in
Section 2.4. Unlike the other studies in this chapter, the study in this final section adopts a
housing market mechanism within Iceace model.
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2.1 Design and integration of an housing market within Eurace
artificial economy
2.1.1 Motivation
It is well-known that the housing market, with the related mortgage securities, has a crucial
role in modern economies. The crisis of 2007 - 2009, triggered by the U.S. real-estate bubble,
reconfirms this crucial role and suggests the importance of a mortgage lending regulation. It
is now universally recognized that monitoring systemic risk can be misleading if the housing
market sector is not properly considered.
We have designed and implemented a housing market within a larger agent-based model
along with two complementary mortgage lending instruments. More specifically, we address
the role of the housing market in the economy (Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008), by designing
a housing sector and a mortgaging mechanism in the Eurace agent-based macroeconomic sim-
ulator (Dawid et al., 2008; Cincotti et al., 2010a; Raberto et al., 2012b; Teglio et al., 2012a).
The model enables us investigate money injection role of mortgage credits; examine its impacts
on real economy; and be able to raise regulatory policy questions under a broader and more
realistic simulation setting.
This extended Eurace model includes all major agents of an economy: households, firms,
banks, central bank and government. Households may take over the roles of consumers, work-
ers, financial investors, share-holders and house owners. There are two types of firms which
are consumption goods producers and capital goods producers. Agents interact in different
types of markets, namely, consumption goods market, capital goods market, housing market,
labor market, credit market and financial market for stocks and government bonds. Except
for the financial market, all markets are characterized by decentralized exchange with price
setting behavior on the supply side. Agents’ decision processes are characterized by bounded
rationality and limited information gathering and computational capabilities (Tesfatsion, 2003;
Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006); thus, agents’s behavior follows adaptive rules derived from the
management literature about firms and banks, and from experimental and behavioral eco-
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nomics of consumers and financial investors.
The extended model enables us to address the crucial issue of the interplay between mort-
gages to households, loans to firms and business cycles in the economy (Catte et al., 2005;
Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008). In this new context, in addition to banks’ loans to firms,
banks’ mortgages to households are considered among the factors connecting the banking
sector to the real economy (Gallegati et al., 2008). The dynamics of credit money is endoge-
nous and its supply depends on the banking system, which is constrained by Basel capital
adequacy regulatory provisions (Blum and Hellwig, 1995; Santos, 2001), while on the demand
side it depends on firms’ necessity to finance the production activity and from households’
requirements for housing purchase.
Our results show that the presence of an housing market in the model has relevant macroe-
conomic implications, mainly driven by the additional amount of endogenous money injected
into the economy by new mortgages. This additional money generally helps to support and
stabilize aggregated demand at consumption goods market, thus improving the main economic
indicators. However, if the mortgage lending regulation is relaxed too much, by raising the
debt-service-to-income ratio (DSTI), then the additional supply of mortgages does not increase
the macroeconomic performance any more, and undermines the stability of economic sys-
tem. Following some recent discussions, a stock control regulation that targets households net
wealth (a stock), instead of income (a flow), is designed and analyzed. Results show that stock
control regulation can be effectively combined with DSTI in order to increase the stability of
the housing market and of the whole economy. It also exhibits the interesting property to di-
rectly affect mortgage distribution among households, avoiding excessive concentration. From
a policy perspective, our results suggest that using a mild flow control regulation, when cou-
pled with a stricter stock control measure, fosters a sustainable growth and eases the access to
housing for first time buyers, therefore promoting house ownership.
In this chapter, after discussing the motivations behind the work, description of mortgage
market model and summary of results will be presented. Before concluding, the methodologi-
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cal novelty of the work will be discussed where an incremental model extension and calibration
are practiced without disrupting the existing large-scale base model.
2.1.2 Background and relevant studies
A relatively recent article in Science (Battiston et al., 2016) highlights promising potentials
of ABM as an experimental macroeconomic approach. The article also points out its under-
utilization. A relevant overview by Richiardi (2015) on the state-of-the-art of agent-based
models in economics reports that a major problem that current models suffer is due to the fact
that they are not modular or scalable for adding new features or for deactivating an existing
component. In this respect, the housing market model within Eurace artificial economy rep-
resents a seamless extension to an already highly advanced ABM model, designed as a new
module that can be easily switched off. The calibration of the housing market within the Eu-
race base model is driven by recent surveys (Dubecq and Ghattassi, 2009; Borsch-Supan, 1994;
Gharaie et al., 2012; European Central Bank, 2013; Anderson et al., 2014; Deloitte Real Estate,
2014; FinansInspektionen Mortgage Survey, 2014).
In contrast to its acknowledged importance, there are only a few number of other ABM
models on housing markets: Gilbert et al. (2009), Ge (2014), Axtell et al. (2014) and Baptista
et al. (2016). All of these housing market models are standalone, i.e., they don’t interact with
the rest of the economy. Their common and main focus is on the mechanisms of housing prices.
The simple model by Gilbert et al. (2009) consists of sellers, buyers and real-estate agents. The
income of households and any other variables are provided exogenously. A relatively more
advanced model by Ge (2014) demonstrates that a loose debt-to-income (DTI) constraint for
households leads to a high volatility of housing prices. However, unlike to our model, shocks
to the model are applied externally. The model by Axtell et al. (2014) is specifically tailored
for the housing market in the city of Washington, D.C. The model is able to generate a housing
bubble of approximately the same size as occurred earlier in Washington. The model has a
micro level focus on households’ real estate purchasing behaviours. The study by Baptista et al.
(2016) examines price dynamics given the ratio of renters as well as speculators in a housing
market. Their results suggest that a growing size of the renters and speculators increase the
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price volatility while a regulated market decreases the volatility. They consider a DTI type
macro-prudential regulation.
Other than ABM approaches, there are a few relatively recent stock-flow consistent (hereafter
SFC) simulation models that analyses macroeconomic implications of the housing markets,
such as Zezza (2007, 2008), Nikolaidi (2014), Meijers et al. (2015), and Nikiforos (2016). The
SFC approach (Lavoie and Godley, 2012), in these studies and in general, enables an integrated
framework for treating the linkages between the real and financial sectors. Zezza (2007, 2008)
builds models to explore implications of the housing market boom on wealth distributions
among households. The aim is to lay down a growth model, grounded in the postkeynesian SFC
approach of Lavoie and Godley (2012) to analyze the links between consumption and saving
behaviour at financial markets and at the housing market. There are two classes of households,
namely, capitalists and non-capitalists. Each type is modelled by a respective representative
agent. Households buy real estate from firms and receive loans from banks. In the version of
the model in Zezza (2007), houses produced by firms are valued and sold at the general price
level, which is given exogenously, but bought at the real estate price level that differs from the
former. Zezza (2008) extends this model to include the interaction with the housing market. In
both version, there is theoretically unlimited supply of housing units and mortgage regulation
is not addressed. At another relevant study by Nikolaidi (2014), houses are also produced by
firms at the general price level but sold and bought at the real estate price level. Meijers et al.
(2015), instead, improve these aforementioned models by including relevant open economy
characteristics and modelling the financial sector in a more elaborate way. The work extends
the model of the banking sector and including housing and mortgages. They model the housing
market differently making house prices endogenous, yet they still assume an unlimited stock of
exogenous housing units. They show that the more elaborate modelling of the financial sector,
also in an open economy context, is a necessary ingredient to explain the vulnerability of the
financial sector.
Housing markets in most of the real economies are prone to strong government regulations.
The government interferences are generally in the form (i) direct subsidies such as public hous-
ing, (ii) tax incentives typically by deduction on mortgage interests, (iii) market regulations via
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policy instruments (Borsch-Supan, 1994). The claimed objectives of government interventions
are threefold. First, governments are aiming at increasing the efficiency of the market and re-
ducing housing driven crises in the economy. Second, their intervention is based on the belief
that everybody merits reasonable housing and that society ought to provide a house to an indi-
vidual who cannot afford it. Third, housing consumption and investment serve as a convenient
mechanism to redistribute income and wealth (Case et al., 2009; Bubb and Krishnamurthy,
2015).
Motivational framework for our investigation on mortgage regulation policies are based on
the following observations: (i) Historically, housing has been the single largest asset in the
economy (Dagher and Fu, 2011; FinansInspektionen Mortgage Survey, 2014). Keeping to be a
leading source of financial crises and economic fluctuations, it poses a big regulatory challenge;
(ii) Mortgage regulation should operate in a prudential mode rather than as a response to a
bubble after it bursts (The Financial Services Authority, 2011); (iii) Regulatory measure should
act at the mortgage level. In other words, regulations that are targeting only banks or other
financial institutions may not be sufficiently effective. For instance, mortgage risk can move
from regulated banks to unregulated shadow banking institutes (Dagher and Fu, 2011); (iv)
Access to mortgage should not be too restrictive. A very strict regulation may inhibit the
stimulative effect of mortgage credits on the business cycles (Kydland et al., 2012).
Two common ways to assess credit worthiness of individual mortgage requests are the loan-
to-value (LTV) or loan-to-income (LTI) measures (The Financial Services Authority, 2011).
LTV is the ratio of the requested mortgage to the present value of the house. A LTV value of
1 would mean the purchase is fully covered by credit. Commonly adopted LTI related mea-
sures are Debt-To-Income ratio (DTI) and Debt-Service-To-Income-ratio1 (DSTI). Following
the mortgage lead financial crisis of 2007 - 2009, these ratios have been probed extensively
by surveys conducted by regulatory institutions such as, among others, the Bank of England
(Gareth et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014), the Swedish financial supervisory board Finansin-
spektionen (FinansInspektionen Mortgage Survey, 2014), and the Bank of Canada (Meh et al.,
2009).
1DSTI is often defined simply as Debt-Service-Ratio (DSR)
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The main policy conclusion of these studies is that the mortgage crediting is one of the main
factors inflating housing prices. This is often followed by shocks in financial markets and real
economy, amplifying feedback loops which may cause the collapse of the economy. The multi-
country study by Muellbauer (2012) highlights that “credit supply conditions in the mortgage
market are the ‘elephant in the room’. Without taking them into account, one simply cannot
understand the behaviour of house prices, household debt and consumption.” (p. 36).
These survey-based studies are also raising questions regarding the appropriateness of LTV
and LTI measures as enforced policy instruments2. For instance, one of the key observation
of the paper by the Financial Service Authority of UK (The Financial Services Authority,
2011) is that loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI), when they are the only measures
employed, are not very useful to detect and prevent mortgage crises. Anderson et al. (2014)
state that allowing mortgage contracts with high debt service ratios (DSTI) would not always
trigger mortgage arrears (p. 422). Gareth et al. (2014) points out that the use of DSTI alone
may not be reliable in long term, especially when there is a high volatility in the interest rates
and housing prices.
Like other researchers, Bubb and Krishnamurthy (2015) point out that a strict LTV as a single
regulatory measure may prevent mortgage crisis to a large extent, however, they pinpoint one
of the major drawbacks of a strict LTV ratio: “An important objection to a leverage limit is
that it might reduce access to homeownership by less wealthy households in contravention of
a long standing policy commitment to expanding homeownership” (p. 67). They discuss how
a strict LTV would create a barrier to homeownership for the first-time homebuyers who have
limited resources to make a downpayment on a house. The book by Case et al. (2009) dedicates
two chapters in this line on the access to mortgages for the poor social classes. They point out
the necessity for a generic regulatory criteria in order to let lower income households access to
mortgages.
Meh et al. (2009) raise a rather more technical concern about the use of LTI type measures.
The authors use micro data to identify changes in household debt, and discuss their potential
2British parliament approved regulations granting powers to the Financial Policy Committee over housing tools,
and specifically regulating residential mortgage lending using loan-to-value LTV and debt-to-income ratio DTI on
25 March 2015. These measures came into force on 6 April 2015.
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implications for monetary policy and financial stability. They examine sub-components of
assets and liabilities of households’ balance sheets. The rationale of their criticism is due to
mixture of stock and flow variables within an LTI type measure, where in general households’
total mortgage debt, a ‘stock’ entry on their balance sheet, is related to households’ disposable
income, a ‘flow’ entry in their monthly income statement (Skingsley, 2007).
The concerns around LTV and LTI measures have been leading to new discussions for identi-
fying relevant measures in order to evaluate the risk of individual household’s mortgage debts3.
Earlier, Meh et al. (2009) suggested to compare a stock entry to another stock entry of house-
holds’ balance sheet (e.g., debt-to-asset ratio) to assess the long-term vulnerability. Other au-
thorities (The Financial Services Authority, 2011) conclude that there is no simple quantitative
rule, proposing to look into other measures where for instance consumption expenditures and
current payments of households are considered. Svensson (2014b) proposes to use the net-
worth ratio on a household’s balance sheet in order to assess his credibility. This is qualitatively
the same measure as the one suggested by Meh et al. (2009).
Why LTV measure is not considered in our study? (1) In long term, it increases inequality
in housing wealth and hence social inequality which is against the principals of a welfare
approach. (2) It has a less stimulative impact on the overall consumption. It is seen that at
an individual level accumulation of housing wealth doesn’t have a very strong impact on the
consumption level (Muellbauer, 2012). A strict LTV policy may cause allocation of housing
stocks in the hands of a minority, which in return indirectly could reduce overall consumption
level that would inhibit stimulating impact of mortgage credit on GDP growth. (3) It creates
a barrier for the first time buyers and low-income level households. (4) From a simulation
research point it is not interesting.
Why a standard LTI or DTI measure is not considered in our study? (1) Empirical studies
show that DTI does not explain the occurrence of crises (2) It is a short-sighted evaluation. It
disregards (a) drop in housing prices, where a fire sell case may even not be able to cover the
3See the speech “The household debt ratio is an unsuitable risk measure - there are much better ones” delivered
by Lars E.O. Svensson, a Resident Scholar at IMF (https://larseosvensson.se/2014/05/19/the-household-debt-ratio-
is-an-unsuitable-risk-measure-there-are-much-better-ones/).
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remaining unpaid principal debt; (b) it is susceptible to interest rates fluctuations; (3) it is a
mixture of flow vs stock control.
2.1.3 Eurace: The base ABM model
At this part of the work, we have employed the large-scale agent-based model and simulator
Eurace, which represents a fully integrated economy consisting of a real sector, a credit sector,
a financial sector and a public sector. The model is a stock-flow consistent model since its
initial design, and the stock-flow consistency (Lavoie and Godley, 2012; Nikiforos and Zezza,
2017) is ensured at all stages: design, update, initialization and run-time. The Eurace model
includes different types of agents: households, consumption good producers (hereafter CGPs),
banks, a capital goods producer (hereafter KGP), a government and a central bank. Agents
interact through several markets, i.e. consumption and capital goods markets, labor market,
credit market, and a financial market where households exchange stocks (i.e. the claims on
firms/banks net worth and future dividends) and government bonds in a centralized Walrasian
financial market. A detailed description of the base model, –its theoretical and methodological
assumptions, behavioral rules, market mechanisms etc,– has been given in Teglio et al. (2018).
In this study, we have enriched the base Eurace model by introducing housing assets, mortgage
lending and a housing market. Households are endowed with equal number of homogeneous
housing units that they can trade in the housing market. Households can also take mortgages
from banks to buy new housing units from other households that creates –heterogeneity in
house ownership–. Details are available below in Section 2.1.4.
We outline the complex set of interactions in the model by reporting two key matrices in Ta-
bles 2.1 and 2.2. The first one is the balance sheet matrix and describes all assets and liabilities
for each class of agents. The second one, Table 2.2, represents the transaction flow matrix,
showing all the monetary flows among agents. This approach allows to check the consistency
at any time step between stocks and flows in the model, both at the level of the single agent and
at the aggregate one. This is in line also with post-Keynesian stock-flow-consistent modelling
approach, see e.g. Caverzas and Godin (2015). We believe that this is a critical feature, in
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particular in a model where the creation/destruction of the endogenous money stock plays a
crucial role in determining economic activity.
In the following sections we describe some of the main behavioral rules and decision making
mechanisms which are more relevant to this work. The dynamical change of balance sheet
variables depends on agents’ individual decisions and on the result of agents interaction within
the different markets.
The scheduling of agents’ decisions and events
The elementary simulation time step is the calendar day, but most of agents’ decisions and
economic events happen with different periodicity and are generally asynchronous. For in-
stance, the financial market is active daily, the housing market is active monthly4, consumption
budget decisions are made monthly but purchases are made weekly, firms’ decisions about
production planning, new hirings, pricing, investments and financing are monthly. Finally, de-
cisions by policy makers can be monthly, quarterly or yearly. In particular, the policy rate is set
monthly and tax rates are adjusted yearly.
Consumption goods producers
We provide here a compact sequential list of the more relevant decisions made by the firms in
the model. More details can be found in Teglio et al. (2018). Expected values are denoted with
the superscript e, while desired values will be marked by a hat, e.g. x̂ , on a variable symbol.
Each firm, indicated with the subscript f , makes its decision asynchronously, according to its
activation day, on the following list of variables:
• the expected demand of consumption goods qeC f based on a linear interpolation of past
TC monthly sales;
• the desired level of inventories Î f to meet expected demand qeC f ;
4A calendar month is defined as a set of 20 days where a calendar week is 5 days.
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• the production q̄C f that is needed to accumulate the desired level of inventories Î f , i.e.,
q̄C f = max[0, Î f − I f ] ;
• the production plan q̂C f as a linear combination5 of production needs q̄C f and previous
month production qC f , i.e., q̂C f = λ q̄C f +(1−λ )qC f ;
• the labor force N̂ f needed and the amount of physical capital K̂ f needed to meet the
desired production plan, given the present endowment of capital goods K f , the present
number of employees N f , and a Cobb-Douglas production technology6;
• the myopic labor demand Ndf given by the difference, if not negative, between the needed
labor force N̂ f and the present number of employees N f ; labor demand fully depends on
the one-step forward expected demand of consumption goods, considering the current
level of capital as given;
• the planned investment in new capital goods ∆̂K f , bounded by the difference K̂ f −K f ,
comparing the price of capital goods pK and the present value of the foreseen additional
revenues generated by the investment; firms adjust investment demand, according to the
discounted long-term expected cash flows;
• the total financial needs M̂ f given by the foreseen cost of planned capital goods invest-
ments pK∆̂K f , planned labor costs w f N̂ f , debt interests I f and repayment δDD f , taxes
T f and the foreseen dividend payout nE f d f , i.e.,
M̂ f = pK∆̂K f +wN̂ f +I f +T f +nE f d f ; (2.1)
where δD is the monthly fraction of debt repayment and, considering the yearly interest
rate r f ,bi paid by firm f on its i-th debt of amount D f ,bi to bank b, monthly debt interests
payments are given by I f = ∑b,i
r f ,bi
12 D f ,bi ;
5This provision is aimed to smooth the production plan over time and then reduce oscillations of input demand.
6Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in economics literature. However, Leontief is more often
adopted in ABM models including our Iceace model, e.g., see Section 2.4 where we have examined impact of
mortgage types. As it is pointed out in Section 5.2.2, replacing Cobb-Douglas production function with Leontief or
another production function according to an underlying conceptual design would be quite simple.
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• the amount of new loan ̂̀f requested to the banking system, given by the difference
between M̂ f and present liquidity M f ;
• the amount of new shares ∆nE f to issue in the stock market if the firm is rationed in the
credit market, i.e., the new loan ` f received is lower than ̂̀f ;
• (in the case of rationing in the stock market) the reduction up to zero, in priority order,
of the total dividend payout, the investment plan and, eventually, the production plan, in
order to make the total financial needs consistent with available liquidity7.
Finally, firms complete the production process that, following a Cobb-Douglas technology,
delivers an amount of new consumption goods qC f given by the new levels of labor N f and
capital K f . The new produced goods are summed to present inventories and made available
for sale to households during the 20 business days following firms’ activation days. Finally,
the new sale price pC f is set based on a fixed mark-up µC on the overall unit costs cu f . At the
end of the 20-th day, the day before the activation day of the new calendar month, each firm
compute the income statement of the month and updates its balance sheet8.
Banks
Banks are always active on a daily basis being ready to receive loans requests from firms and
mortgage demands from households. In this section we describe the interaction between banks
and firms, while the novel part concerning mortgages to households for house purchase will
be described in more detail in Section 2.1.4. As outlined in the previous paragraph, each firm
sends a loan request at its activation day and firms’ activation days are uniformly distributed
during the calendar month. Whenever a bank receive a loan request ̂̀f by a firm f , the request
is evaluated and a loan eventually offered according to the following steps:
7If the available liquidity is not even sufficient to meet compulsory payments, i.e. debt service and taxes, then
the firm enters a process called illiquidity bankruptcy, where the firm fire all workers and stay inactive till it is able
to raise the necessary funds in the stock market.
8In particular, each firm updates the value of its net worth and if the equity becomes negative the firm is declared
insolvent. In that case, it enters a special process termed insolvency bankruptcy, where the firm fires all workers,
undergoes a restructuring of its debt with a related loan write-off and a corresponding equity loss on creditor banks’
balance sheets, and stays inactive for a period of time after which it enters again the market with a healthy balance
sheet. Physical capital of insolvent firms is therefore not lost but remains inactive for a while.
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• the bank assesses the risk of the new loan, first, by estimating the default probability πD f
of the prospective borrower, based on firm’ leverage along the lines of the Moody’s KMV
model (Saunders and Allen, 2010), then by assessing the risk weight ω̂̀f of the new loan
through an ad-hoc cubic function that approximates the so-called Basel II internal ratings
approach, after considering its graphical representation, as in Yeh et al. (2005), i.e.,
πD f =
D f + ̂̀f
D f + ̂̀f +E f ω̂̀f = 2.5(πD f )3 . (2.2)
The rationale is that the lower is the capital base of the borrower with respect to its debt,
the higher is the likelihood of default, and then the loan’s risk, because of possible equity
losses due to negative earnings;
• the bank b checks if its risk-weighted portfolio of total loans (including mortgages) plus
the new prospective loan, weighted by its risk, still fulfills regulatory capital require-





ω`i `i +ω̂̀f ̂̀f) ; (2.3)
where Ψ is a policy parameter, ranging from 0 to 1, set by the regulatory provisions of
the banking system;
• the bank b rejects the loan requests or otherwise it offers to firm f a loan amount `b, f ≤ ̂̀f
to the extent the capital requirement condition of Eq. 2.3 is satisfied. In any case, the
new loan is offered for a duration of T` months at a yearly interest rate rb, f , given by
central bank rate plus a risk premium depending on the estimated loan risk ω` f .
The firm sending the loan request ranks the loan offers received according to their interest
rates, and accept the loan offers characterized by the lowest rates up to the amount of money
requested.
At the end of any calendar month, each bank computes its income statement along with
income taxes and net earnings, then decides the dividends payout to be paid each first day of
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the calendar month, and updates its balance sheet. All net earnings, if positive, are paid out
as dividends, unless the bank had to decline loan requests because of the regulatory capital
requirements constraint. In this case, the bank retains all net earnings to increase its equity
base.
Households
Households are potentially active on a daily basis in the financial market, accessing the
market according to a given participation probability. If unemployed, they also look for new
jobs on a daily basis. Their activity in the housing market, instead, is on a monthly basis, and
more details are provided in Section 2.1.4.
In particular, at any daily simulation step, each household decides to change the allocation of
its financial asset portfolio with given exogenously probability πH . If selected, the household
forms beliefs about the expected returns of all financial assets (firms’ share and government
bond) according a weighted average of fundamentalist, random and chartist prototype expected
return formation, compute the new “optimal" asset allocation according to preference structure
based on myopic loss aversion hypothesis taken from prospect theory (see Raberto et al.
(2008); Benartzi and Thaler (1995) for further details), and then issue buy and sell orders to
get its desired optimal allocation.
After financial market transactions are closed, unemployed households enter the labor mar-
ket, where each household evaluates job offers and applies to the set of jobs characterized by
the highest wages provided that they are higher than its reservation wage9. If the household
is not successful in getting a new job, it decreases its reservation wage by a constant rate δw
and then starts a new cycle of job offers evaluation/application. If the job search is again
unsuccessful, the household decreases again its reservation wage by the same rate δw and stays
9The reservation wage is set to the latest received wage and then is heterogeneous among households
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unemployed till next day when it will start a new cycle.
Employed households receive their salary from their employers on a monthly basis but at dif-
ferent days which coincide with firms’ activation days, which are the times when they are hired.
Salaries w f are equal among the employees of the same firm f but differentiate among firms, ac-
cording to the labor market outcome, as firms raise their wage offer if unable to find the needed
employees. Households employed in the public sector receive from the government a public
wage wg, which is set equal to the average wage in the private sector in the last 12 months.
Unemployed households receive on a monthly basis from the government an unemployed ben-
efit10 which is paid the same day of the month the household is fired. The day of the month
a households receive the salary or the unemployment benefit, it gets also a transfer payment11
yTh from the government and computes and pays taxes on both labor/unemployment benefits
income yLh and capital income (stocks’ dividends yEh and bonds’ coupons yBh received during
the previous 20 business days). The same day the household receives its labor/unemployment
benefit income, it also determines its monthly consumption budget Ch, which is modelled ac-
cording to the theory of buffer-stock saving behavior (Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), which
states that households consumption depends on a precautionary saving motive, determined by
a target ratio ωC of liquid wealth12 Wh to total net income before mortgage related payments
yh,net. In particular, the total net income is given by:





where τL and τK are the tax rates on labor and capital income, respectively. The monthly
consumption budget then is determined by:





10The unemployment benefit is set at a fraction ξU of the latest salary received by the households
11The transfer payment is set to a fraction ξT of the average wage among households
12The liquid wealth is given liquidity plus the market value of the stocks and government bonds portfolio.
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where mU,h is the household’s mortgage related payments, and ξC gives the speed of adjustment
of consumption to meet the desired wealth to income target ratio.
Centralbank
The central bank is in charge of monetary policy and, on a monthly basis, it sets the policy
rate, which is the cost of liquidity provided to banks. In particular, at the beginning of each
month, the central bank collects the information about the latest values of inflation and un-
employment in the Eurace economy and sets the interest rate rCB for the incoming month as
follows:









where πC is the yearly-to-date inflation rate, r∗ is the assumed real interest rate, π̂C is the
inflation target, υ̂N is the unemployment target, and υN is the previous month unemployment
rate.
It is worth noting that Eq. 2.6 resembles the well known Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), but
departs from the standard one for the use of the unemployment rate, and then of a sort of
unemployment gap, instead of the output gap. The reason of this choice is practical as it is
not obvious, in particular in an agent-based model, how the output gap could be measured.
However, the two measures are clearly strongly interconnected and the unemployment gap
used in Eq. 2.6 is certainly a satisfactory indicator of economic recession.
Another role of the central bank is the provision of a standing facility to grant liquidity in
infinite supply to commercial banks, when they are in short supply.
Government
The government is in charge of fiscal and welfare policies. The revenues of the government
come from taxes that are applied to four sources: corporate earnings, consumption, capital
income (dividends and bond coupons) and labour income (wages and unemployment benefits).
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Taxes are collected on a monthly basis, while the four related tax rates are usually revised
yearly, depending on the particular fiscal policy adopted.
Governments expenditures include the labor cost of public sector employees13, unemploy-
ment benefits, transfers and government bond coupons. On a monthly basis, if in short of
liquidity, the government decides to issue new bonds, which are directly sold in the bond mar-
ket at a discounted price with respect to the market price pG, and then purchased by households.
In case of a budget surplus, the government can repurchase its bonds entering the market by
offering a higher price with respect to the market price pG. The government determines the
quantity of bonds to issue or to repurchase on a monthly basis, but there is a smoothing across
the month. Government enters the bond market on a daily basis. Government bonds are per-
petuities that pay a monthly fixed coupon that depends on the bond nominal value p̂G and the
fixed nominal yearly interest rate rG. Government bonds are traded in a centralized Walrasian
financial market. The clearing mechanism determines the market price of the bonds. Govern-
ment bond market price depends on the trading behavior of households, which discount future
bond coupons with the central bank policy rate.
13The number of public employees is set at a fixed percentage ξG of the total household population.
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Non-Financial Private Agents (NFPAs) Policy Makers
Sectors / Agents Hous (H) CGPs (F) KGP (K) Banks (B) Gov(G) Central Bank (CB) Σ
Tangible Capital +XH pX +KF pK +Xh pX +KF pK
Inventories +IF pc +IF pc









+MH +MF +MK -DB





Gov Bonds +nHG pG –nG pG +n
CB
G pG 0
Equity Shares (+) /
Net worth (-)












Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.1: Sectorial balance sheet matrix. A plus (minus) sign corresponds to agents’ assets (liabilities) and each column can be read as the aggregated balance sheet of a specific sector
(e.g. households). Rows show assets and claims of assets among sectors, thus generally adding up to zero. Exceptions are the value of capital (KF pK ), housing units (XH pX ) and inventories
(KF pK ), and households’ equity shares, which are issued by CGPs, KGP and banks and do not add up to zero because of the difference between market price and book value. Note that CGP
stands for Consumption Goods Producer and KGP stands for Capital Goods Producer.
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Households (H) CGPs (F) KGP (K) Banks (B) Government (G) Central Bank (CB) Σ
Current
Account
Consumption – + 0
Wages + – – – 0
Transfers + – 0
Investment – + 0
Taxes – – – – + 0
Dividends + – – – 0
Coupons + – + 0
CB coupons payback + – 0
Banks loan interests – + 0
Banks mortgage interests – + 0
Banks mortgage principal payments – + 0
CB loans interests – + 0
CB interests payback + – 0
= = = = = =
Net cash flow Savings Profits Profits Profits Surplus Seignoirage 0
Capital
Account
Net cash flow +Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
∆ Capital +Σ f ∆K f pK –∆KK pK 0





∆ Issue of new
shares / bonds
–Σ f pE f ∆nE f
–pEG ∆nEG
+Σ f pE f ∆nE f +pEG ∆nEG 0








& ∆ Banks’ deposits
–∆ MH –∆ MF –∆ MK +∆ DB 0
∆ Banks / Public Liquidity
& ∆ Central bank deposits
–∆ MB –∆ MG +∆ DCB 0
∆ CB Liquidity /
∆ Fiat Money
+∆ MCB−∆ FiatCB 0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.2: Sectorial transaction flow matrix. The current account describes the flows of revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus sign) that agents get and make. Agents are reported in the
columns and monetary flows are reported in the rows. The result of agents’ sector transactions is the net cash flow. The capital account section describes the balance sheets changes related
to each sector. Subscripts represent the index of the agent to which the stock refers. Uppercase subscripts are used when the stock refers to a whole sector, whereas lowercase subscripts
are used when it refers to a single agent (for instance in the case of sums). Finally, superscript characters are introduced when the balance sheet counterpart is more than one single sector.
The households column, for example, shows the generation of households’ savings in the current account part. Then, in the capital account part, it is shown that savings plus the received
mortgages, plus the money received by the central bank for QE (+pEG ∆n
QE
EG
) are used to buy a higher bond/stock endowment (−Σ f pE f ∆nE f −Σ f pE f ∆nE f ) or to “buy” new deposits (−∆ MH ).
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2.1.4 Housing market extension
This extended version of the model integrates a housing market into the Eurace artificial
economy. It designs and implements a mortgaging mechanism, which enables us to explore
the role of the housing market in the economy and its impact on business cycles. Besides, this
extended model enables us to conduct and analyze various housing market regulatory policies.
The extension covers (i) households’ seller and buyer behaviors at the housing market, (ii) a
house pricing mechanism, (iii) households’ mortgage requests and banks’ mortgage lending
behavior, (iv) and households’ mortgage default conditions and their consequences.
The housing market is active on the first day of every calendar month. Households are
activated in the market with an exogenous probability ΦH , to assume randomly the role of
buyer or seller with equal likelihood. The reason of this random selection is that we are more
interested in the credit aspects of housing market, and its impact on the economy as a whole.
However, we allow also for a special case, called fire sale case, where households enter the
housing market because they are financially distressed and are forced to sell their houses at a
discounted price with respect to the last average market price pH . In any case, households are
allowed to sell a housing unit only if they own at least two of them, i.e., households cannot
become homeless.
The market is a posted price market with decentralized exchange, and households can sell or
buy one housing unit at a time. If a household h is randomly picked to enter the housing market
with a seller role, she/he posts one of her/his housing units for sale at price pHh given by:
pHh = pH(1+ξ ϕH) , (2.7)
where ξ is a random draw from uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and ϕH is the maximum
percentage price increase of housing price with respect to the previous month average price
pH . Conversely, if a household h is financially distressed, she/he posts one of her/his housing
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unit for sale at price pHh given by:
pHh = pH(1−ξ ϕS) , (2.8)
where ξ is a random draw from uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and ϕS is the maximum
fire sale price reduction. The rationale behind Eq. 2.8 is that financially distressed households
post their housing units for sale at a discounted price to increase the likelihood of a transaction
to be able to reduce their indebtedness and future mortgage payments. Conversely, we stipulate
that normal seller households don’t have any particular necessity to liquidate their housing
units and therefore are willing to sell only if they can realize a small random gain with respect
to the last housing market price pH .
For the clearing, buyers are randomly queued. Each buyer in the queue takes turn one by one
aiming the cheapest available housing unit. The housing units in the model are homogeneous.
A transaction takes place only when the buyer has the necessary financial resources or is able
to get a mortgage from a bank. Then the transaction takes place with the price posted by the
seller. The housing market closes when all buyers have had their turn or there are no more
houses for sale. The monthly housing price of the market pH is the average of the realized
transaction prices within the month.
Mortgage lending
We consider variable rate mortgages where the annualized rate rH is determined at the be-






Mortgage payments are monthly and they spread over TM years. Monthly mortgage payments
Rn of each mortgage n include both the interests and the principal installment, where the latter
is fixed for each mortgage and determined by the ratio between the initial mortgage amount
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and mortgage duration in months. Monthly interest payments are computed on the outstanding
mortgage principal according to the mortgage rate rtH which follows the central bank interest
rate, rtCB.
Regulation measures and policies
Buyers may use their cash to buy housing units or, if they do not have enough liquidity, they
request mortgages from banks. However, in the experiments for this study, the households are
financing the whole housing purchase by credit money, that is loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is set
to 1. See the next section for more details. It should be noted that banks are able to provide
mortgages only if they fulfill the capital adequacy conditions imposed by the regulator, as in
equation 2.3. Banks evaluate mortgage requests according to the following two alternative
criteria.
• Flow Control - Constraints on housing debt payment ratio: This measure is widely
known as DSTI, the debt service to income (Svensson, 2014a). The ratio of mortgage
payment of a household to her disposable income is used to check her credibility. In other
words, banks evaluate applicants capability to face mortgage repayments before granting
it. In particular, banks compare household’s net income1 (both labor and capital) earned
in the last quarter with household’s expected quarterly mortgage payments, including
both old outstanding mortgages and the new requested mortgage. The measure primes
the repayment performance of a household and enables us to relate a flow, the mortgage
payment, to another flow, the disposable income. In the simulations, it is referred as β
policy parameter. A household’s quarterly mortgage payment, mqU,h, and her quarterly
net income, yqnet,h, is used to check her credibility. The credibility of a household is
checked against a housing budget constraint parameter, β , as follows:
mqU,h
yqnet,h
≤ β . (2.10)
1Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 in the Appendix reports a household’s income and her/his wealth.
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• Stock Control - Constraints on household’s net wealth ratio: Household’s net wealth
(equity, Eh) over total wealth (assets, Ah) is used as a stock-control measure. If this ratio
is high enough, the household is able to request the mortgage. In our current implemen-
tation, the stock control parameter is called equity to asset ratio (ETA) and it is labeled
as γ . Under this regulation, households’ net wealth is considered as an insurance in case
of default or repayment difficulties. The wealth of the household is computed after the
mortgage request, in order to keep into account the impact of the mortgage amount on
household’s balance sheet; wealth includes the value of housing units, financial assets,




From the lending side, a bank’s equity and volume of its risky assets is used to compute its
leverage. The maximum leverage for the bank is regulated by central bank. In the model, a
bank needs to satisfy Basel II accords as it has been the case in base Eurace artificial economy.
It is typically a capital adequacy ratio of, i.e. 8%. That is, with that specific value, ratio of risk
valued assets of a bank to equity of a bank should be less than 12.5. However, this value can
be adjusted dynamically and endogenously by the central bank during a simulation run time.
The adjustment can be tailored according to an experimentation policy. For instance, status of
total private debt in the economy or unemployment level can be used to adjust the maximum
allowed leverage. An additional safety buffer ratio such as 0.75% can be further added to have
a tighter capital control.
Lending out mortgage is assumed to increase financial risk of a bank. Upon a mortgage
request there are two criteria to be fulfilled before the requested mortgage is released. First,
the household needs to pass credibility evaluation before placing the request. The criteria,
depending on the policy in place, can be either via the stock control or via the flow control or
both. Second, the bank should still be able to preserve its capital adequacy after delivery of the
requested amount.
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Mortgage defaults - Debt restructuring: A household is financially distressed if the ratio
of quarterly mortgage payments to quarterly net labor plus capital income, that is the debt
service to income ratio of the household h, is higher than a given threshold βh≥ΨS. A financial
stressed household is forced to go to housing market as a fire seller as described above in
Equation 2.8. If the total mortgage payments of a household exceeds a larger threshold βh ≥
ΨW > ΨS, then the household undergoes a mortgage restructuring with a consequent loss on
the equity of the respective bank. Instead of a complete write-off, households’ mortgage is
restructured by a ΨR ratio:
L̂h = ΨR Lh (2.12)
The restructuring mechanism allows a gradual burden on banking considering the probabil-
ity that a household may recover from financial stress. For the sake of simplicity and control
on model dynamics, in this study, mortgage restructuring does not imply a direct housing asset
ownership from households to banks. From a balance-sheet stock consistency point, this im-
plies a direct and corresponding reduction on the creditors’ wealth (equity). For the calibrated
values of these thresholds please refer to Table 2.3.
Calibration of the housing market within Eurace
A typical challenge of any agent based modelling is to be able calibrate model’s parameters
and to initialize model’s population in a way that is theoretically and empirically acceptable
and relevant to the focus of the study. In this work, parameters and variables of housing mar-
ket mechanisms are incorporated into Eurace artificial economy staying within the domain of
empirically observed patterns. Table 2.3 summarizes calibration of housing market parameters
within Eurace model.
The population size in the Eurace model is constant and so it is the number of housing units
in the model. Each housing unit is identical to others and can not be transacted partially. At
the initialization phase of the model, each household is assigned a fixed and equal number of
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such housing units. The re-allocation of the housing units within the economy is governed
endogenously via housing market. Households’ are able to acquire a new housing unit one at a
time only when they are active at housing market and if they are eligible to get a full mortgage
that covers whole value of the housing unit to be bought. In other terms, loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio is set to 1. From a behavioral modeling perspective, this simplification enables us to
observe endogenous money creation in a clearer manner and to examine the direct impact
of different mortgage eligibility criteria on the economy. It should be noted that in reality a
household’s decision to invest in housing assets is complex and multifaceted. It may involve
complicated and diverse asset portfolios due to various saving and consumption decisions,
expectations or speculations regarding returns on housing units, etc.
The repayment of bank loans has two components, i.e., a monthly principal payment and a
monthly interest payment. The duration of a mortgage loan is fixed and calibrated as outlined
below. Each monthly principal installment is constant and is spread over whole loan duration.
The interest payment on remaining installments is adjusted to the latest central bank interest
announcement plus a fixed cap of 1%.
We make a set of assumptions in order to determine the initial housing unit price and the
initial ratio of housing assets to total assets of a household, as well as for determining the
mortgage loan duration in the model. These assumptions are based on empirical facts. In
order to set the initial housing price, we observe the ratio of housing prices to average yearly
wage income in European urban areas. The majority of these ratios, until the end of 2013,
lie in between 4 and 12 (Deloitte Real Estate, 2014; FinansInspektionen Mortgage Survey,
2014). Based on this observation, we have picked a median rate, which is equal to 8. In
the Eurace artificial economy the initial average yearly wage is 12×w0f , where w0f is average
start-up wage offered by firms. This allows us to set a housing value which is equivalent to
8×12×w0f = 96w0f . Recent surveys hint that a ‘healthy’ debt to income ratio should be around
one third of disposable income (Meh et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2014). This is also the most
general rate which is used by banks at determining the allowable loan amount for a mortgage
requests (Dubecq and Ghattassi, 2009; Borsch-Supan, 1994; Gharaie et al., 2012). Accordingly,
we have estimated that households are able to use up to one third of their net disposable income
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Symbol Description Value
β Debt Service To Income (DSTI) 0.0 to 0.6
γ Equity To Assets ratio (ETA) 0.6 to 0.8
ϕH Maximum selling price increase 0.025
ϕS Maximum fire sale price reduction 0.05
ΨS DSTI threshold for fire sale triggering 0.6
ΨW DSTI threshold for mortgage write-off triggering 0.7
ΨR Mortgage re-structuring ratio 0.75
r0H Mortgage spread on top of r
t
CB 0.01
ΦH Housing market entrance exogenous probability 0.5
w0f Initial wage of firms 1
X0h Initial amount of housing units per household 5
P0H Initial price of one housing unit 20w
0
f
PtW 0 Initial ratio of housing prices to average yearly wage income 8
TM Mortgage duration in years 30
LTV Ratio of housing value covered by mortgages 1
Table 2.3: Calibration of Housing Market parameters. The upper row block denotes the range of regulation parameters used
during the policy experiments. The lower row block tabulates the calibrated initializations of housing market related parameters,
where w0f is the initial average yearly wage. The initial reference wage level of base Eurace model is used to set the values for the
rest of housing market parameters. For details of calibration process see Section 2.1.4.
to serve their mortgage payments. Assuming that 80% of households’ gross wage is disposable,
we have identified 12×0.8×1/3 = 3.2w0f as a valid debt service level per year. This implies
that in the Eurace artificial economy 96/3.2 = 30years is a reasonable loan duration. In a
relatively stable economy, applying a 4% mortgage interest rate is acceptable. This rounds up to
an initial housing value which is equivalent of 100w0f . Looking at the components of household
assets of several large survey data, it can be seen that real estate assets form around half of the
total assets of households (Meh et al., 2009). This is also the composition of households’ assets
in the Eurace artificial economy: initial household’s wealth in Eurace, excluding real estate, is
approximately 100w0f . Hence, a housing value allocation of 100w
0
f , is in line with empirical
patterns. The initial housing assets of the household are divided into 5 tradable units, and the
market price of each unit is set to 20w0f . An overall summary of the initialization of the relevant
parameters of the housing market is reported in Table 2.3.
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2.1.5 Results
The artificial economy is populated by 3000 households, 50 consumption goods producers,
1 investment good producer, 1 government, 3 banks, and 1 central bank. For each combination
of parameters that are under investigation the economy is simulated for 30 years. Each simu-
lation run, corresponding to a different parameter set, is performed with 50 different seeds of a
random number generator.
Sensitivity of the results to differing population size has been checked. An additional set
of simulations are run where we have used double big and half small population sizes while
keeping all other parameters constant. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the stability as of key exemplary
variables. The statistical tests, reported in the figure, demonstrate that economic performance
indicators are statistically stable against differing population sizes.
Results are presented in two steps. The first step, in Section 2.1.5, explains the macroeco-
nomic effects of designing an housing market and a related mortgage market into the Eurace
model. The second step, in Section 2.1.5, describes how regulation (or deregulation) of banks
mortgages affects the housing market performance and, in general, the main economic indica-
tors.
The housing market role in the economy
In the baseline version of the model, households are endowed with a fixed number of housing
units but they have no possibility to buy new housing units or to sell them, meaning that the
housing market is frozen, or nonexistent. This baseline version of the model corresponds to a
required debt service to-income ratio (DSTI) equal to zero: households are never eligible for a
mortgage and are therefore unable to enter the housing market (see Section 2.1.4). For values
of the required DSTI higher than zero, households are able to obtain mortgages from banks,
according to their expectation to be able to pay them back. Higher DSTI requirements mean a
looser banking regulation and an easiest access to bank credit.
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(a) GDP per capita. ANOVA: F-value = 0.27, p-value = 0.76. (b) Wages. ANOVA: F-value = 1.25, p-value = 0.29.
(c) Mortgage per capita. ANOVA: F-value = 0.014, p-value =
0.98.
Figure 2.1: Sensitivity test to differing population sizes. The results presented in the paper are based on a population with 3000
households. We have run new simulations with double and half population sizes while keeping all other parameters constant
(As of key policy parameters, ETA = 0.7 and DSTI = 0.3 are used in all of the seeds for this sensitivity analyses. In the actual
experiments where we present results with 3000 households running using 50 different seeds for each parameter configuration,
DSTI is varied from 0 to 0.6 and ETA is varied from 0.6 to 0.8). For each population we have run simulations with 10 different
seeds. The plots are distributions from key exemplary variables. We have conducted ANOVA tests to compare outcomes. The
box-plots and the test results demonstrate that results are statistical stable against differing population sizes. The same pattern
has been observed in other variables that are not displayed here. Nevertheless, the box-plots hint observation of fewer outliers as














































(b) Real GDP Level
Figure 2.2: Unemployment and real GDP over different DSTI. The line that divides each box into two halves is the median value,
where each half corresponds to a quartile of the underlining distribution. The diamond shaped point denotes the mean of the
distribution. All observations from the entire run time of each simulation seed are used for the calculation of the values that
determine the shape of the box-plot and hence the distribution of the observed variable. This applies to all of the box-plots in this
paper.



































Figure 2.3: Mortgages and firms’loans over different DSTI. Figure 2.3a is the level of the mortgage in the economy. Figure 2.3b
is total loans level in the economy.
Figures from 2.2a to 2.6b summarize in box-plots2 the effect of different DSTI requirements
on the main indicators of the economy. In this section we focus on the first two values of
DSTI= 0 and DSTI= 0.1, which highlight the transition from an economy without housing
(and mortgage) market to an economy with housing (and mortgage) market. The economic
impact of different regulation strategies, i.e., higher or lower DSTIs, will be discussed in the
next section.
In order to understand the housing market role in the economy we show also some sample
trajectories of several aggregated variables like loans, consumption and unemployment. Fig-
ures from 2.7 to 2.11 show these trajectories for three selected values of DSTI. Again, we will
focus for the moment on the difference between an economy with or without housing market,
2Please note that on each box-plot displayed in this paper, the line that divides each box into two halves is the
median value, where each half corresponds to a quartile of the underlining distribution. The diamond shaped point
denotes the mean of the distribution. All observations from the entire run time of each simulation seed are used
for the calculation of the values that determine the shape of the box-plot and hence the distribution of the observed
variable.
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(a) Housing fire sales















Figure 2.4: Fire sales and debt write-off over different DSTI. Figure 2.4a is the the total fire sale cases in the housing market.
Figure 2.4b is total mortgage write-offs in the economy.








































(b) Consumption goods price
Figure 2.5: Total firms’ bankruptcies and price level over different DSTI. Figure 2.5a is the bankruptcies occurrences. Figure 2.5b
is the consumption goods price level.










































Figure 2.6: Real consumption and investments over different DSTI. Figure 2.6a is the level of real consumption. Figure 2.6b is
the level of real investments.
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Figure 2.7: Time trajectories of real consumption (upper panel) and real investment (lower panel) over different DSTI(β ) values.
The figure demonstrates time trajectories for a specific random seed, i.e. a single simulation, presenting interaction between
consumption and investment.
i.e., DSTI equal to zero or different from zero. The time series of these plots correspond to a
specific random seed, whereas the aforementioned box-plots represent all the set of used seeds
for the simulations.
By visually analyzing the sample time series, it clearly emerges that the presence of a mort-
gage market increases money supply. Figure 2.8 shows that for positive DSTIs banks start
to grant mortgages and the total amount of credit in the economy raises. This higher credit
amount affects on one side the money supply (bank deposits on Figure 2.9) and on the other
side the housing price (Figure 2.10).
These results are still valid if we observe the whole set of simulations. Figure 2.3a shows
that the mortgage level becomes positive when DSTI departs from zero (compare DSTI = 0
and = 0.1). In general, all features observed in the time series plot for one seed are confirmed
in the box-plots for all seeds.
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Figure 2.8: Time trajectories of firms loans (top panel), mortgages (middle panel), and total credit (bottom panel) over different
DSTI(β ) values.





































Figure 2.9: Time trajectories of bank deposits and bank equities over different DSTI(β ) values.
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Figure 2.10: Housing unit prices and fire sales. The bottom left panel displays fire sale cases when DSTI(β ) = 0.3. The bottom
right panel reveals increased fire sale cases with DSTI (β ) = 0.6.




































Figure 2.11: Time trajectories of real GDP and unemployment rates over different DSTI, β , values. The figure demonstrates time
trajectories for a specific random seed, i.e. a single simulation, presenting interaction between the production capacity and the
level of employment.
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The mortgage-driven endogenous monetary expansion The mortgages granted by banks
directly affect households deposits. As it is well known3, whenever a bank gives a mortgage,
it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new
money, which is finally transfered to the deposit of the household who is selling the house.
This endogenous money creation mechanism affects households aggregated demand, sustain-
ing consumption. From Figure 2.6a we see that the level of real consumption is higher when the
endogenous creation of money is reinforced by the existence of banks mortgages (DSTI≥ 0.1).
In equation 2.5 we can see how the new endogenous money created by mortgages is chan-
neled into the real economy through households consumption. Mortgage money ends into the
payment accounts of the house sellers, raising their liquidity. Households’ consumption in
the model is not affected directly by housing ownership, i.e., the individual desired level of
consumption does not depend explicitly on households housing assets4. However, the higher
liquidity in households’ deposits creates a buffer that helps households to achieve their desired
consumption level, both in boom and recession periods 5. This effect can be observed by com-
paring the higher stability of consumption across different simulation seeds in Figure 2.6a. The
reduction in dispersion between DSTI= 0 and DSTI= 0.1 shows the role of endogenous money
in stabilizing consumption, apart from increasing its average level.
Looking at Figure 2.5b we observe a similar situation for consumption price levels. The
money injection, due to new mortgages (from DSTI= 0 to DSTI= 0.1), raises the level of
prices but also increases the stability of prices, given a more stable consumption goods demand
pattern.
Supporting aggregated demand improves firms sales, giving more resources for investments
to firms. Comparing box-plots of real investments and firms loans between DSTI= 0 and
DSTI= 0.1, it emerges that higher consumption (i.e., higher sales) affects firms investment
3See for instance the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1
4See (Muellbauer, 2012). It demonstrates that housing wealth does not have a very strong impact on the con-
sumption level. The study is based on data from developed countries.
5Households consumption depends on a precautionary saving motive, determined by a target ratio ωC of liquid
wealth Wh to total net income yneth (see equation 2.5)
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Figure 2.12: Time trajectories of the growth in GDP, loans to firms, and mortgages to households within Eurace Artificial Econ-
omy. Sample time trajectories hints that GDP growth leads the growth in loans to consumption goods producers (upper panel)
while it lags the growth in mortgages to the households (lower panel). For the cross correlation of the dynamics see Figure 2.13.
decision and, consequently, raises the level of loans requested by firms and granted by banks.
See Figure 2.6b for investments and Figure 2.3b for firm loans.
Therefore, real GDP is positively affected by the presence of an housing market in the Eu-
race economy, both in terms of total production and of economic stability, measured here by
the dispersion level around the median. Observing the unemployment rate we draw similar
conclusion. The average rate of unemployment (the diamond in Figure 2.2a) decreases from
DSTI= 0 to DSTI= 0.1, as it does the variability across different simulations seeds. This,
again, suggests that the additional amount of endogenous money created by mortgages tends
to stabilize the main economic indicators, including the employment rate.
Stylized facts on credit and GDP We have shown that the presence of mortgages affects
consumption and sales, which in turn stimulate investments and firms loans demand. This
propagation mechanism is actually confirmed by empirical evidence. In the past three decades,
within the Eurozone, growth rates of loans to firms revealed a relatively stable relationships
with the business cycle (European Central Bank, 2013). The growth rate of loans to non-
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Figure 2.13: The dynamic relationship between loans, mortgages and the business cycle in the model. The upper panel denotes
the cross correlation between total Loan and Real GDP, while the lower panel displays the cross correlation between Mortgages
and Real GDP. Note that GDP growth leads when lags have − signs and it lags when they have + signs.
financial corporations tend to lag real GDP fluctuations. On the other side, mortgages to
households exhibit a correlation with real GDP growth and lead the cycle slightly 6. Our com-
putational results in Figure 2.13 show similar patterns. The figure demonstrates the dynamic
relationship between loans, mortgages and the business cycle in the model.
The upper plot in Figure 2.12 and 2.13 suggests that loans to the private sector lag GDP
growth. The phase difference is observed to be around 2 quarters. This phase difference we
observe in the Eurace model is somewhat shorter than the differences that have been observed
in empirical data, where it can go up to one year. This difference may be explained by the mod-
eling simplifications where firm agents’ responses to aggregate demand variation are shorter.
The lower panel in the same figure displays a clear lead of mortgages to business cycles. This
lead of mortgages can partly be explained by the already mentioned mechanism where any
housing transaction causes injection of money in the economy whose size is proportional to the
value of the housing unit.
6For a recent overview, see the box “Stylized Facts of Money" in European Central Bank (2013)
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The lagging pattern of loans to firms over the business cycle may suggest that during recov-
eries firms can first finance investment expenditure using their internal funds, as cash flows
improve during a recovery, and only later they seek for external financing (as suggested by
European Central Bank (2013)). On the other way around, it may also indicate that during
recessions the reduction of banks equity capital caused by firms defaults prevents further loan
issuing, due to Basel II restrictions.
The lead of mortgages confirms that mortgages produce an injection of liquidity to house-
holds and hence an increase in demand, production, and GDP growth. This, in turn, increases
demand for investment at producers’ side, which leads them to request more loans from the
banking sector. Overall, what we observe is a pattern of systematic responses, where money
creation via mortgages is responded by a growth in GDP and later an increase in loan requests
for further investment in productions. A comparison of upper and lower panels in Figures 2.12
and 2.13 clearly reveals this dynamics.
Mortgage lending regulations
In previous sections, the impact of housing market in the Eurace model has been described,
showing the central role of endogenous money creation triggered by the mortgage market ac-
tivation. However, a legitimate question arises: to what extent an increasing amount of mort-
gages, corresponding to an easier and less regulated access to credit, improves the economic
performance and stabilizes the economy? In order to answer this question, we gradually relax
the financial constraints of the mortgage lending regulation, allowing households with higher
debt-to-income ratios (DSTI) to receive credit from banks. This relaxation of credit constraints
is associated with the increase of DSTI threshold, i.e, when DSTI is high enough also citizens
with low income with respect to the debt service are eligible for a mortgage. A high value of
DSTI could also be labeled as sub-prime lending, recalling the recent housing market crisis in
the U.S.
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Looking at the box-plot figures, resuming results for all seeds, we can try to give an answer
to the question. Figure 2.3a shows that the total amount of mortgages in the economy is sharply
raising up to a certain level of DSTI (around 0.4), but it tends to stabilize or to even decline
afterward. Mortgages overtake total loans from DSTI = 0.4, but at the same time they boost
the level of loans in the economy for low DSTI, as shown in Figure 2.3b. The same pattern
is confirmed for bank deposits in Figure 2.9, which do not increase any more when regulation
becomes too loose. On the other hand, the stability of the housing market is seriously under-
mined by a loose regulation, as shown in Figure 2.4a and Figure 2.4b. When credit is given to
fragile, or sub-prime borrowers, the number of housing units fire-sales increases, driving down
the housing price and triggering many debt write-off, that in turn damage banks equity capital.
This propagation mechanism can be observed both in the box-plots and in the time trajecto-
ries. Looking at the loosest regulation case (See DSTI = 0.6 on box-plots in Figures 2.4a, 2.4b,
2.5a, and time series in Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10), a clear time structure can be observed. Fire
sales tend to increase in the last part of a boom, causing a crash of the housing price and, af-
terwards, a strong reduction in banks equity and therefore in banks financial stability. Through
the channel of the reduced lending capacity of banks, also real economy can be affected, as the
two crisis around year 21 and year 29 clearly show.
We can summarize that the benefit of additional endogenous money creation is no more
relevant after a certain DSTI threshold, i.e., bank deposits grow quickly up to DSTI = 0.3, and
then stabilize. On the other hand for higher DSTI the economy becomes more unstable; the
average number of total firms defaults in Figure 2.5a has a parabolic shape with a minimum
value around DSTI = 0.4. In particular, the considerable difference between mean and median
for high DSTI values suggests the presence of simulation seeds with disastrous outcomes in
terms of firms defaults chains.
Looking at real GDP in Figure 2.2b a slight decreasing trend can be observed from DSTI
= 0.3 onward. A similar pattern is followed, i.e., by the unemployment rate and by the GDP
components, consumption and investments, etc. Figures 2.11 and 2.7, respectively, demon-










































































































Figure 2.14: Stock control, ETA(γ), regulations when coupled with a flow control regulation of DSTI(β ) = 0.5. For a detailed
comparison as of different combinations of γ and β see Table 2.4 and Table 2.5
effects related to the introduction of an housing market mechanism in the economy become
weaker when the regulation of mortgage loans becomes too loose.
Stock Flow Control Role in Housing Market We finally consider in our analysis the
impact of banking regulation on mortgages based on stock control rather than flow control.
We already introduced the recent debate on this subject, and we present here some results
obtained with the Eurace model. We recall that, according to the stock control regulation,
a household will get a mortgage if its net wealth over total wealth ratio (ETA, i.e., Equity
over Total Assets) is higher than a threshold γ . Therefore, if γ is high the regulation is tighter,
and households with high debt with respect to their total wealth are less likely to get a new loan.
We explore three stock control policies, tightening for increasing γ values (from 0.6 to
0.8) combined with three flow control policy, i.e., DSTI, tightening for decreasing β values
(from 0.5 to 0.3), for a total of nine different policies. Table 2.5 shows the values of the main
economic indicators for each policy combination, while Table 2.4 focuses on indicators strictly
related to the housing/mortgage market. Figures 2.14 shows a set of box-plots comparing the
impact of the three stock control policies in the case of a threshold β = 0.5 for flow control
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Figure 2.15: A sample time trajectory, i.e., from a single seed, comparing impacts of combined loose vs strict regulatory policies
on Mortgage Levels and Number of Transactions in housing market. Strict policy control is denoted by the solid line (−) and
loose policy control is denoted by strip line (- -)
































Figure 2.16: A sample time trajectory, i.e., from a single seed, comparing impacts of combined loose vs strict regulatory policies
on average House Price and number of Fire Sale cases. Strict policy control is denoted by the solid line (−) and loose policy
control is denoted by strip line (- -).
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β γ=0.6 γ=0.7 γ=0.8
Average House Price
0.3 142 (1) 137 (1) 95 (0)
0.4 172 (1) 158 (1) 96 (0)
0.5 178 (2) 166 (1) 97 (0)
Average Transaction
Volume
0.3 5613 (18) 5481 (18) 4857 (14)
0.4 6169 (23) 5837 (15) 4912 (17)
0.5 6555 (33) 6098 (17) 4974 (14)
Household Mortgage
growth
0.3 9.79 (0.05) 9.67 (0.04) 9.52 (0.03)
0.4 10.73 (0.06) 10.28 (0.04) 9.62 (0.03)
0.5 10.98 (0.08) 10.58 (0.05) 9.68 (0.03)
Average Fire-Sale
0.3 0.50 (0.06) 0.27 (0.02) 0.13 (0.01)
0.4 4.01 (0.65) 1.68 (0.10) 0.43 (0.02)
0.5 15.37 (1.63) 4.99 (0.23) 0.73 (0.04)
Average Write Off
0.3 52.77 (7.95) 35.54 (6.34) 9.86 (0.29)
0.4 120.03 (7.50) 89.48 (7.47) 11.12 (2.68)
0.5 177.26 (5.70) 146.96 (6.23) 38.31 (6.29)
Table 2.4: Simulation results on housing market indicators with 3 different flow control measures DSTI (β ) and 3 different stock
control measures ETA(γ). It tabulates the results obtained by running Monte Carlo simulations using 50 different seeds of random
number generator. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
regulation.
Results clearly indicate that tighter stock control stabilizes both the mortgage market and the
housing market, especially in the case of looser flow control regulation. Results also show that
a tighter stock control regulation improve slightly the indicators of growth and unemployment.
In particular, the first two plots of Figure 2.14, which are related to mortgages, show a
slowdown of mortgage growth and a significant decrease in write-offs when stock control is
stricter. This effect is mainly due to the risk-averse nature of the stock control regulation that
penalizes debt holders. When γ is high, households who hold too much debt are not allowed
to borrow more. The aggregate effect is reducing risk on mortgages and allowing for a more
stable path. The fire sales and the housing price growth plots confirm that the housing market
is more stable when the regulation based on households stocks (ETA) is tighter. Finally, the
last two plots show a positive effect also on two fundamental economic indicators, i.e., GDP
growth and unemployment rate. In general, stock control regulation has a stronger effect in
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β γ=0.6 γ=0.7 γ=0.8
Firm Loans
0.3 1.91 ·108 (2.24 ·106) 1.89 ·108 (2.31 ·106) 1.88 ·108 (2.16 ·106)
0.4 1.97 ·108 (2.01 ·106) 1.92 ·108 (2.02 ·106) 1.88 ·108 (2.64 ·106)
0.5 1.93 ·108 (2.49 ·106) 1.91 ·108 (2.29 ·106) 1.89 ·108 (2.37 ·106)
Total Credit
0.3 3.75 ·108 (3.25 ·106) 3.55 ·108 (3.25 ·106) 2.94 ·108 (2.47 ·106)
0.4 4.25 ·108 (3.34 ·106) 3.82 ·108 (2.99 ·106) 2.96 ·108 (3.04 ·106)
0.5 4.36 ·108 (4.59 ·106) 3.91 ·108 (3.45 ·106) 2.98 ·108 (2.67 ·106)
Bank Equity
0.3 3.98 ·107 (6.19 ·105) 3.86 ·107 (5.91 ·105) 3.52 ·107 (5.45 ·105)
0.4 4.39 ·107 (6.41 ·105) 4.06 ·107 (5.21 ·105) 3.51 ·107 (6.67 ·105)
0.5 4.35 ·107 (8.39 ·105) 4.15 ·107 (5.89 ·105) 3.61 ·107 (6.21 ·105)
Bank Deposits growth
0.3 8.51 (0.08) 8.50 (0.11) 9.09 (0.05)
0.4 9.01 (0.09) 8.86 (0.09) 9.12 (0.06)
0.5 8.96 (0.11) 9.03 (0.10) 9.14 (0.06)
Consumer Goods Price Growth
0.3 5.58 (0.04) 5.49 (0.05) 5.68 (0.04)
0.4 5.61 (0.05) 5.61 (0.04) 5.68 (0.04)
0.5 5.57 (0.04) 5.59 (0.04) 5.71 (0.04)
Money Wage growth
0.3 7.35 (0.04) 7.34 (0.05) 7.68 (0.03)
0.4 7.36 (0.04) 7.40 (0.04) 7.70 (0.04)
0.5 7.29 (0.04) 7.34 (0.04) 7.64 (0.04)
Real Consumption
0.3 2 ·105 (671) 1.99 ·105 (682) 2.01 ·105 (551)
0.4 2.01 ·105 (633) 2 ·105 (657) 2.01 ·105 (548)
0.5 1.99 ·105 (830) 1.99 ·105 (601) 2 ·105 (591)
Real Consumption growth
0.3 3.15 (0.02) 3.15 (0.03) 3.20 (0.02)
0.4 3.11 (0.03) 3.14 (0.03) 3.20 (0.03)
0.5 3.01 (0.05) 3.10 (0.02) 3.20 (0.03)
Real Investment
0.3 49,924 (667) 49,622 (815) 51,212 (674)
0.4 51,421 (743) 50,260 (623) 50,906 (812)
0.5 49,638 (795) 50,641 (714) 51,012 (831)
Real Investment growth
0.3 9.43 (0.23) 9.74 (0.27) 9.58 (0.21)
0.4 9.68 (0.23) 9.81 (0.21) 9.48 (0.23)
0.5 9.22 (0.35) 9.65 (0.24) 9.51 (0.23)
Real GDP
0.3 2.5 ·105 (1157) 2.49 ·105 (1353) 2.52 ·105 (971)
0.4 2.52 ·105 (1251) 2.5 ·105 (1157) 2.52 ·105 (1149)
0.5 2.49 ·105 (1457) 2.5 ·105 (1143) 2.51 ·105 (1210)
Real GDP growth
0.3 3.96 (0.03) 3.97 (0.04) 4.08 (0.04)
0.4 3.93 (0.05) 3.97 (0.03) 4.06 (0.04)
0.5 3.77 (0.07) 3.94 (0.04) 4.08 (0.05)
Unemployment (%)
0.3 6.21 (0) 6.20 (0) 5.48 (0)
0.4 6.36 (0) 6.20 (0) 5.55 (0)
0.5 6.68 (0) 6.34 (0) 5.67 (0)
Table 2.5: Simulation results on general macroeconomic indicators with 3 different flow control measures DSTI (β ) and 3 dif-
ferent stock control measures ETA(γ). The results are from Monte Carlo simulations using 50 different seeds of random number
generator. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
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Figure 2.17: Complementary impact of stock-flow regulation. The figure is a depiction of tabulated results on real GDP growth of
Table 2.5. The degrading impact of a loose flow control on GDP growth is reverted when it is combined with stricter stock control
measures.
the case of a loose flow control. This can be better seen in Figure 2.17, suggesting that the
degrading impact of a loose flow control on GDP growth is reverted when it is combined with
stricter stock control measures. The two policies can be considered complementary and can be
both used in order to regulate (and stabilize) our credit driven economy.
Finally, the stock control regulation has a relevant implication in terms of mortgage debt
distribution. Figure 2.18 shows the Gini index of households mortgages for different stock
control policies. As already noted, households who are not holding any debt are clearly favorite
for getting a new mortgage. Thus, when there is a tight stock control regulation along with a
mild flow control, the combined policy works as an equalizing mechanism that has two main
effects. The first one is to bring about a more homogeneous distribution of housing wealth,
in this case represented by the housing units that households buy with the mortgage. In other
words, access to housing units for the first time buyers is eased and hence house ownership is
promoted. The second effect is to reduce the risk of mortgage default and fire sales, preventing
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β : 0.5 & γ : 0.6
β : 0.5 & γ : 0.7
β : 0.5 & γ : 0.8
Figure 2.18: Comparison of distributions of mortgage acquisitions under a loose flow control β = 0.5 w.r.t different stock cases:
γ = 0.6, γ = 0.7 & γ = 0.8. The top panel traces mortgage distributions among households by computed gini-coefficient. Homog-
enizing impacts of mortgage write-offs and fire sales are hinted by the bottom panel and the middle panel respectively.
the accumulation of debt that could become unsustainable. Looking at the loose stock control
policies in Figure 2.18, it emerges that the unequal distribution of debt among households is
reduced whenever a crisis in the housing market occurs. In this case, households holding more
debt, thus more financially fragile, are punished by debt write off, leading the economy towards
a more homogeneous distribution of debt. This can be detected in Figure 2.18 by observing
the correspondence between fire sales (and write-off) and the decreasing trend of the Gini
index when stock control is loose. On the other hand, when the housing market is booming,
the distribution becomes more unequal again. When stock control is high enough we do not
observe any fire sales (or write-off) and the Gini index does not fluctuate.
2.1.6 Modelling assumptions and limitations
There are a couple of limitations in the current version of housing market. First, in the current
model the number of housing units is constant. At the beginning of each simulation households
are endowed 5 housing units and they can sell their housing units down to the last remaining
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one as there is no rental market. There is no construction sector that adds new housing units to
the economy. Hence any type of boom in construction sector and its impact on real economy
and on total private sector debt can not be addressed. A relaxation of this constraint would
require design and implementation of construction firms, their access to capital and financial
networks. Such an extension could be used to address role of government investment in infras-
tructures and hence on the economy at large (Stiglitz, 1997). The extension could be further
exploited to discuss and experiment with various policies which may stimulate or inhibit activ-
ities of building sector. Last but not least, having relaxed this constraints would enable us to
discuss the role of growing number of housing units per person in an economy or vice versa
(Baffoe-Bonnie, 1998; Tibaijuka, 2013). One may expect that existence of a construction sec-
tor, depending on its relative size in the artificial economy, may amplify amplitude of business
cycles. It may deepen and enlengthen burst phases that are specifically driven by mortgage led
crises while it may lead the booms led by housing construction and speculative activities in the
real estate market.
Second, in the current version, when a fire-sale is not possible or is not a remedy for the
financially stressed household, a debt-write-off occurs. The bank is covering the whole burden.
That is, the debt of the household is restructured without a transfer of a partial or full ownership
of the housing assets to the bank. This simplifications saves us from a modelling complexity on
the banks’ balance sheets and behaviors, while it might hinder us observing severity at uneven
housing ownership distributions due to recurring endogenous crises. Nevertheless, we would
like to point out that it is an enforced fire-sale mechanism that serves a reduction in the number
of debt re-structuring occurrences. In case of an active market the mechanism may fully or
partially reduce the burden on the banks. A stressed household may end up selling all of her
housing units but the last one. Since there is no rental market the households in the model are
not allowed to sell all of their housing units for speculative purposes or due to an enforced fire-
sale condition. However, in case of a system wide crisis, it is possible that there are not enough
buyers. This would cause the burden transferred to the banking sector and let the household
keep the unsold housing units. A modelling update in that direction along with addition of a
rental market, indeed, would enrich our insights. We would be able address possible uneven
household wealth distributions triggered by economy wide mortgage crises.
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Third, banks apply a flat risk rate to total mortgages they have provided. There is no risk
adjustment associated to each single mortgage. Banks’ risk associated with mortgages they
give out to households can be tailored to financial stress a household does have. The measure
can be interpreted and used as a micro-level prudence and the current results can be contrasted
against it.
Last but not least, in the current model, other than a speculation on housing market prices
(Levin and Wright, 1997), households are not engaged in an asset management behavior where
they aim to improve their returns from their housing ownership. The current model has focused
on impacts of credit money creation via a relatively simplified mortgaging mechanisms. In the
current implementation, households are not managing a saving account where they build up a
budget to cover a part of housing value that they will attempt to buy in ‘advantageous’ market
conditions. They rather need to improve their financial state to be able to acquire a loan which
covers whole value of the housing unit they attempt to buy. This modeling simplifications can
be later relaxed to study various saving as well as investment decisions, for instance, where
impact of a rental market on housing value as well as on expectations on returns at investments
in real estate ownership is addressed.
2.1.7 Summary
In this chapter we have investigated the macroeconomic implications of the presence of an
housing market and its related mortgage device in the Eurace model. The aim is twofold, from
the one hand we want to understand the economic impact of having an housing market in the
model, and from the other hand we want to explore the effect of different mortgage regulations
on the economic performance.
We observe that the main effects of the housing market are delivered through the endogenous
money creation mechanism, due to the new mortgage loans that banks grant to households.
These new loans increase money supply and stimulate the aggregate demand of goods. Our
computational experiment shows that the inflow of endogenous money affects both the finan-
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cial variables of the economy and, to a minor extent, the real ones, including real GDP and
unemployment rate.
The second part of the experiment studies impact of mortgage requirements on the artificial
economy. In particular, we use the debt-service to income (DSTI) ratio as a mortgage quali-
fication measure (high DSTI means lower requirements to get a loan). Our study shows that
increasing DSTI has non linear effects on the economy. While raising DSTI, we observe an
expansion for low values of DSTI both for the monetary and the real side of the economy.
However, after a threshold, the economic performance deteriorates, due to a higher instability
of the mortgage market when sub-prime borrowers have access to credit, thus increasing the
number of housing units fire sales, bank write offs and, finally, firms bankruptcies.
We also consider an alternative mortgage qualification measure, called “stock control” be-
cause it observes the equity over total assets (ETA) of the potential borrowers. A tight “stock
control” regulation is able to stabilize the mortgage and housing markets in the case of loose
DSTI regulation.
Finally, our study indicates from the one hand the importance of the housing market in the
economy, due to its role of regulating endogenous money creation and thus accommodating
aggregate demand. From the other hand, results warn us that excessively loose mortgage re-
quirements can lead to financial instability and economic crises. Our results further suggest
that stock control regulation can be effectively combined with DSTI in order to increase the
stability of the housing market and of the whole economy. The results from experiments on
stock control regulation exhibit the interesting property to directly affect mortgage distribution
among households and avoid excessive fluctuations in households’ debt (and asset) distribu-
tion. From a policy stand point, our results suggest that using a mild and even a loose flow
control along with a strict stock control leads to sustainable growth and eases the access to
housing for first time buyers, therefore promoting house ownership.
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2.1.8 Methodological Novelty: Incremental calibration
In this particular work, we have introduced a methodological novelty by introducing and
incremental calibration. The housing market model in this work has been added to a com-
plex model that has been already calibrated and validated during numerous works. Within the
particularity of this work, we examine two economic phenomenon: money creation via a mort-
gage lending mechanism and policy experimentation on regulation of housing markets towards
a steered credit growth and stability. While examining impact of a new component on top of
a complex system the challenge is to be able to extend the model in a modular and controlled
manner so we would be able to compare and contrast the artificial economy with or without
the new component. A seamless integration is needed for the kind of controlled experiment set
up we aim for. Along with model design and implementation a careful calibration exercise is
necessary while introducing new model parameters. We have used a key and relevant variable
of the base model: Eurace model’s initial wage offer. Using the initial wage offer of firms as
the measurement unit and referring to empirical findings from the literature we calibrated the
housing market parameters and we set the initialization values of the new agent variables. For
the details please refer to Section 2.1.4 and Table 2.3
64
2.2 Mortgage credits and business cycles
2.2.1 Motivation
In this work, we primarily address importance of real estate markets on the economy (Muell-
bauer and Murphy, 2008). We have used the extended version of Eurace model by accommo-
dating a real estate market and a mortgaging mechanism. The work at one hand has enabled
us to observe the impact of mortgages on business cycles in the extended artificial economy
(Catte et al., 2005) on the other hand enabled us to examine validity of the extended Eurace
artificial economy.
In this context, in addition to banks’ leverage, their financial links to the other banks and
firms, also, their mortgage loans are considered among the list of factors at observing reaction
of banking sector to real economy (Gallegati et al., 2008). In the model, the dynamics of
credit money is endogenous and depends on the supply side by the banking system, which is
constrained by Basel capital adequacy regulatory provisions (Blum and Hellwig, 1995; Santos,
2001), while on the demand side depends on firms financing production activity and households
indebtedness for housing needs and speculation.
2.2.2 Summary of results
Our results are in line with empirical evidences elsewhere (European Central Bank, 2013).
That is, growth in loans to consumption goods producers tend to lag real GDP fluctua-
tions while mortgages to households tend to either lead GDP growth slightly or occasion-
ally follow a coincident pattern relative to GDP growths. This dynamics is presented in Fig-
ures 2.19 and 2.20 and Table 2.6. In the experiments that has generated these results the model
as detailed in Chapter 2.1 was employed where economic indicators with or without a housing
market activity has been compared7.
Housing purchases via mortgage credits cause injection of money in the economy. An in-
crease in the amount of mortgage in the current model follows empirical patterns of increase in
7For further discussions see Section 2.1.5.
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Without Mortgage With Mortgage
Real GDP Growth 3.38 (0.08) 3.85 (0.10)
Real Consumption Growth 2.93 (0.19) 3.07 (0.08)
Real Investment Growth 6.09 (1.29) 9.74 (0.29)
Total Credit Stock Growth 6.95 (1.22) 9.93 (0.08)
Unemployment Rate 7.07 (1.00) 6.52 (0.01)
Money Wage Growth 6.51 (0.44) 7.28 (0.06)
Bank Equity Growth 7.13 (0.67) 9.87 (0.17)
Table 2.6: Simulation results with the Eurace model with and without the real estate market with 20 different seeds of random
number generator. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The economy model as detailed in Chapter 2.1 is used.













































Figure 2.19: Time trajectories of firms loans (top panel), mortgages (middle panel), and total credit (bottom panel). Each panel
compares trajectories with or without housing market. A model parameter φ is used, which determines the entry probability of a
household to the housing market. A φ = 0 implies a zero transaction.
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Figure 2.20: The figure displays a sample credit growth pattern over time in. GDP vs loan growths are on the upper panel and
GDP vs mortgage growths are on the lower panel. The time series plots suggests the fact that growth in mortgages in the economy
leads a growth in GDP which is followed by a growth in loans to firms.
M1 type of money in an economy. The lagging pattern of loans to firms over the business cycle
may suggest that during recoveries firms can first finance investment expenditure using their
internal funds, as cash flows improve during a recovery, and only later they seek for external
financing. On the other way around, it may also suggest that during recessions the reduction of
their equity capital prevents banks from granting credit to firms. The lead of mortgages suggest
that mortgages function as injection of liquidity to households’ consumption budget, and hence
an increase in demand, production, and a GDP growth in the system. This, in return, increases
demand for investment at producers’ side, which leads them to request more loans from the
banking sector. Overall, what we observe is a pattern of systematic responses, where money
creation via mortgages is responded by a growth in GDP and later an increase in loan requests
for further investment in productions.
In simulation scenarios where mortgaging is active, it is seen that the additional mortgages
create new money, raise households’ consumption and firms’ investments. The impact of
money creation via mortgages can be observed by higher growth rates at wages, bank de-
posits as well as at banks’ equity. A clear increase in consumption as well as in investment is
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observed. These results can be attributed to the factors relevant to endogenous money creation
via households’ mortgages (See Figure 2.19). Furthermore, the model when mortgaging mech-
anism is activated produces a lower unemployment rate and higher money wage, as presented
in Table 2.6.
The existence of mortgaging gives advantages to the banks through an increase of bank eq-
uity and bank deposits which in return eases the access to the credit for investment. Overall
results suggest that existence of a regulated mortgaging contributes to macroeconomic system
by increasing real consumption, real investment, money wage, bank equity, bank deposit, and
reduce the unemployment rate. This result is relevant with empirical facts on global economy
where real estate markets play a significance role to drive the booms (Catte et al., 2005). The
results also point out that the stock of money is driven by the demand for loans, therefore sup-
porting the theory of endogenous nature of credit money (Howells, 1995; Arestis and Howells,
1999). The study then also clarify the nature of endogenous money, giving a contribution to a
debate that has grown stronger over the last two decades.
2.2.3 Methodological novelty: Time lagged cross correlation tests
In order to be able to present business cycle dynamics we have employed cross-correlation
analysis on panel data of relevant parameters. Although cross correlation on lagged time series
data is known in econometrics, the application of the methodology to the simulation data within
ABM domain is one of the first. This validation approach has been further employed in our
subsequent works, e.g. see Figure 2.13.
2.3 Housing sector and green finance
2.3.1 Motivation
In this work, we aim to investigate macro-prudential policies that may help to stimulate bank-
ing sector to shift from speculative lending, the cause of asset bubbles and economic crises, to
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an energy efficient production technology. The most well-known and discussed solution to
the low-carbon investment challenge has been the introduction of a price on carbon (Nordhaus,
2013; WB, 2015), either through a carbon tax, i.e. a tax on the carbon content of goods and ser-
vices, or through a cap-and-trade system of emissions allowances, with the aim to address the
market failure related to the exclusion of environmental costs from the market pricing system.
The rationale is that a carbon price would push private agents to internalize correctly environ-
mental costs and therefore to perform the appropriate green investments aimed to reduce them.
However, carbon price mechanisms still have strong political opposition on the grounds that
they are harmful for business and can dampen economic growth.
Beside carbon pricing, a new idea that has gained recent attention concerns the design of
appropriate banking regulation policies aimed to push banks to lend to low-carbon activities
in order to ease the green investment gap (Rozenberg et al., 2013; Ferron and Morel, 2014;
Aglietta et al., 2015; Campiglio, 2016). In this work, we aim to see to what extend a banking
regulatory framework, where banks that lend to firms undertaking green investments are re-
quired to respect looser requirements could manage to direct credit toward the green sector and
therefore reduce the green investment gap. However, in our work we differentiate on capital re-
quirements depending on the destination of credits employing the Basel regulatory framework
but not reserve requirements in terms of the quantity of supply.
Our design of banking regulation that follows a proposal by Campiglio (2016), which sug-
gests the adoption of different capital adequacy ratios according to the type of lending that
banking institutions provide. Accordingly, we have designed a set of computational experi-
ments characterized by capital requirements for mortgages that can be higher or lower than a
reference value, i.e. 10%, which is the basic capital requirement value adopted for firms’ loans.
The rationale behind this choice is the assumption that loosening credit access for house pur-
chases may produce asset bubbles with destabilizing effects for the real economy, while loans
to business firms are aimed at increasing and renewing their capital endowment with positive
effects for the productive capacity of the economy and for environmental sustainability.
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2.3.2 Summary of results
Inspired by some recent proposals, aimed at promoting green investments at the expense of
speculative ones, we designed a set of computational experiments within Eurace. It should be
noted that in the model, there is no construction of new housing units or renovation of existing
ones.
First, housing market in the model functions as an important destination of speculative credit
in the economy. Therefore, our main research question is about the effects of loose credit con-
ditions, depending on the destination of the borrowed funds. In this respect, we should consider
that over-lending to the business sector has downside risks due to increasing insolvency rates
for firms’ but also positive effects on productive capacity and energy efficiency (in our model)
of the economy. By contrast, easy mortgage lending gives rise to price bubbles and incentives
speculative house purchases.
The second relevant feature of our model design regards the heterogeneity of capital goods
with respect to energy efficiency that we assume to be exogenously increasing over time. This
new model provision implies that investments in capital goods provide an environmental benefit
as the new vintages are characterized by higher energy efficiency and then allow the production
of consumption goods at a lower energy intensity per unit of consumption good produced.
Investment decision making is then updated accordingly to take into account the inter-temporal
saving of energy per unit of consumption goods produced due to investment decisions.
The rationale behind this choice is the assumption that house purchases are made mostly
for speculative purposes and may produce asset bubbles with destabilizing effects, while loans
to business firms are aimed to increase their capital endowment with long-run positive effects
for the productive capacity of the economy. Banking regulation should then favor lending to
business firms with respect to lending for house purchases, e.g. through setting lower capital
requirement in the former case. A similar proposal has been set out by Campiglio (2016) to
spur green investments, at the expenses of speculative ones, as an alternative to carbon taxation.
We devised a simple regulation for banks in order to incentivize loans to firms with respect to
real estate mortgage lending. The regulation consists in demanding higher capital requirements
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for banks in the case of mortgages, thus encouraging banks to give loans to firms. As up-to-date
capital goods have better energy efficiency in the model design, a higher pace of investments
implies lower energy intensity per unit of produced consumption goods, energy savings and a
positive environmental externalities.
Simulation outcomes suggest that the regulation is successful in promoting investments and
capital accumulation in the short term, and consequently in improving energy efficiency of
firms. However, in long run, these results are achieved at some welfare costs for households,
which can be summarized in lower consumption growth rates and purchasing power. The
reason is that reducing mortgages with a restrictive regulation has a negative impact on the total
private credit in the economy, and therefore on the endogenous money supply. This, in turn,
reduces consumption and aggregate demand. In the long term, the contraction of total credit
increases, and the negative outcomes on aggregate demand become more serious, reducing firm
investments. Therefore, in the long run, the positive effects on capital and energy efficiency
become negligible, while the main economic indicators show a period of recession.
2.3.3 Methodological novelty: Robustness test on exogenous modelling factors
We have applied robustness tests on the model dynamics and outcomes to measure the impact
of fossil fuels. In the model fossil fuels are provided externally by a foreign sector. The
price of the raw energy in the model is determined exogenously. The growth of the price is
exponential given by pE(t+1) = p0(1+ξ0)t . We have tested the validity of the results to such
exogenous factor. We have re-run simulations with fixed prices as well as declining oil prices.
The statistical tests suggest the results are indifferent to external price dynamics. A detailed
discussion on robustness test and empirical validation on the choices made for p0 and ξ0 are
given in Section 3 of our relevant work Raberto et al. (2018).
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2.4 Impact of mortgage instruments on wealth and regulations
2.4.1 Motivation
The objective of the study has been to examine macroeconomic implications of mortgage
types. Iceace macroeconomic model of a credit network economy has been used. It is an
agent-based computational macroeconomic model, see the model Web site8, that utilizes the
balance sheet accounting of economic agents, introduced by the Eurace model. The Iceace
model was created in the likeness of the Icelandic economy and for this paper it was used to
compare different mortgage instruments. Specifically, the housing market in the model was
built up adhering to empirical facts from the Icelandic housing market and the behavior of
Icelandic households, where an adjusted-rate-mortgaging (ARM) is more common. For this
paper we have added two more mortgage types, namely, IIM and FRM:
• ARM: Interest rate follows the rate of the Central Bank plus a constant 2% spread.
• IIM: Interest rate is fixed throughout the term and principal indexed to CPI.
• FRM: Interest rate is fixed as the rate of the Central Bank at the moment of the request
plus a constant 3% spread.
Although Iceace is inspired by Eurace that is described in Chapter 2.1, it differs from Eurace.
Unlike Eurace it lacks a financial market. Instead, all equities are owned by an EquityFund
agent which sends dividends to the households. If one or more firms have requested financing
from the equity fund the equity fund may retain a part of the dividends for financing, given
that two conditions pertaining to the financing are fulfilled. A firm must apply for financing
and only do so when in need of financing and it must have exhausted every possibility to get a
loan from the banking system. In the model, the government is responsible for the fiscal policy
of the artificial economy, setting the level of income tax and general transfer benefits, always
aiming at a zero deficit.
8http://iceace.github.io/home/
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An exogenously set parameter is used to determine to what extent income tax versus benefits
is to be used to reach zero deficit. In other words, unlike in Eurace model where the government
can issue bonds and trade them in the financial markets to finance its deficit, in Iceace model
the government is increasing tax or reducing the transfers to be able to balance its deficit. In
Iceace instead of a Cobb-Douglas production, firms are characterized by a Leontief production
technology. Lastly, in Iceace a construction sector is modeled via Constructor Firm agents
which produce new housing units and trade them in the decentralized housing market. For the
details see Bjarnason et al. (2015); Erlingsson et al. (2014).
2.4.2 Summary of results
Both the analytical analysis of total mortgages for different mortgaging instruments as well
as the results from simulation confirm the fact that there are more mortgages in the system with
IIM. However, the GDP levels with IIM mortgage type comparatively don’t match this pattern.
This can be explained mainly by circulation of money that is created by mortgages. Although,
IIM creates more money which would increase level of demand for consumption in short-run
followed by a growth in supply of consumption goods, the macro indicators of the artificial
economy don’t suggest this.
According to our analytical analyses that we have presented in the paper, in case of IIM
amount of mortgage repayment by households is significantly higher, which decrease their
consumption budget proportionally in mid to long-run. That is, short term inflow of money to
households’ consumption budget is reversed by large amount of mortgage payments neutral-
izing a possible and expected growth in GDP in long term. The collected mortgage payments
via IIM, on the other side, increase earnings of the banking sector, the central bank and the
tax income of the government yet it doesn’t lead to a growth in production due to lack of an
required growth in demand for consumption.
In summary, in this study we saw that inflation-indexed mortgages can mislead households’
expectations of risk with the low initial monthly mortgage payments and encourage households
to purchase more housing which stimulates housing prices. However, in long run it creates
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relatively more uneven housing wealth distribution amongst households. Further, IIMs seem
to increase the profits and reduce the risk for banks and diminish the effectiveness of standard
monetary policy tools, i.e. the policy rate, and seem to cause a decline in real GDP in the
long-term. In other word, the effect of the policy rate, is diminished when inflation-indexed
mortgages are used. Banks partake in the interest rate risk with fixed rate mortgages but bear
little or no risk with adjustable rate or inflation-indexed mortgages.
2.4.3 Methodological novelty: combining simulation data and analytical analy-
sis
In this work, model specification regarding households’ mortgage debt repayment schemes
and a set of sample simulated data are used to compare expected volume of principal pay-
ments in the economy under differing mortgage type enforcement regimes. Then consistency
of simulation data from Monte-Carlo experiments is compared against analytical and numer-
ical findings. Both analytical and simulation results foresee the additional mortgages that are
injected into the economy in case of IIM. However, it should be noted that it has been the micro-
level data from the simulations that enabled us to examine the impact of additional mortgage
repayments on housing wealth distributions and hence its relevance to policy making.
Section 2.39 in Bjarnason et al. (2015) details and discusses the use of simulation data com-
bined with empirically observed data in order to conduct an analytical comparison of mortgage
payments under IIM, ARM, and FRM regimes. Averaged time series of interest and inflation
rates of the simulation data are used to compute total, first, mean, and nominal mortgage pay-
ments for ARM and IIM cases respectively. Annuities for different loan terms are calculated
analytically for a representative initial mortgage amount. In order to explore the role of path
dependency as of inflation rates on cumulative mortgage payments at IIM annuities, empiri-
cal and simulated figures are compared to hypothetical fixed inflation rate cases with the same
initial mortgage principal and annuity regime.
9For a direct access see https://ideas.repec.org/p/jau/wpaper/2017-10.html.
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Chapter 3
A Multi-country simulation set-up for
economic interactions and integrations
3.1 Policy motivations
The recent history of the European Union highlighted the critical importance of a proper po-
litical and economic architecture in order to take full advantage of the unification and to with-
stand exogenous negative shocks. The global financial crises of 2007− 2008 had a pervasive
impact on all the leading economies in the world, but the place where it might have been more
disruptive is the European Union, which revealed structural fragility and inadequacy to tackle
some of the main challenges ahead. The crisis in the Middle East and North African countries,
exacerbating migration flows towards Europe, represents another shock that disclosed the lack
of coordination among countries in the EU.
The geographical, cultural, and economic diversity among these countries has not been har-
monized in a well-balanced and convincing project, thus exposing the union to frequent con-
frontations and conflicts at different levels, i.e., north versus south, core versus periphery, Ger-
many versus Greece, U.K. versus continental Europe. Brexit and the recent elections of 2018
in Italy, bringing to power euro-skeptical parties, have shown both the vulnerability of the cur-
rent project and the need to revise it. A rich debate flourished among scholars, politicians, and
75
observers, about the needed steps to improve the prosperity and the stability of the European
project.
The aim in this work has been to provide a computational model, which is flexible enough
to address several of the main topics that are emerging within the European Union and beyond.
The basic idea of this work is to convert the “current state of the art” Eurace model1, which is
a single country model, into a versatile compound of open economies interacting in many po-
tentially different ways, including by joining unions. One of the advantages of this incremental
approach is the generality of the resulting model, which is not conceived to study a particular
problem but to mimic the main features of the agents that populate the economy, in order to
reproduce the most important stylized facts. The single country Eurace model has been used
for studying endogenous business cycles (Raberto et al., 2012a; Cincotti et al., 2010b), mon-
etary policy and banking regulation (Teglio et al., 2012b; Cincotti et al., 2012), fiscal policy
(Teglio et al., 2018), environmental sustainability (Raberto et al., 2018), housing market regu-
lations (Ozel et al., 2016), among other topics, showing how the model can be applied to study
very diverse economic issues. The work in this study starts from the generality of the orig-
inal single country model and extends it by designing the main interactions that characterize
open economies, like international goods and capital markets, workers mobility, and common
international rules and policies. Therefore, the core simulation element evolves from a single
closed economy to a multiplicity of open economies that are connected in different ways and
with different strengths.
In the first work (Petrovic et al., 2018) where we have employed the model, summary of
which has been given in Section 3.4, we study the macroeconomic implications of becoming
part of a union, whose architecture is inspired from the EU, i.e, it includes international labor,
goods and capital markets, along with a common currency. We start with a very simple and gen-
eral case, where we compare the performance of two identical countries belonging to the union
with two equivalent closed economies. We are particularly interested to study how the mobility
of workers across borders affects the economy of the union. We extend the first experiment to
the case of countries endowed with different productivity levels. The main goal, in this case,
1Eurace is a stock-flow consistent computational model, grounded on the agent-based methodology, which has
been used for studying several macroeconomic issues. See the citations in this and previous chapter for more details.
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is to understand the conditions under which two countries with different productivities bene-
fit from becoming members of a union, and which are the main problems that might emerge.
This setting can be related again to the European Union case, as countries are characterized
by different productivities. We observe that in general, the union shows a better performance
than the two isolated countries, however, when the productivity gap is high and mobility fric-
tions are low, the union can even aggravate the inequality between the two countries because
an excessive emigration impoverishes the country with low productivity. In order to tackle the
problem of inequality, we design a last experiment where we test the possible mitigation effect
of a re-distributive fiscal policy at the union level.
The stylized fiscal integration mechanism that we call “fiscal pool” in our last experiment of
the first paper consists of a centralized deposit account where member countries of the union
are obliged to put a part of their budget surplus (if any). On the other hand, countries that need
to finance their budget deficit can ask (and obtain) money from the fiscal pool. Since the gov-
ernments finance their budget deficits raising new public debt, the “fiscal pool” should enable
a better use of the income surplus in the union consequently improving the budget balance and
reducing the public debt of the union members. The governments should afford higher spend-
ings providing also higher transfers to households which would increase their total income. In
turn, this should decrease the likelihood of migration since households will be willing to stay
in their home countries if they can earn competitive incomes. In addition, note that the outflow
of workers may act as a sort of the accelerator mechanism. With a lower amount of production
factors (workers) the economic activity declines, and so the tax revenue. If the public expenses
(e.g. interest on the sovereign debt, public employees, etc.) are downward rigid in the short
run, the government may be forced to raise new public debt and try to decrease some of the
public expenditures (contractionary fiscal policy) which will further slow down the economic
activity. On the contrary, expansionary fiscal policies generally improve the performance of the
countries in the union. For instance, an increase in the maximum deficit-to-GDP ratio (expan-
sionary policy) improves the dynamics of GDP, labor productivity, and employment, however,
at the cost of a higher level of public debt and inflation (Caiani et al., 2018). In addition, di-
verse shocks that may hit the members of common currency areas can be mitigated through the
fiscal integration among countries. The fiscal transfers between regions can absorb the impact
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of asymmetric shocks and improve the efficiency of the common monetary policy, as in Kenen
(1969).
3.2 Relevant studies
There are a few works in the agent-based literature, dealing with multi-country or multi-
regional settings. Dawid et al. (2014) present a two-region model to study the effects of policies
which aim at fostering convergence, in the case of fully integrated or fully separated labor
markets. In a later study, Dawid et al. (2017) use a similar model to test the effects of a set of
interregional fiscal policies on the economic growth of the different regions. In particular, they
find that fiscal transfers have a positive effect on the weaker (periphery) region, which is in
line with our results. A conceptual difference between our work and the work by Dawid et al.
(2017), besides the design issues concerning the multi-country model, is that we do not focus
on convergence, but we aim at understanding the conditions under which two countries with
a permanent productivity gap can coexist in a monetary union. The rationale for this choice
can be found in the empirical literature casting doubt on the productivity convergence process
in Europe. Many studies, from Tsionas (2000) and Boldrin and Canova (2001), to Aiello and
Pupo (2012), Monfort et al. (2013), and Sondermann (2014), show from different perspectives
a lack of significant convergence, therefore highlighting the relevance of studying if and when
it is convenient for countries with different productivities to join in unions. There is also a
more general standpoint, behind the choice of permanent productivity gaps, which questions
the indisputable desideratum of economic convergence. Actually, non-convergence can stem
from different economic traditions and cultural traits that might be important to acknowledge
or even protect. In this perspective, the union should be the place allowing for the successful
coexistence of countries with different economic strength and properties: Germany and Greece
can serve as an example.
Another multi-country model has been proposed by Caiani et al. (2018), to perform fis-
cal policy experiments in a European-like economy, finding that fiscal austerity raises public
debt-to-GDP ratio. They focus attention on the design of international trade, omitting the in-
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ternational labor market, which is, on the contrary, quite central in our work (details about the
framing of labor mobility in our paper are provided further on). Furthermore, Wolf et al. (2013)
designed a multi-regional model, especially focused on the study of climate policy. More in
general, the model presented in this paper belongs to the recent tradition of macroeconomic
agent-based models, which includes Dosi et al. (2015), Caiani et al. (2016), and Ashraf et al.
(2017), as a non-exhaustive sample. This paper presents a methodological innovation, with
respect to the state of the art, which is related to the very nature of the flexible multi-country
structure of the model. As our setting allows for running as many countries as we like within
the same simulation2, we use isolated countries as exact replicas of the countries in the union,
in order to have a control group to evaluate results. Indeed, this “control group” approach could
be applied also for addressing research question related to single-country models3.
The contribution of our work is not limited to the agent-based approach but extends to other
fields of studies. One of them is the work on Optimal Currency Areas - OCA (see for instance
Broz, 2005 for a review and Mélitz, 1995 for a critical analysis), which studies under which
conditions countries would benefit from a common currency. In particular, Alesina et al. (2002)
express the shared vision that the higher the association of shocks among the union countries,
the lower the costs of losing independent monetary policy. Moreover, Frankel and Rose (1997)
show that raising the trade volume among countries in a monetary union may generate a higher
correlation among countries’ business cycles resulting in common demand shocks. Our model
is able to generate business cycles endogenously (see Raberto et al. (2012a) for more details),
and we show that becoming part of a currency union significantly smooths the cycle asymme-
tries, which is in line with the empirical findings of Frankel and Rose (2001). In any case, we
are cautious in the very first paper about drawing conclusions on a common monetary policy
in the union, and we postpone this delicate topic to a more specific subsequent work.
The effects of labor mobility on the macroeconomic aggregates have been widely examined
in the theoretical literature, mainly using the computable general equilibrium (CGE) frame-
work, for instance in the context of the EU Eastern enlargement. This type of studies allows
2See the Appendix of our work Petrovic et al. (2018) for more details on the extensive range of configurations
envisaged by the model.
3We could, for instance, run N completely isolated countries.
79
the analysis of the interaction between migration, capital movements, and trade which is also
addressed in our study. Overall, the CGE literature finds stronger implications of migration on
wage and unemployment than those found in the empirical literature. The negative effects of
immigration, in particular for low-skilled workers, are outweighed by positive effects coming
from the integration of goods markets (e.g. Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). Therefore, most of the
models predict that the EU Eastern enlargement results in higher wages and lower aggregate
unemployment in both receiving and sending countries, which is in line with results that we
provide in this paper. Besides, CGE models predict an increase of GDP in the receiving country
and in the EU. This effect is even amplified if the creation of new trade between existing and
new member states is taken into account (Boeri and Brücker, 2005). However, the gains in ag-
gregate and per capita income can be reduced due to labor market rigidities. For instance, after
the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the UK has opened the job market for new member states,
while Germany has kept strong labor market regulations until 2011 (Pytliková, 2014). As a
result, the UK has absorbed the majority of the immigration inflows in the post-enlargement
period while Germany, who was the main destination in the pre-enlargement period, attracted
only modest immigration flow. The net effects of the diversion of migration from Germany
towards the UK are a higher GDP and employment growth in the UK as well as the decline of
the joint GDP of Germany and the UK (Baas and Brücker, 2008). Our study contributes to this
discussion, even if the model that we use has important differences with respect to the cited
ones. It is worth noting that we consider both the performance of the union as a whole and
the performance of the single countries of the union with respect to their identical counterparts
as isolated countries (the control state). Our aim is not to study the impact of immigration
(see Moreno-Galbis and Tritah, 2016 who examine both the EU and non-EU immigration to
European countries) on the hosting country, but to study the distribution of the population in
the union, according to some economic characteristics of the member countries, and to eval-
uate the overall effects by observing several economic indicators. Hence, in our model, the
migration outflow from one country is at the same time immigration inflow for another coun-
try. We find that the absence of mobility frictions can harm the country with low productivity,
as many workers, attracted by higher real wages, emigrate to the high tech country, provoking
the disarray of the government budget and of the whole economy. On the other hand, we find
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that labor mobility is able to foster employment and income in the union, especially when the
productivity gap between countries is not excessive.
3.3 Methodological Novelties
In order to be able address the kind of policy questions as outlined in Section 3.1, a modular
and scalable simulation set-up is needed. In that sense, in this phase of the work our primary
objective has been to create a simulation set-up in order to be able to study, for instance, the
conditions under which two or more countries can benefit from becoming part of a union.
Combining state-of-the art software engineering methodologies and agent-based computational
economics, we have designed a complexity-wise scalable and flexible multi-country model,
which is able to consider a wide variety of union configurations. In other words, the model
enables us to create and control the economic characteristics of the countries joining a union,
i.e., the level of integration of its markets, regulations, and institutional bodies. This section
presents a set of core methodological novelties that have lead us to design, develop and employ
presumably the most advanced and complex ABM simulation model to the date.
3.3.1 Scalable complexity
The simulation set-up that enables us to conduct controlled macroeconomic policy experi-
ments has been possible via a rigorous modelling design approach. We have introduced two
types scalability into modelling design:
1. Vertical scalability: Flexibility in modelling components
2. Horizontal scalability: Flexibility in population design and configuration
Vertical scalability
The first scalability refers to ability at being able to include or exclude agents, mechanisms,
markets and policy instruments in an artificial economy with no or minimal necessity for code
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Figure 3.1: Base Eurace model (Teglio et al., 2010) before model refactoring and extensions.
implementation. The value offer in such a vertical scalability enables to focus on conceptual
design and be able to examine and control impact of a sub-model such as housing market, a pol-
icy parameter such as mobility friction, or an agent behavior such as the speculative investment
choices in financial markets.
It should be noted that such vertical scalability has been possible due to the ability to design
new agents, new agent behaviors or new agent-agent interactions incrementally.
A layered design strategy that reflects flexibility of underlining FLAME 4 framework (Ki-
ran, 2017) has provided us the opportunity to follow a modular and incremental development
process at adding new agents, markets and mechanisms to the base Eurace model. Figure 3.1
represents the state of the base model (Teglio et al., 2010) before the vertical extensions. Fig-
ure 3.2a demonstrates addition of new components that addresses financial securities and sta-
bility mechanisms (Teglio et al., 2018) while Figure 3.2b demonstrates the components that
have enabled us to address policy stimulation towards green finance. In short, other than re-
design and re-implementation of some of the previous components, a significant number of
new features and components are added to the model. Namely, we have added a housing mar-
ket, agents, mechanisms and markets for financial securities, and green sustainability related
components and mechanisms. Figure 3.2 demonstrates available and configurable modelling
futures after addition of new agents, mechanisms and markets.
























(a) New financial stability components (Teglio
et al., 2018).
(b) New components on environmen-
tally sustainable policies and regulations
(Raberto et al., 2018).
Figure 3.2: Addition of new components to the base model.
The modularity of the design enables us to turn on and or turn off a market or a mechanism
without any change at model description layer or at behavior implementation layer. In other
words, by setting relevant configuration parameters of the model at initialization layer we are
able to include or exclude certain components of the model. The enhanced modularity serves us
in two ways. At one hand, we are able to conduct experiments in an incremental and controlled
manner to analyze impacts of a new component, which is very crucial for validation of new
modelling features. On the other hand, it gives flexibility to researcher at configuring an artifi-
cial economy that fits best to his or her research question without a necessity for redevelopment
of an agent-based model from scratch.
Horizontal scalability
By horizontal scalability we refer to population design where an economic system is set
up. The configuration options of the model enables us to set up a large family of artificial
economies. Number of closed or open economies, unions or trading partnerships and the size
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Figure 3.3: Available components of closed single country Eurace economy. Given the research and
experiment design any combination of these components can be selected accordingly.
of each economy can be set. For instance, a step by step configuration of complex economic
system can be obtained as follows:
1. At the baseline a single country closed economy with desired markets and mechanisms
is configured. Our population initialization tool, the PopGUI5 graphical user interface
application, is used to combine sub-models and to set the model parameters. Figure 3.4a
depicts one of the dialog box of the PopGUI for this purpose. The PopGUI dialog box
in the figure highlights list of enabled subcomponents.
2. A desired number of instances of the closed economy of previous stage is created. The
replication can be created easily again via the PopGUI tool. The screenshot in Fig-
ure 3.4b exemplifies a creation of an economy with 7 identical and isolated economies.
5https://github.com/ICEACE/PopGUI
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(a) A screen shot of the graphical user in-
terface for population initialization with
FLAME models, namely PopGUI, where
the dialog box highlights the list of en-
abled subcomponents.
(b) Creation of an economy with 7 identi-
cal and isolated economies.
(c) Creation of a two country monetary
union where member states has different
populations in terms of households, firms,
banks, etc.
(d) A screenshot of a dialogbox of PopGUI
where memory variables of bank agents
in the first country are being configured.
Figure 3.4: Scaling horizontally.
3. Number of agents in each country is configured. Figure 3.4c demonstrates creation of a
two country monetary union where member states has different populations in terms of
households, firms, banks, etc.
4. The countries in the same monetary union, the countries that can trade with each other,
the countries that allow mobility of labor among them is configured. Figure 3.5 is depic-
tion of an economy where 3 fully integrated countries form a monetary union. A fourth
country out of the union is able to trade with the union and labor mobility between the
union and that fourth country is allowed. A fifth country that has no trade and labor
mobility at the initialization beyond its boundary also created in this scenario.
5. Finally, before instantiating the designed multi-country scenario, memory variables of
each agent at each country is initialized. This final stage enables the researcher to be
able to create countries with differing level of technology, human capital, etc. Besides, if
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Figure 3.5: A multiple country configuration of the model. It is an economy where 3 fully integrated
countries form a monetary union. A fourth country out of the union is able trade with the union and
labor mobility between the union and that fourth country is allowed. There also exists an isolated fifth
country.
necessary, for instance, a differing wealth distribution in each country can also be set at
this step. Figure 3.4d is a screenshot of a dialogbox of PopGUI where memory variables
of bank agents in the first country are being configured.
It should be noted that the model is designed in a generic way that it enables the researcher to
configure it such that flow of goods and labor between countries in the model can emerge from
individual and endogenous agent decisions. For instance, it can let the firms to decide individ-
ually and endogenously on the list of countries to export6. In a similar manner, households can
individually and endogenously decide the list of foreign labor markets to observe and to move
to.
6For the details of model specifications regarding export decisions at our first use case of the set up, see Section
2 in Petrovic et al. (2018). A summary of firms’ decision mechanism for that case is provided in Section 3.4.
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3.3.2 Accommodation of real agents within artificial economy
A major part of the work on multi-country simulation set up has taken place during the EU
funded SYMPHONY7 project. The multi-country version of the model was used as the game
engine for the online game platform that was designed during the project. For the platform a
global economy with multiple countries were configured and served as the simulation engine.
One of the key objectives then has been to enable human users of its platform to configure
an artificial economy, initialize it and run it, and interact with it during the run time. In order
to fulfill this major objective a number of new configuration parameters have been introduced
to the model. In the current version of the symphony project platform, human users are able to
take over the roles of government and central bank artificial agents. When the simulator is in
the game mode and if the control of a designated agent is passed over to a human player, policy
decision processes of the agent, such as setting the interest rate, are handed over from artificial
agents to the game players during the run time. In other words, when in the game mode, the
corresponding central bank agent skips its own policy making process and uses the interest rate
that is decided by human player and announces it to the other human and non-human agents in
the game.
This feature is accommodated in the model easily by exploiting the layered design approach.
See Chapter 5 for overall design pattern for complex economic systems. The decisions of
human players are incorporated into the model via the initialization layer. During the run time,
we are able to take full snapshot of the economy at the end of each iteration when all the agents
have reached to synchronization point, that is, to the end of an iteration. Such a frozen state of
the economy can be used to initialize or resume a new simulation from that point onwards. This
feature is used by the ABM engine of the Symphony platform that enables the game players
steer the certain behaviors of artificial agents during the run time.
7https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/110002_en.html/
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3.3.3 Experiment set up with control groups
The modular and scalable modelling design approach has enabled us to create control groups
that are isolated closed economies. Figure 3.6 demonstrates the simulation set-up that is con-
figured for the work in Petrovic et al. (2018) and that is summarized and further discussed in
this chapter.
Figure 3.6: Experiment set-up used to study policies joining a monetary union when there is technology
difference between union members. High Tech and Low Tech within the union and out of the union are
identical economies at the start of simulations. The economies out of the union are closed economies
and used as control groups. See Section 3.3.3 for the details of the statistical measures devised for a
comparative study where the isolated economies are used as control groups.
A horizontally scalable economy design enables us to create controlled experiment groups
that can be configured and run parallel test groups. For instance, in the study whose results
are summarized and discussed in this chapter, a low tech closed economy serves as a control
configuration against the low-tech test country who is part of a monetary union. At the start
of a simulation the test country has exact population configuration as the control country in
terms of the size of its markets, skill and capital distributions among households, and level of
technology of its production firms. Being able to embody the test and control groups within the
same simulation run enables us to expose both groups to the same random seed for each run;
and when necessary examine stochastic variations between test and control group as of single
runs; and then test statistical significances after having aggregated data from multiple runs for
the same initial conditions.
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In the case of the research motivations as explained above in this chapter, we have designed a
2×2 experimental setting with two countries that are part of a union and two isolated countries.
The population design of a test group, namely the countries forming the union, and a control
group, namely the isolated countries out of the union are depicted in Figure 3.6. The isolated
countries are used as a benchmark to evaluate the net effects of belonging to the union. In
particular, this setting allows us to compare the evolution of countries in the union with respect
to their identical counterpart out of the union.
3.3.4 Statistical measures for Monte-Carlo simulations with controlled groups
Agent-based simulations, in general, provide very detailed data that should be aggregated
and analyzed at the macro level. Our multi-country setup with the control groups of economies
has lead us to employ novel aggregation and comparison procedures. In order to be able to
compare and test relative dynamics of economies with or without a monetary union we have
devised new statistical measures that take the control groups into consideration. The outcome
of numerous simulations with different random seeds are used for these measures.
The 2× 2 experimental setting explained in the previous section not only allows us to ex-
plore the differences between the union and the isolated countries but also within the countries
belonging to the same union. In order to make full use of the generated data, we have devised
a set of statistical measures which are useful for the interpretation of results, keeping in mind
that we want to examine the evolution of specific features of a country (or union) always in
relation with its country benchmark.
The variable Y represents a generic economic indicator under study, e.g.: GDP, number of
yearly immigrants, total physical capital in the country, etc.






This measure indicates the mean value of the economic indicator Y at month t overall consid-
ered seeds. S is the set of seeds used in the experiment, and |S| indicates the cardinality of the
set, which here coincides with the number of elements, i.e., seeds. We use this type of measure
in the time-varying graphs, while the next measures are used in the box-plots, and show the
variation of a specific indicator across the different seeds s ∈ S.













Given a random seed s, the statistical measure ΣsAB(Y ) represents the average value in the
time subset T ⊂ T of the sum of the observed economic indicator Y in the two considered
countries (A and B). We often use this measure to compare the value of an economic indicator
in the union with the value of the same indicator in the isolated countries, therefore computing
the difference ∆ΣsAB,CD(Y ). In general (but not necessarily), countries A and B are in the union,
while C and D are the isolated ones. If Y is real GDP, then ΣsAB(Y ) will be the average real
GDP level in the union (if countries A and B belong to the union), and ∆ΣAB,CD(Y ) will be the
difference between the average real GDP level of the union and the average real GDP level of
the isolated countries.
For the sake of clarity, sometimes we use the relative difference instead of the difference,
defined as [ΣsAB(Y )−ΣsCD(Y )]/ΣsCD(Y ). In this way, the gap between the union and the isolated
countries is in relative terms (given in percentage) and can be grasped at first sight, e.g., the
average GDP in the union is 10% higher than in the isolated countries.
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Given one random seed, the statistical measure ΨsAB(Y ) represents the average value in the
time subset T of the difference of the observed economic indicator Y between the two consid-
ered countries (A and B). This measure can be useful to explore the average difference between
GDP of a country in the union with respect to its counterpart out of the union, or the average
difference between GDP in the two countries of the union. If the setting is entirely symmetric,
i.e., if all the countries are identical at the beginning, we expect that the mean value of this
indicator across seeds should be zero.
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Given one random seed, the statistical measure ϒsAB(Y ) captures the divergence of countries
A and B concerning the observed indicator Y . It is computed as the average value in the time
subset T of the absolute difference of the observed economic indicator Y between the two
considered countries (A and B). When the local divergence ϒsAB(Y ) is high, it means that the
values of Y in the two countries are on average very different and that the countries tend to
“diverge”. In general, we consider the difference ∆ϒsAB,CD(Y ) to compare the local divergence
of countries in the union with the reference divergence of the isolated countries C and D. If
we observe a high ∆ϒsAB,CD(GDP), the distance between the GDP of the two countries of the
union, is larger than the distance of their isolated counterparts, meaning that the union created
inequality or polarization across countries.
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3.4 Summary of results
This section summarizes the results of computational experiments that we have designed to
study the macroeconomic implication of forming a union of countries. The details of model
description including its validation, extensive analyses of results and discussions are presented
in (Petrovic et al., 2018).
In this particular work, we have created a setup that enabled us to question when it is con-
venient for two countries to join a monetary union. The union is characterized by a fully
integrated consumption goods market, labor mobility between member countries, and where
stocks and bonds can be traded in an international financial market and the union central bank.
Firms employ physical capital and labor force to produce homogeneous durable consumption
goods. Firms that are within a union deliver consumption goods to all malls within the union,
while households shop only in the country of residence. Before the production takes place,
firms plan the production quantities taking into account the expected demand and the current
level of inventories at each specific market. Firms form beliefs about future demand based on
past sales and calculate market specific planned production. Since the production is centralized
in the country of origin, firms calculate the total planned production summing up all market
specific planned outputs. The final output depends on the firms’ production capacity and on
available funds. If companies are not able to produce the entire planned quantity with the
current capacity, they will look for additional workers and also invest in new physical capital.
The number of new employees will be determined in the labor market, where the companies
will compete among each other, while the amount of needed physical capital will be calculated
maximizing the Net Present Value of the expected returns on investment. Investments are
carried out if firms have sufficient available funds. In the case they are financially constrained,
i.e. they do not have sufficient internal resources and they are rationed both in the credit and
financial markets, investments will be adjusted accordingly. The details of model specifications
are given in Section 2 of Petrovic et al. (2018).
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3.4.1 Simulation setup
We design a 2×2 experimental setting with two countries that are part of a union, henceforth
CU1 and C
U




2. The isolated countries are





2, and they are used as a benchmark to evaluate the net effects of belonging to the
union Countries in the union share a common currency and a union central bank, while isolated
countries are non-trading closed economies. In particular, this setting allows us to compare the
evolution of countries in the union with respect to their identical counterpart out of the union






2). In other cases, we will be interested to study some measures
of convergence in the countries of the union, with respect to the benchmark (that is CU1 and C
U
2
vs. CI1 and C
I
2). It should be noted that in this setup there is no trade between the countries in the
union and the isolated countries out of the union. Each isolated country is a closed economy.
We have employed the statistical measures as described in Section 3.3.4 to make the crossed
comparisons. We have designed three scenarios. Here summary of the findings from each
scenario is reported. The extensive details and discussions on the results from computational
experiments can be found in (Petrovic et al., 2018).
The general setup of the model includes four countries where each has 750 households, 16
firms, a single physical capital producer, a commercial bank, the central bank and the govern-
ment. At the union level, there is also the Union Central Bank which controls the monetary
policy of the union members. For each scenario presented above, we ran 30 independent Monte
Carlo simulations, each one consisting of a time span T of 24,000 iterations, which in our
model stands for 1,200 months or 100 years. A validation of the model dynamics is provided
in the Appendix of Petrovic et al. (2018).
We initialize our model such that all economies are under-capitalized at time t = 0, which
allow us to observe two different regimes. The first one is a capital accumulation regime, while
the second is a stable path8 capital stock regime. In this way, we can analyze two important
conditions of the economy, and we can try to disentangle the effects of the proposed scenarios
8The model is characterized by endogenous business cycles, showing fluctuations, and even crises, also in the
stable path regime, see e.g. Teglio et al. (2018) for details.
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across the two economic regimes. As we will discuss in this results section, the first phase of
capital accumulation exhibits far from the equilibrium dynamics and more fragile economies,
where endogenous shocks can easily propagate across the markets. On the other hand, the sec-
ond phase is more stable but always characterized by business cycles that can become turbulent
in some cases. Figures 3.7a and 3.7b show the average time series of real capital stock and real
GDP for a representative scenario (mobility friction ρ = 0.8). These figures reveal the two
regimes of the economies. The results summarized here from the stable phase.





































(a) Real capital stock



























Figure 3.7: Statistical measure “the average over seeds” Y t given in equation 3.1. A scenario with mobility friction ρ = 0.8. CU1




2 are isolated countries. Time series on both panels exhibit two regimes. The
regime in the period of first 400 months is characterized by the capital accumulation and huge fluctuation in real GDP, while in
the period after 400 months the economy enters a stable path.
3.4.2 Scenario I: Union of identical countries
The first “basic scenario” aims at studying the impact of integration on the performance of







we study the implications of belonging to the union, that is, how CU1 and C
U
2 evolve with respect
to CI1 and C
I
2. In this scenario and in subsequent scenarios union is a monetary union, where the
central bank sets a common monetary policy. It is characterized by a frictionless international
goods market, i.e., households can buy products from both countries without any additional
cost, and they are indifferent. The union also shares a common financial market where house-
holds can buy assets from each country, and a common labor market where households can
move from one member state to the another.
Within this basic scenario, we examine how labor market frictions affect the performance
of each union member and the union on aggregate under varying mobility friction constraint.
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The mobility friction is represented by an overall exogenous proxy parameter ρ . It may entail
migration costs, lack of support networks at a new host institute, difficulty in transfer of pension
funds, or cultural differences. We have provided a theoretical discussion on how to represent
these varying mobility friction factors endogenously under a multi-country or multi-region
setting in (Ozel et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in this work we have opted to represent it as an
exogenous experiment parameter. When ρ = 0 households are completely indifferent between
working at home or abroad, while when ρ = 1.2 they have a strong preference for working at
home. We did not add the results for higher ρ values to the presented plots both to improve
readability and because they do not add any valuable behavior or information. It should be
noted that the parameter is a multiplier on the wage offered abroad. The resulting amount
serves as a proxy representing the cost of moving abroad. The extreme case is when ρ = ∞,
where nobody moves9.
We find that it is always convenient for two identical countries to join in a union. Not only
the union as a whole outperforms the independent countries, but also each country of the union
is better off with respect to its isolated version. This result is due to the integration of the goods
and labor markets, which allow for a better allocation of resources in the union. However,
if mobility frictions of workers are very low, the performance of the union is weakened, and
inequality between countries in the union can even increase. In general, countries in the union
also run better government budget, facing lower expenses, collecting more taxes and therefore
providing more services (in the form of transfers in the model) and experiencing a higher
welfare.
Figure 3.8, via a subset of key economic indicators, presents a direct comparison between
the performance of the union and the aggregate performance of the isolated countries, for each
mobility friction value. In particular, it plots the statistical measure ∆ΣsAB,CD(Y ) of equation
3.2, representing, for each economic indicator Y , the difference between the value of Y in the
union and in the isolated countries. If this difference is positive, it means that Y is higher in the
union if it is negative, Y is higher in the isolated countries. If it is zero, there is no difference.
9See the relevant section in (Petrovic et al., 2018) for a further discussion on the range of the parameter.
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In general, unless otherwise stated, the timespan T is the second half of the simulation, i.e., the
last 50 years. This allows us to capture the economic dynamics in the stable path.
Some of the main economic indicators, such as real GDP per capita, real investments, real
consumption, capital stock, and unemployment rate are presented in Figure 3.8. The economic
activity is, in general, significantly higher in the union (around 10%-20% higher) with respect
to the isolated countries, except for the case with the frictionless labor market ( ρ ≤ 0.2). Better
economic performance is explained by the presence of international goods, and labor markets in
the union. In particular, the international goods market allows for a better allocation of products
across the two countries, where a potential decrease in the local demand is compensated by the
demand of the foreign country. This flexibility leads to a lower, and more stable, unemployment
rate, as shown in Figure 3.8f. To sum up, the union configuration allows for a more efficient
economic adjustment in the cases of excess demand or supply in both the labor and goods
market, finally outperforming the configuration with isolated countries. As a final remark,
we should mention that the performance of the union depends on the considered scenario, as
Figures 3.8a - 3.8e clearly show. In particular, the advantage of the union, with respect to the
isolated countries, becomes weaker when mobility frictions ρ are too low. This point has been
addressed and discussed in detail in Section 3.I. of Petrovic et al. (2018). In summary, we have
seen that the relatively weaker performance of the union in the case of low mobility frictions
mainly depends on the inefficient use of the capital stock between the two countries. As the
union model does not allow for capital stock displacement, the smaller country, suffering from
a drain of workers, does not fully use its available capital stock, while the larger country has
an excess of households with respect to the available capital stock. Figures 3.8e shows that
the total amount of capital stock in the union is much lower (even lower than in the isolated
countries case) in absence of mobility frictions, confirming an inefficient use of capital.
3.4.3 Scenario II: Union of technologically differing countries
The second scenario is similar to the basic one, except for a difference in technology between
the two countries. Another exogenous policy parameter γg is used as the technological indicator
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(f) Unemployment rate.
Figure 3.8: Statistical measure “the mean of the sum” ∆ΣsAB,CD(Y ) given in equation 3.2. Panels a, b, c, d, and e show relative
differences, while panel f shows differences between the countries in the union (CU1 and C
U
2 ) and the isolated countries (C
I
1 and
CI2). The x-axis and colors indicate scenarios with respect to the value of mobility friction ρ . The solid lines in the bars represent
median while dots denote mean. Note that, the box-plots include two statistical tests that are presented on the top of the figure for
each box-plot. The left (darker) test measures whether mean is statistically different from zero, according to the null hypothesis
H0: mean is not statistically different from zero; while the right (lighter) test measures whether the given value of ρ is statistically
different from the basic case of ρ = 0. Thus, the null hypothesis H0 is: there is no statistical difference between the two cases.
Stars (***, **, *) indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively, while “◦◦” indicates that the test is not significant.
When the conditions are met we use a parametric paired t-test, and a non-parametric paired Wilcoxon rank-sum test otherwise.
Adapting the notation to consider technology, we have two countries in the union, CUH and C
U
L
with different level of technology, and two isolated countries, CIH and C
I
L, identical to the union
members. We study the performance of the union, with respect to the isolated countries, for
several degrees of the technological gap and mobility frictions.
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Detailed results10 show that when the two countries differ in productivity, it is again worth
to form a union. However, the performance of the union is strongly affected by the size of
the productivity gap among the countries. The most critical case is represented by a large
productivity gap combined with very low mobility frictions of workers. The high technology
country tends to attract workers and the union (intended as an abstract statistical entity) still
benefits by a more productive employment of the labor force. However, the conditions of
the low-tech country may collapse, leading also to a deterioration of the public sector, whose
revenues decrease generally more rapidly than its spending. The public sector is therefore not
able to revert the economic downturn.
Figure 3.9 presents the performance of the union as a whole (displaying ΣsAB(GDP), of Equa-
tion 3.2), instead of focusing on the single countries. The left part, concerning the union, and
the right part, concerning the isolated countries, can be compared in order to analyze the impact
of the union. It is worth noting that the total population is constant across the squares of the
figure and therefore the real GDP also represents the real GDP per capita pattern in the union
over the different scenarios.
Comparing the left and the right part of Figure 3.9, we observe that the real GDP of the
union as a whole is always higher than the real GDP of the sum of the isolated countries.
The explanation of this result recalls the one used for the case above, and it is mainly based
on the presence of common markets. In the case of countries with different technologies,
an additional reason for higher overall production in the union is that, whenever a household
migrates from the low-tech country to the high-tech country, its productivity raises, along with
the overall production in the union. We have seen that high-tech country is more populated than
the low-tech one. Figure 3.10 clearly proves the result. It further shows that the population gap
increases for lower mobility frictions and higher productivity gaps.
10For a detailed set of analyses on the dynamics of the union consisting of technologically differing members see

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Real GDP. Low-Tech productivity (LTP legends) in the color code.
Figure 3.9: Statistical measure “the mean of the sum” ΣsAB(Y ) given in Equation 3.2. The left panels show the countries in the
union (CUH and C
U




L). On Figure 3.9a, the x-axis indicates different
productivity levels γL of the low-tech country while colors indicate scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ . On
Figure 3.9b, the x-axis indicates scenarios with different values of mobility frictions ρ while colors indicate different productivity
levels γL of the low-tech country. The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean. Note that, the box-plots
in this sample figure include two statistical tests that are presented on the top and on the bottom of the figure, for each box-plot.
The test at the top measures whether the mean is statistically different from zero, according to the null hypothesis H0: mean is
not statistically different from zero; while the test at the bottom measures whether the mean of a given box is statistically different
from the corresponding basic case, e.g. ρ = 0 for each case of low-tech country productivity γL. Thus, the null hypothesis H0
is: there is no statistical difference between the two cases. Stars (***, **, *) indicate the significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%
respectively, while “◦◦” indicates that the test is not significant. When the conditions are met we use a parametric paired t-test,
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Figure 3.10: The number of households by countries. The x-axis indicates different productivity level γL of the low-tech country,
while colors denote different values of mobility frictions ρ . The solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean.
3.4.4 Scenario III: Union with a fiscal po l
The last scenario adds to the second one a fiscal policy measure (called “fiscal pool”), con-
sisting in a common pool of liquidity, available at the union level, that comes from the budget
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surplus of each member country and can be redistributed in the case a country has to finance
its budget deficit. The rationale behind this mechanism is to mitigate the unbalance, which is
observed in the second scenario, between the two countries of the union. The performance of
the countries in the union with or without the “fiscal pool” instrument is therefore examined.
Our results have shown that a fiscal integration mechanism is able to mitigate the inequality
among countries, especially in the most critical cases. Sustaining the income in the low pro-
ductivity country reduces emigration and raises the aggregate demand both for domestic and
foreign products. Nevertheless, the average economic indicators in the union slightly decline,
because a larger part of the production is reallocated in the low-tech country.
It is seen that the fiscal pool acts by preventing or restricting, the sources of inequality that
have been described in the previous section. Figure 3.11 compares the real wage differential
between the countries of the union with and without the fiscal pool mechanism. It shows that
the wage differential is lower when the fiscal pool is active and the productivity gap is high (the
right side of the picture, as usual, is the control group of isolated countries and does not present
any difference). This lower wage differential moderates the emigration in the union, as reported
in Figure 3.12a, showing that the low-tech country is more populated and the high-tech country
is less populated when the fiscal pool is active. A key element is that the accumulation of capital
stock is more balanced with the fiscal pool, as Figure 3.12b shows. Part of the capital stock of
the high-tech country (which is lower) is now located in the low-tech country. Consequently,
also the real GDP of the low-tech country increases because production is less dislocated to
the high-tech country (see Figure 3.12c). Finally, the fiscal pool improves the well-being of
the low-tech country in the most critical cases, i.e., when productivity gap is high and mobility
frictions are low and slightly reduces the well-being in the high-tech country, measured as real
GDP per capita in Figure 3.12d.
3.4.5 Conclusions
To sum up, our results suggest that a better fiscal integration would be useful if the policy
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Figure 3.11: Statistical measure “the mean of the difference in difference” ∆ΨsAB,CD(Y ) given in Equation 3.3. The left panel
shows the difference in difference between countries in the union (CUH and C
U
L ) with and without the fiscal pool, while the right
panel shows the difference in difference between isolated countries (CIH and C
I
L) with and without the fiscal pool. The x-axis
indicates different productivity level γL of the low-tech country, while colors denote different values of mobility frictions ρ . The
solid lines in the bars represent median while dots denote mean. See the note in Figure 3.9 for the interpretation on the reported
statistical significances.
cial if the goal is to maximize the overall production of the union. This raises some interesting
political issues about the kind of development strategy that a union (with particular reference
to the European Union) want to pursue. Our study underlines that the objective of maximiz-
ing economic growth is not always in harmony with the objective of reducing inequality and
acknowledging the structural and cultural difference that exist among countries.
We remind that our work is based on the assumption of no productivity convergence among
countries, which might be extreme but allows us to highlight the mentioned issues. In the
case of productivity convergence, of course the economic inequality could be just healed by
time, with lower need of political intervention. However, we also ignore in the paper the
political/electoral implications which can bring to power parties seeking the destruction of the
union. Therefore, if the union has to be conserved, policy makers not only should consider the
objective to improve growth numbers at the union level, but also care about a redistribution
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(d) Real GDP per capita.
Figure 3.12: Statistical measure “the mean of the difference in difference” ∆ΨsAB,CD(Y ) given in Equation 3.3. The left panels
show the difference in difference between high-tech countries (CUH and C
I
H ) with and without the fiscal pool, while the right panels
show the difference in difference between low-tech countries (CUL and C
I
L) with and without the fiscal pool. The x-axis indicates
different productivity level γL of the low-tech country, while colors denote different values of mobility frictions ρ . The solid lines




Stock-flow consistent network designs
for agent-based models
This chapter presents two separate yet inter-related studies from a network theoretic perspec-
tive. Section 4.1 presents the details of a simulation set-up that serves to model and analyze
risk and contagion at interbank networks. Section 4.2 presents modelling details of the work
on forming liability links between two separate systems of interbank networks. Preliminary
results and future directions are reported.
There is a longer term objective in these studies within the framework of complex ABM
models. The aim is to generate stock-flow consistent network structures that can be plugged
into the our large scale ABM simulation environment, the state-of-art of which is presented in
Chapter 3. Being able to embed these network based components in a macroeconomic model
provides a set of conceptual and methodological advantages. Empirically driven calibration,
initialization of network relations, for instance in case of contagion model of Section 4.1, will
enable us to address antecedents and consequences of endogenously generated shocks relevant
to interbank-networks. The network fusion model of Section 4.2 will serve us to incorporate
empirically observed credit or financial structures as part of our entry and exit mechanisms at
multi-country economic integration scenarios.
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4.1 Simulating dynamics of contagion in interbank markets
4.1.1 Motivation
During the last three decades, the banking sectors of advanced countries have undergone a
remarkable process of concentration. This evident and known phenomenon has raised con-
cerns about its effects on the competitiveness and stability of the banking industry (Beck et al.,
2006; Battiston et al., 2012; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). In this respect, economic analysis has
reached conflicting conclusions (Beck et al., 2007). On the one hand, some authors hold that
the increase in concentration has reduced the competitiveness of the banking sector and that
such market power generates higher profits, making the industry more resilient to shocks. On
the other hand, the consolidation has generated systemically relevant banks, banks that are
sufficiently large and sufficiently connected in the interbank network to pose serious threats
of systemic contagion. In as much as these banks can count on implicit “too important to
fail” policies, they have incentives to intensify risk-taking behavior and, in so doing, increase
banking system fragility (Anginer and Demirguc-Kunt, 2014; S. Mishkin, 1999).
In this work, we have focused on one specific aspect of the relation between concentration
and stability of the banking sector. We create a simulation set-up where using a parsimonious
set of parameters we are able to characterize core-periphery interbank network structures. In
a core-periphery interbank network, the core is composed of banks tightly connected among
themselves and the periphery is composed of banks that are not connected to one another
and are solely connected to one or few banks in the core. Then we study the effects that the
core-periphery structure of the network of interbank obligations, induced by the concentration
process, has on the exposure of the banking system to the risk of direct financial contagion.
We primarily conjecture that core-periphery financial networks are ‘robust-yet-fragile’, in the
sense that they are resilient to small shocks and fragile to the risk of widespread crises if hit by
a sufficiently large shock.
The core-periphery network structure is a generalization of a star-shaped network, i.e. a net-
work where all peripheral nodes are connected only with a single central node. More precisely,
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the core-periphery network is a multi-center star network where the central nodes tend to form
a complete network among themselves, i.e. a network where each bank lends to every other
bank. See Figure 4.2 for a simplified depiction of the structure that is generated by our set-up.
Recent analytic results show that both the complete, see Figure 4.1d, and the star-shaped, see
Figure 4.1f, interbank networks have a ‘robust-yet-fragile’ nature, with respect to the risk of
default contagion. Haldane and May (2011) first conjectured that highly connected networks
might exhibit this feature: be resilient to small perturbations and, at the same time, be fragile in
the sense of being exposed to widespread default cascades if hit by low probability-high impact
shocks. Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Eboli (2013) demonstrate that in complete interbank net-
works there is no default contagion for external shocks smaller than a certain threshold, while
the whole system defaults if hit by shocks larger that such a threshold. Castiglionesi and Eboli
(2018) and Eboli (2013) show that star-shaped networks have the same ‘robust-yet-fragile’
feature of complete networks. The rationale for these results lies in the fact that both high
connectivity and high centralization imply that the losses caused by the default of one or more
banks tend to be evenly spread among all other network members. For the opposite reason,
sparse and decentralized networks are more exposed to cases of default contagion (of limited
scope) caused by small shocks and less exposed to the risk of a complete system meltdown. On
these bases, we expect to find the same ‘robust-yet-fragile’ feature in a core-periphery network,
since the latter is the joint of a complete and a star-shaped network.
We aim to test our conjecture running numerical simulations of default contagion on a range
of randomly generated interbank networks designed to approach progressively a core-periphery
structure. We expect that, as we move from random sparse networks towards sparse core-
periphery networks, our simulations will show that such networks become progressively less
exposed to episodes of local contagion caused by small shocks and more exposed to the risk of
system-wide default crises caused by large shocks.
In this particular phase, we have an isolated and stylized interbank network model. There
is only one type of agent: trading banks where interaction behavior between them is homoge-
neous and given. The banks in the network can be heterogeneous in as much as each bank is
characterized by its own balance sheet. The values of the balance sheet headings of each bank
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are determined by setting the parameters of the model, where the assignments of debts, assets
and equities to a bank are calibrated taking into account the position of the bank in the network.
Accounting identity is assured both at each individual agent level as well as at the aggregate
level for stock-flow-consistency. The shocks are exogenous and modeled ex-ante.
4.1.2 Model overview
In this particular work, we have designed and developed a set of modules to be able to address
and test our conjectures. The overall model design is a layered process. It decouples the steps
of a research on financial contagion where a cascaded procedure from network creation to data
analysis is made possible:
1. a network configuration module that can generate stylized or random interbank net-
work models with desired level of size, sparsity, connectivity and centralization;
2. a balance-sheet configuration module that generates stock-flow and network consistent
balance sheet distributions according to modelling parameters;
3. a shock-propagation model that enables us to trace flow of the shocks from source
nodes to sink nodes in the network;
4. and an exogenous random shock model which enable us create exogenous shock vec-
tors where statistically sufficient number of permutations and differing shock amplitudes
are created for systematic Monte Carlo simulations.
This simulation process as a whole is akin to the work in Nier et al. (2007). However, we
have an extended and generalized approach which gives the flexibility at studying contagion
regarding choices on different network structures, at creation and application of different shock
sequences, and configuration of desired balance-sheet structures. For instance, as it can be
seen in Section 4.1.7 where an exemplary case on probing a contagion process is demonstrated,
unlike Nier et al. (2007) we are not limited to variations as of network connectivity. We are also
able to introduce a variation at the level centralization within an interbank network. Our generic
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approach provides a modelling abstraction and hence flexibility for a research on contagion
dynamics.
The underlining diffusion model in the current version of the simulator is based on Eboli
(2013). The shocks whether internal or external are absorbed by the share-holders first. When
total internal and external shock received by a bank exceeds its capital, it is transferred to its
creditors. The credits are liquidity of the households deposited to the bank and loans taken
from the other banks in the system. In the presented version of the contagion model for a given
bank, i, each of its external depositor k, and its interbank loan owner, j, share the burden of
excessive shocks proportionally to the size of their deposits hik or loans di j.
Modelling details and assumptions are presented subsequently.
4.1.3 Interbank network structures
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4.1: Generation of stylized regular graphs with constant connectivity and centralization levels. Figure 4.1a - 4.1c depicts
where the circular graph is incrementally transformed into a fully connected graph while graph level centralization is kept con-
stant. Figure 4.1d - 4.1f demonstrates the process where network connectivity is kept constant but centralization is increased to
its maximal level ending in a perfect star.
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(a) Erdos-Renyi random graph,
Gkk(K, pkk), for the core component
where K = 4 and pkk = 1 that
generates a fully connected core.
(b) Erdos-Renyi random graph, Gpp(K, ppp), for the periphery component
where N = 40 and ppp = 0.01 that generates a very sparse connection among
peripheral nodes.
(c) A core periphery graph where new edges between nodes at the core com-
ponent, fig. 4.2a, and the nodes at periphery, fig. 4.2b is added according a
Bernoulli process with ppk = 0.7.
(d) The degree distribution of the
resulting random core-periphery net-
work in fig. 4.2c.
Figure 4.2: Generation of a random core-periphery graph Gcp(N,K, pkk, ppp, ppk), where N = 40, K = 4,
pkk = 1.0, ppp = 0.01, and ppk = 0.7. The resulting overall network centralization, CG = 0.22 and
connectivity, = KG = 0.05.
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(a) A multi-core random graph. The multi-core random graph is generated
by letting pkk = 0.2.
(b) A complete graph
which is a specific
case of the random
core-periphery network:
Gcp(N,K, pkk, ppp, ppk),
where N = K = 5 and
pkk = 1.0.
(c) A perfectly balanced random
core-periphery as a specific case of
the random core-periphery network:
Gcp(N,K, pkk, ppp, ppk), where N = 30,
K = 3 and pkk = ppk = 1.0 and ppp = 0.
Note that each periphery node is
connected to only one of the core nodes. (d) A random core-periphery with pendants.
Figure 4.3: Sample networks generated by core-periphery network model.
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We have developed a network generation module that creates stylized networks such as ring,
star, and k-regular networks, as well as, random networks with desired level of connectivity
and centralization. Network connectivity and centralization are used to characterize interbank
debt exposure. A link in the network is typically directed denoting a loan given from a bank i
to another bank j. As such links represent interbank liabilities on the balance-sheets within the







Then total exposure of an interbank network can be computed as D = ∑Ni=1 di.
Random core-periphery network
In this section, we present generation of random core-periphery networks. A k-core-
periphery network can be characterized by a graph G(K,N,E) where a few core nodes K ⊂ N
and K  N are receiving majority of the edges, E, in the graph. Figure 4.2, for instance, is
a core-periphery network with 4 designated core nodes. Barabasi–Albert preferential attach-
ment model (Barabási and Albert, 1999) is typically employed in complex networks literature
to be able to generate core-periphery-like network models. Barabási and Albert (1999) pro-
pose a network construction algorithm where a graph of N nodes is grown by attaching new
nodes each with m edges that are preferentially attached to existing nodes with high degree.
Resulting graph exhibit a scale-free node degree distribution that also defines core-periphery
networks. The algorithm has two limitations. First, it does not allow to specify connectivity of
the core nodes with each other. Second, it imposes an exact number of m links originated from
a peripheral node.
Given aforementioned limitation of Barabasi–Albert model, we introduce a novel core-
periphery network generation model where connectivity between core-to-core, periphery-to-
core, and periphery-to-periphery nodes can be specified exclusively employing appropriate
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distribution functions. For this work, we have employed Erdos-Renyi graph model (Erdös and
Rényi, 1959) where a distinct Bernoulli random variable indicating the presence of edge is
used for each case. However, our framework is designed to accommodate a multi-level ap-
proach where separate probability distribution functions can be used connecting nodes across
different levels or within a level. The probability distribution functions could be constructed us-
ing empirical data or analytical models. Section 4.2 presents our subsequent work Gencer and
Ozel (2018) where a Barabasi–Albert preferential attachment model is generalized at fusing
multiple core-periphery networks.
In a random Erdos-Renyi graph G(N, p) with N vertices an edge between two nodes, ei j,
exists with a probability of p ∈ (0,1) independently of every other edge. Let ei j ∈ {0,1} be
a Bernoulli random variable indicating the presence of the edge. For the Erdos-Renyi model,




0, with 1− p
(4.2)
Each edge is included in the graph with a Bernoulli trial. The probability parameter p is con-
sidered as connectivity specification. The higher p the more connected a graph is. While p = 0
would generate a network with no links, p = 1 would generate a fully connected graph. Our
random core-periphery graph Gcp(N,K, pkk, ppp, ppk) is then characterized by 5 parameters,
where each p is an independent Bernoulli random variable. Table 4.1 summarizes parameter
descriptions.
Parameter Description
N Total number of nodes in the network
K Total number of nodes in the core
ppp The Bernoulli probability of link formation between pairs of nodes in the periphery
pkk The Bernoulli probability of link formation between pairs of nodes in the core networks
ppk The Bernoulli probability of link formation between a periphery node and a core node
Table 4.1: Parameters of a random core-periphery network generation function Gcp(N,K, pkk, ppp, ppk). Note that the specific
case where pkk = ppp = ppk = p is equivalent to a typical Erdos-Renyi graph G(N, p)
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The random core-periphery network generation module is simply the union of respective
Erdos-Renyi random graphs. The panels in Figure 4.2 demonstrates the procedure. Figure 4.3
presents generation of various other network structures using the Gcp(N,K, pkk, ppp, ppk) con-
figuration function.





1 | degmaxG −degG(v) |
(N−1)(N−2)
, (4.3)
where degG(v) is the degree centrality of node v, and degmaxG is the maximum degree observed
in G(N,E). Given the fact that an interbank loan, di j, implies a network relation, a link at its
graph theoretic representation, degree of a node in the graph is simply the number of distinct









1, when dv j ≥ 0 or d jv ≥ 0
0, otherwise.
(4.5)
The network centralization definition above is based on Freeman (1979), where degree cen-
trality is used as the centrality score. The denominator in Equation 4.3 is a normalization factor.
It denotes a theoretical maximum centralization score. According to this definition, i.e, while
a fully connected interbank network configured by Gcp(N,K = 0, pkk = 1, ppp, ppk), would
exhibit a CG = 0, a perfect core-periphery network configured by Gcp(N,K = 1, pkk, ppp =
0, ppk = 1), which is a single core star network, would exhibit a maximum possible centraliza-
tion CG = 1.
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Definition 2 Connectivity, KG, for a given graph G(N,E) is a graph level index that corre-







where degG(v) is computed the same as in Equation 4.4.
In different words, connectivity for a given network is computed as the total number of
observed connections divided by the number of possible ties in the network (Wasserman
and Faust, 1994). According to this definition, i.e, while a fully connected interbank net-
work configured by Gcp(N,K = 0, pkk = 1, ppp, ppk), would exhibit a KG = 1, a perfect core-
periphery network configured by Gcp(N,K = 1, pkk, ppp = 0, ppk = 1), which is a single core





N . It should be noted that star network, is one of the minimally con-
nected graph with N > 1 nodes. A ring network with N > 2 nodes would be another stylized
network structure that exhibit a similar level of connectivity with KG = Nx22N(N−1) =
1
N−1 . The
minimum possible connectivity for a network is observed when each node is an isolate which
would yield to KG = 0.
Stylized network models
The random core-periphery generation module is able to produce a range of stylized network
structures such as a complete graph or a perfect star. However, in order to test a number of
theoretical conjectures a range of other regular and non-random graphs is needed. We have
developed an additional network generation module that creates stylized graphs with desired
network connectivity and centralization1.
The inputs for the algorithm are the number of nodes in the network, N; the level of con-
nectivity in the network K; and desired level of centralization, c, in the network. Keeping
N and K constant, whereas varying c from 0 to N we are able to create a family of stylized
1See the Centralize module from our network library that we have developed for the simulator: https://
github.com/bulentozel/SimFinNet.
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networks from CG = 0 network centrality to the maximum possible centrality while keeping
the network connectivity constant. It should be noted that with K = 1 the algorithm generates
a family of connected networks of the minimum connectivity. The maximum centralization
CG = 1 is achieved when K = 1 and c = N. For K > 1 and c > N−K the algorithm produces a
core-periphery like network with K fully connected core. The generated directed network is a
symmetric one. That is each outgoing link is reciprocated. A link represents an interbank debt.
Reciprocity is a modelling simplification that corresponds to liquidity swap between banks
(Eboli, 2013; Nier et al., 2007).
Figure 4.1 demonstrates exemplary network outputs of the model. Figure 4.1a is a circu-
lar graph with minimal connectivity and CG = 0 network centralization. Figure 4.1a is a
k-connected regular graph, where using the circular graph of Figure 4.1a each node has es-
tablished K = 2 new connections with other neighboring nodes. The network centralization
is still 0. Figure 4.1c is a fully connected graph by adding more links to the initial circular
graph incrementally. Note that the network centralization is still 0. Figure 4.1d is a circular
graph with minimal connectivity and 0 network centralization. It is used as the starting point to
create a maximally central graph with the same number of nodes and connections. Figure 4.1e
is a ring-star graph, where the same number of nodes and connections of a ring graph is used
and in 5 consequent steps the connections are directed to the designated star. The network
connectivity, KG, is maintained constant while centralization, CG, is increased incrementally.
A perfect star obtained by directing links of the initial ring incrementally to the designated
star. Figure 4.1f is a fully central star graph where the network connectivity is the same as the
originating circular graph.
4.1.4 Balance sheet configuration
Factors that are considered while configuring balance sheets of the banks in the system are (i)
level of capitalization, ε , (ii) exposure to interbank debts, φ , (iii) amount of external assets,
A, and (iv) network position, degG in the system. For a given bank, i, and its balance sheet
entries ei as of its equity, ai as of its total external assets, hi as of its total external debts such
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as deposits from households and firms, ci as of interbank loans delivered, and di as of its total
interbank debts, bank level capitalization and exposure is defined as follows:
ε = ei/ai + ci, (4.7)
φ = di/hi. (4.8)
In our base model regarding balance sheet initialization, the aggregate network level identity
of interbank debts D and loans C is also imposed at the node level for each bank:
ci = di = φ hi. (4.9)
Given the balance sheet identity:
ai + ci = hi +di + ei, (4.10)
we yield following bank level configuration:
ai = hi + ei. (4.11)
Manipulating Equation 4.11 and using Equation 4.8, we can redefine hi in terms of modal
parameters hi(φ ,ε,hi):
ai = hi + ei = hi + ε(ai +φhi) (4.12)






In the base model, level of capitalization and interbank debt exposure rates are serving as
model parameters and they hold at each individual level as well as at aggregate network level.
That is, applying the node level exposure and capitalization rates assures the same ratios at
the network level automatically by applying summation operation on the either side of the
equations above: A = ∑ai, C = ∑ci, H = ∑hi, D = ∑di, and E = ∑ei then C = D, A = H +E,




A Total external assets
Table 4.2: Balance sheet configuration parameters for the base model.
It should be noted that the interconnection between stock-flow and a network consistent
balance sheet configuration is implied by Equation 4.1, where di = ∑Nj=1 di j and hence the
total exposure is D = ∑i ∑ j di j, where each di j = wi j is the contagion bandwidth for the cor-
responding link ei j.
4.1.5 Shock propagation model
The shock propagation in the network is based on the balance sheet contagion model as
described in Eboli (2013) and recently in Castiglionesi and Eboli (2018). In brief, shocks,
whether internal or external, are absorbed by the share-holders first. Shocks exceeding the
capital of a stressed bank transferred to its creditors. In our base model, each deposit owner
hik, and each loan owner di j share the burden proportionally to the size of their deposits or
loans at the defaulted bank.
The external asset ai is the source of exogenous shocks. To define amplitude of an external
shock with respect to the size of external asset ai, we use a parameter b ∈ [0,1]. That is, it
captures the fraction of the value of the asset ai which is lost. An exogenous shock is an
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assignment of value to the vector [b] where at least one of its components assumes a strictly
positive value. If b > 0 then the source node, i.e., the bank that is suffering a loss, sends to its
direct descendants a financial loss equal to bai. The shock, i.e., the flow of losses out of the
source nodes, is a vector of scalars [ba]. As a shock occurs, the involved source nodes release a
flow of losses into the network. The propagation of these losses across the network is governed
by the rules of limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata reimbursement of creditors. For
simplicity, we assume that all debts have the same seniority. We distinguish about a common
shock, that affects more than an agent in the network, from an idiosyncratic shocks, that is born
by a single node (agent) only. When a node i suffers a loss, this loss is first absorbed by the net
worth of the node. Only the residual loss, if any, is passed over to other nodes in the network.
The losses that are offset by the equity of the agents in the network are born by households, in
their capacity as shareholders, thus they exit from the flow of losses that circulate across the
network to end up directly into the sink node. To represent this property, for each node i in the








where λi is the total amount of loss at the node i, either received externally via shocks on
external assets or internally through loans given to other nodes within the network. The variable
βi ∈ (0,1) measures the share of net worth lost by a node. If a node i receives a positive flow of
losses, it first sends aims to cover it by its own equity equal to βi ei. In that respect, the equity
of the bank as a financial intermediary measures its absorption capacity. If the losses suffered
by i are larger than its net worth, then this node is insolvent and sends the residual loss (λi ei)








The variable bi ∈ [0,1] assumes a value of zero if the i-th bank is solvent, while it assumes a
strictly positive value that indicate a default. In the latter case, the assets of the insolvent bank
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are liquidated and its creditors get a proportional refund. The variable bi measures the fraction
of the i-th agent’s debt that is not recovered through liquidation, i.e., the loss-given-default ratio
of the failing agent. When the i-th agent becomes insolvent, households receive a loss equal
to bi hi j (if hi j > 0) while a node j which is a creditor of node i receives from the latter a loss
equal to bi di j. The loss born by a bank node is the sum of the losses, if any, received from its









b jd ji, (4.17)
where j is the debtor, i is the creditor and aki define a set of external asset owned by node






b jd ji ≥ ei. (4.18)
Note that, λ exti = ∑k b
kaki is the portion of the shock received from external shocks, and
λ inti = ∑ j b jd ji is the internal shock due to the contagion.
Definition 3 A secondary default, Λsecondary, occurs when a part or all of the initial net-worth
ei(t = 0), is caused due to accumulation of internal shock propagation up to time t: βi(t) =
1 ∧ λ inti (t)≥ 0.
Due to contagion an already insolvent bank may keep receiving internal shocks through the
network. However, for clarity in our analyses a default is labeled as secondary only if the initial
insolvency has been triggered due to a contagion according to the Definition 3.
4.1.6 Exogenous shock model
In this set-up the interbank network is shocked exogenously on their external asset portfolios.
The shocks are applied in a sequential manner. That is, an external shock is applied one at a
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time. The shocks can be permuted according to assets or banks. When shocks are permuted
according to assets, the bank holding the specific toxic asset is selected. Depending on the
amount of asset in the portfolio of a bank, the same bank may be hit several different times.
On the other hand, when the shocks are permuted according to banks, a bank is exposed to
the shock all at once or iteratively until all of its toxic external assets are absorbed before
moving on the next bank according to the permutation. When shocks are permuted according
to banks then permutation vector holds the fraction of the total of external asset of the bank to
be affected. In order to observe and record a detailed contagion dynamics, the simulator further
divides that fraction of the external asset into smaller chunks and apply them iteratively until it
is absorbed completely.
Depending on the shock application scheme the shocks are randomized according to banks
or assets. In the case of a permutation on the banks, given N number of nodes there are N!
possible sequence of shocks. Nevertheless, given the structure of the network majority of the
permutations can be equivalent to each other. In other words, the number of structurally distinct
shock permutation may depend strictly on the network structure. For instance, in a complete
network, where each bank is connected with all other banks and they all have the same balance
sheet configuration, the symmetry of the network renders the sequence of the shocks irrelevant.
In this class of networks, all of the N! permutations have the same equivalent effect on the
contagion process. In a perfect star, however, where all pendants are identical but the structure
of the network is not symmetric, the number of total distinct shock permutation is N. Since
an exogenous shock that hits the central node has a contagious effect that is different from the
effect of a shock on a pendant node, the timing of the shock on the star node determines the
distinctiveness of a shock. In that case, a shock can simply be characterized by the number of
pendants hit before or after the designated central node.
4.1.7 Analyzing dynamics of a contagion process
In this section, the entire process from network initialization to the final state of a contagion
process is demonstrated. Tables and figures presented in this section are the automatically
produced by the simulation software that is developed during this work. A manual for the
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configuration of the simulator regarding the level of details and formats of output files can be
accessed at the project repository2.
Figure 4.4 demonstrates diffusion of contagion on a fully connected network. In this ex-
emplary case, each bank receives shock one at a time. Entire external asset of the bank that
receives the shock is affected. Red colored banks in the network indicate a default induced
mainly due to a direct external shock. A black node indicates a secondary default, Λsecondary,
that is induced due to contagion. A gray node hints a stressed but not defaulted node due to
transmission of shock from the other defaulting banks.
N K ppp pkk ppk KG CG
15 2 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.51
Table 4.3: Network configuration report of the network generation module. The automatically generated output presents
configuration parameters and features of a random core-periphery interbank network. The connectivity and centralization
levels of the resulting network are, respectively, KG = 0.13 and CG = 0.51. The corresponding configuration function is
Gcp(N = 15,K = 2, pkk = 1, ppp = 0, ppk = 1). Figure 4.5 visualizes the network.
Table 4.3 presents the configuration parameters that are used by the simulator to create the
initial network structure. The connectivity and centralization levels of the resulting network are,
respectively, KG = 0.13 and CG = 0.51. The corresponding configuration function is Gcp(N =
15,K = 2, pkk = 1, ppp = 0, ppk = 1). Figure 4.5 visualizes the snapshots of the output network.
Table 4.4 reports balance sheet and random shock configuration parameters. These inputs are
applied to the network seen in Figure 4.5 which was configured by the parameters in Table 4.3.
The resulting balance sheets are presented in Table 4.5. It should be noted that bank level level
of capitalization and debt exposure is set by ε and φ respectively. A stands for the cumulative
external assets in the system. According to the configuration in this table only a 2/3 of the
banks in the system will be sampled for a random shock order permutation; and at each round
70% of the external assets of the selected bank is wiped-off. Table 4.6 presents the growth
of contagion due to application of the shock according to one of the random permutations.
Table 4.7 is the report on the resulting final state of the contagion.
Table 4.6 presents the growth of a contagion according to network, balance sheet and shock
configurations are given in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. According to this automatically generated
2See https://github.com/bulentozel/SimFinNet for data, source code and documentation.
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N nshock rshock A ε φ
15 10 0.7 115.55 0.10 0.40
Table 4.4: Automatically reported balance sheet and random shock configuration parameters. These inputs are applied to the
network seen in Figure 4.5 which was configured by the parameters in Table 4.3. The resulting balance sheets are presented in
Table 4.5. It should be noted that bank level level of capitalization and debt exposure is set by ε and φ respectively. A stands for
the cumulative external assets in the system. According to the configuration in this table only a 2/3 of the banks in the system will
be sampled for a random shock order permutation; and at each round 70% of the external assets of the selected bank is wiped-off.
Table 4.6 presents the growth of contagion due to application of the shock according to one of the random permutations. Table 4.7
is the report on the resulting final state of the contagion.
report, one of the core receives a substantial external shock that causes a complete collapse of
itself and its peripheral nodes. The other remaining core is weakened substantially. It should be
noted that the probing parameter Lcontag denotes the depth of propagation until a source shock
is absorbed completely, that is either covered by a loss in the net-worths of inflicted banks or
sinked at the deposits. Lcontag can also be considered as the length of a shock wave until it
looses its amplitude completely.
Banki a c h d e
1 28.89 10.00 25.00 10.00 3.89
2 33.02 11.43 28.57 11.43 4.44
3 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
4 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
5 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
6 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
7 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
8 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
9 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
10 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
11 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
12 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
13 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
14 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
15 4.13 1.43 3.57 1.43 0.56
Table 4.5: The balance sheets of the banks according to the configuration parameters tabulated in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. This
report is generated automatically by the simulator software developed for the work.
Table 4.7 reports the final state of the contagion process that is presented in Table 4.6. It
should be noted that if rabsorb = 1, the corresponding bank is insolvent. The Λsecondary reports




shock Lcontag nde f aults
1 1 0.70 6 7
2 4 0.70 6 7
3 6 0.70 6 7
4 8 0.70 6 7
5 9 0.70 2 8
6 10 0.70 6 8
7 11 0.70 2 9
8 12 0.70 6 9
9 13 0.70 2 10
10 15 0.70 2 11
Table 4.6: Growth of the contagion according to network, balance sheet and shock configurations given in Tables 4.3 , 4.4 and 4.5.
Several snapshots of the contagion is visualized in Figure 4.5. According to this automatically generated report, one of the core
receives a substantial external shock that causes a complete collapse of itself and its peripheral nodes. The other remaining core
is weakened substantially. It should be noted that the probing parameter Lcontag denotes the depth of propagation until a source
shock is absorbed completely, that is either covered by a loss in the net-worths of inflicted banks or sinked at the deposits. Lcontag
can also be considered as the length of a shock wave until it looses its amplitude completely.
In this section, details on the analyses of a contagion process for a single shock vector is
presented. The simulator has further features that help to conduct Monte Carlo simulations
where the results from single runs are aggregated.
4.1.8 Results
We conjecture that core-periphery networks exhibit a ‘robust-yet-fragile’ feature. At this
phase of the work, employing a simulation modules details of which are presented above, we
have created a controlled set-up to test our conjectures via simulations.
We observe that a core-periphery network is the joint of a complete network and a star-
shaped network. We characterize the core by the level of connectivity among the central nodes.
We characterize the periphery by the ratio of the pendants node in the network. Based on these
observations we have created a family of networks to decouple and measure the connectivity
and centralization aspects of an interbank network. We have used the Centralize module from
our network library that we have developed for the simulator. The network configuration pa-
rameters are the number of nodes in the network, N, the level of connectivity in the network K
and desired level of centralization, c, in the network.
122
Banki λi rextshock λ
int
i rabsorb bi Λsecondary
1 24.86 0.70 3.25 1.00 0.60 0
2 3.52 0.00 2.47 0.79 0.00 -
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
4 3.75 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.64 1
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
6 3.75 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.64 1
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
8 3.75 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.64 1
9 2.89 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.47 0
10 3.75 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.64 1
11 2.89 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.47 0
12 3.75 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.64 1
13 2.89 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.47 0
14 3.75 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.64 1
15 2.89 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.47 0
Table 4.7: The final state of the contagion process that is presented in Table 4.6. It should be noted that if rabsorb = 1, the
corresponding bank is insolvent. The Λsecondary reports whether it is a secondary default or not. λi is the total amplitude of the
shock received by the bank; λ inti displays the portion received due to contagion; r
ext
shock denotes the percentage of external assets
of the bank is wiped off due to a direct exogenous shock; and bi reports the final state of the shock propagation function for an
inflicted bank node.
In all of the experiments size of the interbank network is fixed by setting N = 64. For our
decoupling process we design two sets of experiments. In the first setup, we create a family of
k-regular network structures, where network level centralization is fixed and minimal CG = 0.
Then we increase the network connectivity KG incrementally from least possible to maximal
connectivity. We create circular graphs as visualized in Figure 4.1a - 4.1c where moving from
K = 1 regular graph, a ring, to K = N − 1, a fully connected graph, we maintain CG = 0.
According to the network connectivity as described in Equation 4.6, then in this set-up the ring
has the minimum connectivity of KG = 1N−1 =
1
63 ≈ 0.016 and the fully connected network has
the maximum possible connectivity, KG = 1.
In the second set of the experiments, we use a family of network structures similar to the
ones depicted in Figure 4.1d - 4.1f. Again fixing N = 64, this time we transform a ring into a
perfect star, reshuffling the constant number of edges3. We call this family of networks as the
ring-star transformation. It should be noted that KG = 0.016 as above but the centralization is
varied, according to Equation 4.3. It is incrementally grown from CG = 0, in the case the ring
3In fact in the last transformation where we reach the perfect star, instead of 64 we have 63 edges loosing the
last ring edge.
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where each node has exactly the same number of connections, to CG = 1 where the designated
star node is incident to all edges, the interbank loan relations, in the system.
In both set-up each edges are bi-directional. An edge represents an interbank debt. Bi-
directionality implies the reciprocity at the interbank debts. It is a modelling simplification that
corresponds to liquidity swap between banks (Eboli, 2013; Nier et al., 2007).
N CG KG A ε φ
64 0.0 to 1.0 0.016 to 1.0 100.0 0.06 to 0.12 0.2 to 0.8
Table 4.8: Simulation parameters. The size of the interbank network N, and aggregate external assets A, interbank loans C and
debts D, the total amount of net-worth E and the household deposits H are kept constant as the invariants in each seed of Monte
Carlo simulations.
Balance-sheets of the banks in each network configuration set-up are initialized according
to the parameters defined previously in Table 4.2 and the network structure. In other words,
the size and the structure of the interbank network so as the level of capitalization and the debt
exposure of each node are used as the initialization parameters. Table 4.8 displays the simula-
tion parameters. While the size of the interbank network N, and the network level volume of
aggregate balance sheet entries, A,C,H,D,E are kept as the invariants, at one hand the impact
of network structure is inspected by varying CG and KG, on the other hand impacts of total
exposure and capitalization are inspected by varying ε and φ respectively. Individual bank
level balance sheet entries are configured according to specifications that we have presented
and discussed in Section 4.1.4.
In this work, each interbank link in the network has a certain bandwidth. Given di = ∑Nj=1 di j
and hence the total exposure is D = ∑i ∑ j di j. leads to di j = wi j =
D
|E | = w0. |E | is the total
number of edges in the network. At each simulation for a given initial configuration CG, KG, ε ,
φ then w0 is the specific bandwidth for the configuration.
For the observations regarding network centralization CG, we have used c simulator parame-
ter incrementing it from 0 to 63, where each round an interbank loan from a peripheral node is
moved to the designated central node. For the observations regarding network connectivity KG,
we have used the connectivity parameter k of the simulator. At each round it is incremented
by 1 covering a ring up to a fully connected circular graphs in 64 steps. In order to exam-
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ine impact of net-worth we have examined ε ∈ (0.06,0.08,0.1,0.12) according to empirically
observed ratios. In a similar manner we have φ at 4 different ratios, φ ∈ (0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8).
For each configuration, (CG, KG, ε , φ ), 1000 unique random shock permutations are gener-
ated and applied. Each permutation denotes the order of banks that receive an external shock.
The length of the permutation vector is equal to the number of banks in the system, N = 64.
That is, at the end of each shock permutation all of the banks are exposed to the external shocks
at a random fashion than the other permutations. The amplitude of the external shock that a
bank receive is fixed rshock = 1.0, wiping off all of its external assets. In the first set-up on the
connectivity, the shock is applied at a single round; while in the second set-up on the centraliza-
tion where banks exhibit heterogeneous balance sheet structures the total external asset of the
bank is divided into multiple portions and hit in multiple rounds until it is depleted completely.
This yields to 64x(4+ 4) = 512 distinct initial configuration for the first set-up, where the
primary focus is on the role of connectivity. We have set ε = 0.1 while varying φ and φ = 0.4
while we vary ε . In a similar manner, it yields to 512 distinct initializations for the case on the
role of network centrality. In total, the results we present below are based on simulations with
2x512x1000 = 1,024,000 distinct Monte Carlo seeds4.
The results are presented in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. The upper two panels in the figures
present two contagion thresholds T1 and Tf in. T1 denotes the amount of accumulated shocks
until the first secondary default in the system is observed. Tf in is the total of external shocks
that is sufficient to cause a complete collapse of the financial system. Each data point is a box-
plot summarizing the outputs from 1000 distinct shock permutation for the given configuration.
Box-plots for T1 and Tf in are drawn on the same figure for ease of comparisons.
Comparison of the contagion thresholds in Figures 4.6b to 4.6h reveals both stability and
fragility of an interbank network with respect to the level of connectivity. It is seen that in-
creased connectivity reduces the risk of any contagious default in the system providing a sta-
bility at the level of individual banks; however increased connectivity also increases the risk of
4This massive number of simulations are conducted on an on-premises super-computing facilities. A 64 nodes
Supermicro server computer, run by Ubuntu Linux OS, with a 256GB of CPU RAM and 2TB of hard disk capacity
is utilized.
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a complete systemic collapse. This implies that along with increased connectivity individual
risks are mitigated by the network absorbing the shocks from the individual banks until the
point when a first secondary default occurs. Figures 4.6i to 4.6l suggest that the difference
between the medians of the contagion thresholds decreases exponentially with the increase of
connectivity. We observe that in fully connected networks they are exactly the same threshold.
This numerically observed phenomenon coincides with the studies elsewhere where a shock
that is sufficiently large to cause a single secondary default is also sufficiently large to cause
the default of all banks in the network.
In the results from our second experiment set-up where we investigate impacts of central-
ization in the system we observe a similar phenomenon. Nevertheless, as Figures 4.7a to 4.7l
suggest the dynamics of the contagion is different. Unlike in the case of low connectivity,
at low levels of centralization in the system makes individual banks more vulnerable against
external shocks. Increasing the centralization where peripheral nodes are trading more with
the core banks their default avoidance chance is not as much improved. On the other side, the
system as a whole is more stable for la very larger range of levels of centralization. The sys-
temic failure is very sudden when the whole system is too central. This numerically observed
phenomenon coincides with the ‘too big to fail’ debate, but our approach sheds more light on
the dynamics.
Aforementioned contagion dynamics holds for the cases of increased φ and ε . In all cases
increasing the net-worth improves the stability while increasing the exposure to interbank debts
reduces the stability. It is worth mentioning that as the lower panels in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7
demonstrate, as of the configurations we have presented in this work, while the values of the
first and final thresholds vary with φ and ε , the dynamics of their convergence does not change
with these parameters.
Figure 4.8 further displays contagion dynamics as of distribution of secondary defaults de-
rived from Monte Carlo simulations. In the case of connectivity, at the lower levels of network
connectivity, it is seen that the secondary defaults are dispersed along a large range of ex-
ternal shocks pointing out a less likelihood of a systemic risk. However as the connectivity
increases, we observe that secondary defaults are delayed but are cumulated at increasingly
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smaller ranges of external shocks pointing out higher risks of contagion. The case of centrality,
the lower panel in the figure, present a different dynamics. Although probability of secondary
defaults concentrates around a medium level external shock distribution is more dispersed.
4.1.9 Discussions
In this work we have focused on relations between concentration, connectivity and stability
of the banking sector. We have introduced a novel framework where connectivity and concen-
tration can be analyzed at the same time. We have designed and parametrized a simulation
set-up for a two-tear financial system: a relatively dense connections in the core banks com-
posing the first tier money center banks and a set of peripheral nodes composing the second tier
financial institutions in the sense that most peripheral banks do not lend to each other directly
but through the core banks acting as intermediaries.
As of empirical works, Craig and von Peter (2014) present a core-periphery model of inter-
bank networks as a two-tier system. They use Bundesbank data on interbank exposures among
1800 banks German banks, and show that their model fits well the German banking system,
which displays a two-tiered core-periphery structure, with a core composed of 45 banks only.
Moreover, they find that size is a good predictor of the position of a bank in the network: they
show that, on average, a bank in the core is 51 times larger than a bank in the periphery, and that
large banks tend to be in the core and act as intermediaries between small banks, which tend
to be in the periphery. The authors suggest that economies of scale and scope in the activity
of large and well-diversified banks can explain this finding. Veld and van Lelyveld (2014) put
forward the two-tier model and the fitting procedure by Craig and von Peter (2014) in Dutch
banking system. They draw similar conclusions about the structure of their national interbank
network. These empirical results strongly suggest that a high degree of concentration induces
the emergence of core-periphery interbank networks.
As far as further empirical analyses are concerned, the prevailing view is that the consolida-
tion process has rendered the systems more stable, i.e. less exposed to systemic crises. Mistrulli
(2011) draws this conclusion with respect to the Italian interbank network, while Chang et al.
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(2008) obtain similar results for the Brazilian banking sector. Evrensel (2008), using data on
79 countries, shows that concentration in the banking sector increases the period during which
a country is not experiencing a crisis. Beck et al. (2006) analyze the banking sector of 69
countries and find that both concentration and competitiveness improve stability. Their results
challenge the main theoretical argument in support of the view that concentration increases
stability. As the authors put it: “The findings that (i) concentration lowers banking system
fragility and (ii) low competition raises banking system fragility imply that future research
needs to move beyond a simple “concentration–stability” versus “concentration–fragility” de-
bate where concentration is viewed as a simple proxy for market power. [. . . ] . . . these results
(i) are inconsistent with the argument that concentration enhances stability by boosting the
market power of banks and (ii) indicate that concentration is measuring “something else” be-
sides market power “. They also remark “. . . the empirical work does not explain exactly why
concentration increases banking system stability. Future work needs to more fully dissect the
channels through which concentration influences bank stability.” (Beck et al., 2006, p1585 and
p1599).
Our work is in the line of Beck et al. (2006) by creating a parsimonious simulation set-up
that is also able to accommodate a two-tier modelling approach suggested by Craig and von
Peter (2014) and validated by further empirical studies (Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014; Evrensel,
2008; Chang et al., 2008). The first round of the numerical analyses based on our simulation
set-up may have policy implications.
We suggest that resilience of interbank networks can be increased by a complementarity be-
tween concentration and connectivity. We derive upon a combined interpretation from the two
experiment set-ups. Our results imply that when stimulation towards more interbank trade be-
tween peripheral nodes of the second tier banks combined with a moderation towards connec-
tivity between the money centers of the first-tier core banks together may provide a sustainable
resilience to external shocks.
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4.1.10 Summary and future work
Our preliminary results on stylized network structures confirm and enrich the conjectures
elsewhere. We aim to extend the Monte-Carlo simulations to random core-periphery structures
where a full range capital accumulation and exposure is scanned comparatively.
Longer term perspective in this line of study is to embed the interbank-network model within
Eurace simulator as described in Chapter 3. Objective of such modular extension will enable
us (i) address questions relevant interaction between real-economy and interbank-networks, (ii)
be able to create an artificial economy set-up where shocks to financial markets are generated
endogenously. The ability to have a simulation set-up where real and financial-markets are con-
nected and where shocks are also endogenous may give a multitude of opportunities from an
ABM stand point. Among others, regulations and their limitations, bailing-in vs bailing-out op-






Figure 4.4: Shock propagation demonstration on a fully-connected network. Each node receives shock one at a time. Entire
external asset of the shock receiving node is affected. Red colored nodes indicate a default induced mainly due to a direct external
shock. A black node indicates a secondary default, Λsecondary that is induced due to contagion. A gray node hints a stressed but




Figure 4.5: Shock propagation demonstration on a stylized multi-centered network. Each node receives shock one at a time.
Entire external asset of the shock receiving node is affected. Red colored nodes indicate a default induced mainly due to a direct
external shock. A black node indicates a secondary default, that is induced due to contagion. A gray node hints a stressed but not
defaulted node due to transmission of shock from the other defaulting banks. In Figure 4.5a, we see that one of the central node
has received external shock which wiped-off its remaining net-worth. Three of its pendant was hit earlier. Figure 4.5b is the case












































































































































































































































Figure 4.6: Shock propagation with respect to differing connectivity levels. The vertical axis denote the amount external shocks
observed for the threshold type. The horizontal axis represent the level of connectivity. Upper panel compares T1 and Tf in with
respect to increasing φ = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8 where ε = 0.10. The middle panel compares T 1 and T f in with respect to increasing
ε = 0.06,0.08,0.10,0.12 where φ = 0.40. Lower panel displays the additional amount of external shock, ∆T = T f in − T 1,
that would collapse the entire system. The differences between medians of the two thresholds are estimated for the measure.
Comparisons are with respect to increasing φ = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8 where ε = 0.10 are displayed. The upper two panels in the
figures present two contagion thresholds T1 and Tf in. T1 denotes the amount of accumulated shocks until the first secondary
default in the system is observed. Tf in is the total of external shocks that is sufficient to cause a complete collapse of the financial
system. Each data point is a box-plot summarizing the outputs from 1000 distinct shock permutation for the given configuration.


















































































































































































































































Figure 4.7: Shock propagation with respect to differing centralization levels. The vertical axis denote the amount external shocks
observed for the threshold type. The horizontal axis represent the level of centralization. The upper panel compares T1 and Tf in
with respect to increasing φ = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8 where ε = 0.10. The middle panel compares T 1 and T f in with respect to increasing
ε = 0.06,0.08,0.10,0.12 where φ = 0.40. The lower panel displays the additional amount of external shock, ∆T = T f in−T 1,
that would collapse the entire system. The differences between medians of the two thresholds are estimated for the measure.
Comparisons are with respect to increasing φ = 0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8 where ε = 0.10 are displayed. The upper two panels in the
figures present two contagion thresholds T1 and Tf in. T1 denotes the amount of accumulated shocks until the first secondary
default in the system is observed. Tf in is the total of external shocks that is sufficient to cause a complete collapse of the financial
system. Each data point is a box-plot summarizing the outputs from 1000 distinct shock permutation for the given configuration.
Box-plots for T1 and Tf in are drawn on the same figure.
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(a) Secondary defaults with varying network connectivity levels.
(b) Secondary defaults with varying network centralization levels.
Figure 4.8: Distribution of secondary defaults. For a selected connectivity and centralization the x-z plane can be read as a
probability distribution like function on the number of secondary defaults with respect to the accumulated external shocks on the
system. The total area for each color, representing a discrete level of connectivity (upper panel) or centralization (lower panel)
is constant and equal to each other. This normalization enables the reader to compare and contrast accumulation of contagious
risk for different network configurations.
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4.2 Multi-level network formation model for economic interac-
tions and integrations
Creating random network structures is one of the essential requirements for realistic simula-
tions of complex networks. Real networks exhibit a multi-level structure which does not lend
itself to existing generative models. This study considers the problem of fusing two random
networks towards bridging the multi-level network creation problem. Using a computational,
rather than an algebraic, approach we propose a generative model of fusion process. Based
on a parsimonious set of parameters to describe the fusion process, we develop a model for
simple graphs. In addition we develop a scheme for the case of weighted graphs, and discuss
possibilities for directed graphs.
4.2.1 Motivation
In this work, we aim to design a network fusion model that enables us to create economic in-
teraction structures akin to empirically observed credit or financial structures. In our short term
research agenda, the model serves to generate multiple core-periphery structures of interna-
tional financial systems where we are able to investigate integration of national core-periphery
structures examining interactions and flows across national systems. As part of longer term
research agenda, we aim to adopt stylized patterns as part of our entry and exit mechanisms at
multi-country economic integration scenarios.
There is increasing interest in network research from various scientific disciplines (Borgatti
et al., 2009). At the core of this interest is the complexity perspective which portrays a sys-
tem “not as deterministic, predictable, and mechanistic, but as process dependent, organic, and
always evolving" (Arthur, 1999, p107). This emerging interest blends naturally with simula-
tion based approaches in fields ranging from biology to economics (Judd, 1997). Simulation
of complex systems involves modeling of system constituents and the network structure of
interaction between those constituents.
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This work concerns the problem of creating random network structures as one of the es-
sential requirements for realistic simulations of complex systems. While random networks is
a long standing area of research (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Erdös and Rényi, 1959) avail-
able methods have significant shortcomings in terms of producing structures that correspond to
real networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Real networks tend to have a ‘multi-level’ structure
which does not lend itself to modeling with a single algebraic scheme (Fricke and Lux, 2014).
Computational, rather than algebraic, approaches has been explored to address this problem
more recently (Pasta et al., 2013; Sallaberry et al., 2013; Zaidi, 2013).
Our study adds on to this emerging research thread by addressing the problem of abridging
multiple levels in random network creation. We focus on the problem of interconnecting two
micro level random networks to create a larger network at the macro level. In approaching
this problem we develop a method which is driven by certain parameters which represents the
characteristics of the final network that results from fusion of lower level networks.
In this respect, the procedure presented in this work is continuation of the network generation
model described in Section 4.1.3. The flexibility and generalization we add in this work enables
us identify empirically observed distribution functions regarding link allocations at interbank
networks. Additionally, in this work we demonstrate how to allocate a given total interbank
loans dispersed heterogeneously between banks.
The particular problem addressed in our study is fusion of two constituent graphs by adding
edges that go between them. The generative model we develop uses a parsimonious set of
parameters that describe the aggregate strength and dispersion of connection between the two
constituents. We consider a scheme for choice of vertices that resonates well with established
single-level random network creation models in the literature, while discussing consequences
of this choice and possible alternatives.
4.2.2 A generative model for fusion of two simple graphs
Consider two simple graphs, G1 = (V1,E1) and G2 = (V2,E2). The goal of the fusion process
is to produce a new graph, G = (V,E), such that V1 ∪V2 = V and (E1 ∪E2) ⊂ E. The new
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graph, G, contains additional edges that go between the two constituent graphs. We denote this
edge set as E ′ = {(v1,v2)|v1 ∈V1,v2 ∈V2}, and we denote its vertex cover as V ′. Note that the
fusion process adds no edges other than those, i.e. E \ (E1∪E2) = E ′. The method described
below concerns the creation of these additional edges, given certain parameters describing
aggregate properties of E ′ as well as parameters that describe the stochastic processes for choice
of vertices that are incident with it.
We characterize the fusion process with a minimal set of parameters describing the features
of resulting graph. In the case of simple graphs the only parameter is the size of E ′, the number
of edges to be created during fusion process, denoted as λ . Our generative algorithm, shown in
Algorithm 1, consists of a loop which iterates λ times. At each step a pair of vertices is chosen,
each from one of the constituent graphs, and a new edge is created which goes between the two
graphs, abridging the next level in a multi-level structure.
Algorithm 1 The generative algorithm for fusion of simple graphs.
1: Set V ←V1∪V2 and E← E1∪E2
2: Set i← λ
3: while i > 0 do
4: Choose a pair of vertices, v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2, randomly from probability distribution
Pv
5: Add edge (v1,v2) to E
6: Set i← i−1
7: end while
8: return G = (V,E) as the fused graph
One can think of various schemes for the choice of vertices to which a new edge will be
incident with. In the case of a single-level random network two major schemes used in the
literature are uniform choice model of Erdös and Renyi (1959) and preferential attachment
model of Barabasi and Albert (1999). Here we limit ourselves to an adaptation of the preferen-
tial attachment model for the multi-level fusion process. In adapting the preferential attachment
scheme into a generative process model, we consider a probability distribution, Pv, where the
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probability of a pair of vertices, v1 ∈V1 and v2 ∈V2, being chosen at each step as proportional





The normalization factor, Ω, appears so that the probabilities add up to one. The normaliza-




Some examples produced with the above generative model is displayed in Figure 4.9. The
constituent graphs in these models are all created with Barabasi-Albert model, with m = 3. We
have used NetworkX software for graph generation and visualization (Hagberg et al., 2008).
4.2.3 Adaptation of model for weighted graphs
The introduction of edge weights into our generative model requires several modifications
into the scheme outlined above in Algorithm 4.9. In describing the fusion process we need
parameters other than the number of edges, λ . A second parameter, γ , describes the aggregate
strength of those edges. The third parameter, δ , gives the dispersion of the weight over the
new edges, by providing the standard deviation of normal distribution from which the new
edge weights are drawn from, as a ratio of the mean of distribution. Together, these parameters
are the only parameters of our generative model that describe the stochastic fusion of two
weighted graphs, given in Algorithm 2.
In representing a weighted graph we denote an edge as (v1,v2,w) where w represents the
edge weight, and degrees such as dG1(v1) and dG2(v2) are defined to be sum of link weights
incident with a vertex, as usual with weighted graphs. Thus, the strength parameter, γ , can be








(a) |V1|= 10, |V2|= 10,λ = 2 (b) |V1|= 10, |V2|= 25,λ = 4
(c) |V1|= 25, |V2|= 60,λ = 8 (d) |V1|= 100, |V2|= 100,λ = 10
(e) |V1|= 100, |V2|= 100,λ = 25 (f) |V1|= 250, |V2|= 250,λ = 60
Figure 4.9: Fusion of simple graphs of various sizes
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Algorithm 2 The generative algorithm for fusion of weighted graphs.
1: Set V ←V1∪V2 and E← E1∪E2
2: Set r← γ
3: Set c← True
4: while c is True do
5: Choose a pair of vertices, v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2, randomly from probability distribution
Pv
6: Choose a weight, w, for edge v1↔ v2, randomly from probability distribution Pev1,v2
7: if w2 < r then
8: Add edge (v1,v2) to E
9: Set r← r−w
10: else
11: Set c← False
12: end if
13: end while
14: return G = (V,E) as the fused graph
Our design uses a weight dispersion scheme which resonates with the preferential attach-
ment. In our scheme the weight of a new edge is the outcome of a random process whose prob-
ability distribution is dependent on the weighted degrees of the vertices it is incident with. Our
scheme requires that the expected value of edge weight E [w], is proportional to dG1(v1)dG2(v2).
In drawing weight of a new edge we only consider a normal distribution, Pev1,v2 =











where Θ is a normalization constant.
With these parameters defined, we can consider the strength parameter as a description of








γ = λ E [w]






γ = λ ∑
v1∈V1,v2∈V2
Pv(v1,v2)µv1,v2
Replacing the choice distribution from Eq. 4.19 and constraint from Eq. 4.20 in the above, we
find:























Some examples produced with the weighted version of generative model are shown in Figure
4.10.
Please note that with the above scheme, the resulting fused graph preserves the degree order
of vertices during the fusion process. Consider two vertices, u1 ∈V1 and v1 ∈V1, with degrees
dG1(u1) and dG1(v1) prior to fusion process. The expected value of their degrees after fusion




























(a) |V1|= 10, |V2|= 10,λ = 3,γ = 5 (b) |V1|= 10, |V2|= 25,λ = 4,γ = 7
(c) |V1|= 25, |V2|= 60,λ = 8,γ = 14 (d) |V1|= 100, |V2|= 100,λ = 10,γ = 15
(e) |V1|= 100, |V2|= 100,λ = 25,γ = 40 (f) |V1|= 250, |V2|= 250,λ = 60,γ = 100









Now if we consider an inequality as follows in the pre-fusion graph:
0≤ dG1(u1)≤ dG1(v1)
it is straightforward to see that the same ordering is expected to be preserved in the fused graph,
by replacing the ordering in computed expected degrees after fusion:
0≤ dG1(u1)+dG1(u1)2X ≤ dG1(v1)+dG1(v1)2X
Note that ∀v ∈ G : dG(v)≥ 1 or dG(v) = 0 holds.
4.2.4 Considerations for directed case
Directed graphs does not present any particular obstacle to adopting our generative model. A
particular consideration is about the parameter set to define directed (weighted or unweighted)
fusion process. If one wishes a fusion where the aggregate strength of arcs between the two
constituent graphs must be the same, then one set of strength and number of edges parameters
would be sufficient. Otherwise, in the asymmetric case one needs two set of those parameters
for each direction. The weighted or unweighted fusion process can simply be applied in both
directions separately with the corresponding parameters.
4.2.5 Summary and further work
We have limited our generative model to only two constituent graphs. It seems straight
forward to extend the generation into multiple graphs, and even to multiple levels of fusion.
An important limitation of our study is validation of the fusion process against real multi-
level graphs. Such a validation will require and assessment of similarity between real graphs
and the artificial ones created with out generative model. However, graph similarity is largely
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discussed in the literature as vertex similarity (Blondel et al., 2004), and seems to be lack-
ing flexibility for such a validation. Further work is required for an assessment and possible
adaptation of graph similarity measures.
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Chapter 5
A design pattern for complex and
large scale stock-flow consistent
agent-based models
5.1 Motivation
Agent-based models have been proven to be able to incorporate the two aspects of a micro-
founded macroeconomic models for policy analyses. On the one hand, it enables to design
interacting heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality. It adopts the behavioral rules of
the agents borrowed from the managerial and decision economics. On the other hand, ABMs
have proven to be able to accommodate top-down policy experimentations such as fiscal and
monetary interventions. However, ABM practices are criticized at lacking a methodological
maturity at developing large scale, re-usable and accessible models. Deriving upon hands-on
experience through a sequence of research and development on ABMs in economics, majority
of which have been presented in earlier chapters, in this chapter I like to elaborate on a method-
ological framework that can be employed at large scale agent-based models for policy analysis
in economics.
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The consolidation of this methodological approach is not only based on personal or team
experiences at the design, implementation and simulation of ABMs but also derives upon the
know-how that is implicit within the computational ABM frameworks and the reported expe-
riences of other research groups within the domain. This chapter, in that sense, highlights an
over-arching methodological approach based on a series of researches that I have involved in
as a co-author of the papers. Design and development of ABM in economics has been covered
in numerous monographs elsewhere. A systematic and comprehensive review of the models to
this day is reviewed by Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018). The objective in this chapter is however
limited to the set of methodological novelties that have arisen within the PhD study that has
lead to fulfillment of this dissertation work.
The framework combines a set of novelties for design, implementation and simulation of
stock-flow-consistent ABM models: (i) a decoupled initialization phase where stock-flow-
consistent network of balance-sheet structures, as well as, other complex agent-agent inter-
actions can be set-up ex-ante, (ii) a steady-state transition phase, where a stable and stock-flow
consistent state of the model is determined prior to policy experiment via Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations, (iii) a well defined unit of design at the implementation of agent actions, where the
focus is on an atomic sate of an agent, (iv) an agent behavior library, where previously imple-
mented atomic agent behaviors can be re-used as the building blocks of a large scale model, (v)
a messaging protocol, where direct or indirect agent-agent communications are standardized,
(vi) a state transition diagram, where event occurrence periodicities, sequences, synchroniza-
tions, communications and other conditions can be sketched graphically or via a high level
domain specific markup language, (vii) a model configuration tree, where previously imple-
mented components such as markets can be turned on or off via model configuration parameters
prior to initialization and simulation phases.
In essence, the methodological framework develops upon modular and layered design ap-
proaches inherited from state-of-the art software development technologies. This modular de-
sign pattern has given us the flexibility at creating vertical and horizontal scalable complex
economic systems as described in Chapter 3.
146
5.2 Behaviors vs interactions
Modularity is achieved by decoupling atomic components of a socio-economic system at the
design stage. In a multi-agent system, each agent is endowed with a finite set of attributes.
Values of these attributes can stay constant during the simulation life time of an agent or can
be altered through agent’s interactions with the other agents in the system or with its environ-
ment. Combination of values that these memory variables attain together with the combination
of signals or messages they receive from the other agents or from the environment determine
the state of an agent. Hence theoretically, an agent may exhibit an infinite number of states.
Nevertheless a simulation life time of an agent can be observed as a finite and specific se-
quence of state transitions. In that respect, at an atomic level, a simulation model design can
be transferred to a design of state-transitions for each agent type in a model.
In that respect a state transition can be considered as the unit of design. Design components
of an ABM can be listed as follows:
• Policy parameter: The set of exogenous variables, such as the household mobility friction
variable we have used in Chapter 3.
• Agent type: Firm, Bank, Household, etc. Both varying number of agent types as well
as multiple instance of each agent with possibly different state variables enables the
construction of a multi-agent system.
• Memory variable: The set of attributes for each agent type in the model. For instance,
balance sheet entries of a firm is a subset of the agent’s memory variables. They are
namely the state variables. It should be noted that the endogenously or exogenously set
values for these variables lead heterogeneity in the model.
• Message: Communication received from other agents in the system. For instance, a
mortgage payment sent by a household to a bank is represented by a message, likewise
a job offer from a firm to a household. Thus not only coordination and communication
between agents but also asset or debt flow between agents are realized via messages.
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• Behavior: Any autonomous action of an agent that either alter the state of the agent or
that leads the agent to alter the state of its environment or another agent’s in the system
or both.
• Environment: It is an abstract component. The assigned values of policy parameters
along with aggregate state of all agents in a simulation step determine the environment
where an agent acts and interacts. In that respect, from an implementation point of
view, design and assignment of policy parameters and a design of state transitions for
each agent one by one corresponds to design of an ever changing dynamic simulation
environment.
Given the components above, design of agent types, agent memory variables, set of mes-
sages between agents (interactions), set of agent functions (behaviors), model parameters (pol-
icy parameters), and markets or mechanisms via a selection and combination of a subset of
previously designed messages and functions can be decoupled from each other. That is, design
and implementation of each component can be done separately and incrementally.
5.2.1 Unit of design
Figure 5.1: Unit of design.
The unit of design is roughly given in Figure 5.1. The block in the middle represents the
implementation of a behavior. A behavior, in terms of design terminology, corresponds to any
function that possibly alters the memory space of the agent itself. A function may also result
in sending out a message to other agents with or without changing its own memory state. As
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the figure suggests a function and hence a behavior depends on the current memory of the
agent itself and the state of the environment. The interaction with the environment is either via
a direct access to the model parameters and/or via a set of messages received from the other
agents within the system.
The novelty of this approach stems from the fact that a model designer can focus on a self-
consistent and sound behavior design and implementation independent from the design of an
overall complex system.
5.2.2 Behavior library
An atomic design unit approach enables the model designer to build a library of reusable
functions. A function can be as simple as an agent behavior such as in which the agent
checks/reads in policy rate posted by the central bank and updates its own corresponding mem-
ory variable or as complex as an advanced learning and adaptation mechanism such as an
internal neural network model which may update trading strategy of the agent at financial mar-
kets. Or a set of different functions can be designed to be used interchangeably. For example,
both a Leontief and a Cobb-Douglas production function can be made available in the library.
Depending on the conceptual model then one or the other can be selected accordingly. As a
rule of thumb, simplicity and a minimal computation in behavior design is considered in order
to increase a re-use chance of existing implementations. A minimal behavior can be described
as a function that causes a minimum number of changes in the agent’s memory space or at its
interactions with other agents. An example function implementation from the Eurace model
library is depicted in Figure 5.4 where a Firm’s loan request action is presented.
5.2.3 State transitions
A state transition unit as presented in Figure 5.1 is the building block for scalable and com-
plex ABM models that we have developed. Figure 5.2 depicts a generic toy model with two
different agent types. A model implementation in principle comprises sequencing of agent
state transitions. An entire state diagram is then the design a generic simulation loop adopting
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Figure 5.2: Iteration loops for two hypothetical agents at an imaginary model. Agent-a can be for instance a household while
agent-b is a firm.
atomic design units. Activation of each state can be conditioned by the state of the simulation
environment, the point in the time, or the communications from the other agents.
5.2.4 Behavior activation
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 together display a state transition block within Eurace model where
Firm agents credit mechanism is implemented. As pointed out above state transitions can be
conditioned by a number of external or internal factors: (i) activation time as of daily, weekly,
monthly, quarterly or yearly calendar, (ii) due to value of an exogenous policy parameters,
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(a) State transition graph.
(b) Conditions on state transitions.
Figure 5.3: Conditional state transitions. A snippet from Eurace model. The panel on the left is a graph-
ical visualization of a particular state of a consumption good producer. The display on the right is its
implementation via a high level modeling description language that is used in Eurace and Iceace mod-
els. The xmml (eXtended Machine Mark-up Language) is an XML based tool that helps to construct an
entire state diagram of a model (Kiran, 2017).
(iii) due to a communication interaction from another agent, (iv) or simply due to a specific
combination of agent’s internal memory state, such as activation of insolvency procedure due
to balance-sheet structure.
Figure 5.4: An implementation example from Eurace model’s behavior library. The panel displays a code snippet from a con-
sumption good producer firm. ln this unit of design, a loan request behavior relies on the agent’s memory space, and some external
communications. The function checks/reads in available banks in the system, keeps a track of the ones that has been contacted.
The contact is made my the messaging mechanism where a request is placed. The firm reports the current state of its own equity
and outstanding debt along with the amount of debt request.
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5.2.5 Synchronization of interactions
As it is suggested by Figure 5.2 - 5.3, at each iteration, agents in the models run their respec-
tive state-transition diagram concurrently. An iteration for an agent corresponds to a traversal
of the agent through its state transition diagram. The very common synchronization point for
all agents is the end of each iteration which typically points to the end of a calendar day. Once
all agents have reached to their respective ‘End’ state, the internal logical simulation clock is
incremented and agents rerun their state-transition diagram.
Communications are handled via a message board system which enables asynchronous com-
munication patterns within an iteration. It should be noted that state transitions are also de-
pendent on expected interactions with other agents. Thus the atomic design unit together with
conditional state transitions not only enable us have vertically scalable complex models but
also enable us to assure easily verifiable stock-flow consistency within the economy. Any in-
teraction that includes flow of assets, debts or equity from one agent to agent due to payments,
creation, write-off or delivery of credit money, or change in any ownership is immediately ac-
companied with a balance-sheet update on both ends of the flow. In most of our models, at the
end of a calendar day, accounting identity is checked autonomously by each agent.
5.3 Initialization and calibration of stock-flow consistent models
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions is a known problem to ABMs small or large.
Initialization and calibration of stock-flow consistent models are inherently a constrained based
problem. It requires design and simultaneous solution of a large number of equations which are
not necessarily always linear. Solutions are used to initialize variables within memory space of
agents in the model.
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5.3.1 Layered initializations for stock-flow consistency
In all of the models research results of which have been presented in this dissertation, we
have applied a layered initialization. There are two stages of a layered initialization:
1. Initialization of agent balance sheets that secures initial stock consistency
2. Initialization of agent-agent interactions that secures initial flow consistency
Initial average wage offer in the economy is used as the initialization unit of measure which
is generally equal to one unit of the currency in the economy. Then as part of the first layer
of initialization distribution function on household wealth, firms’ and banks’ assets and debts
are identified. Depending on the research question sound and consistent empirically validated
stylized ratios between balance sheet entries and distribution functions on balance-sheet ratios
as well as values across agents are employed. After having set the size of the economy as of
initial wage, average wage offer asset, debt, and equity are allocated accordingly. Accounting
identity at each individual agent level as well as at the aggregate levels are checked to secure
stock consistency.
For the second layer of initialization agent-agent interaction patterns need to be used. The
flow of credit, assets or equity from one economic agent to another is handled by implicit or
explicit network relations in a model that match accumulation of stocks distributed in the first
phase.
5.3.2 Modelling and initializing of complex network structures
Some examples for agent-agent interactions are:
• Firm-Household employment relations, which should be consistent with initial firm size
distribution, individual firm’s production capacity, level of technology at each firm and
households’ skill distribution.
• Firm-bank credit relations, which needs to meet credit distribution in the system.
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• Household-Bank and Firm-Bank deposit networks, which needs to be consistent with the
distribution and total of liquidity in the system.
• Household-Firm ownership structure, which needs to be consistent with share distribu-
tions among households as well as distribution of other traded financial assets.
• Bank-Bank credit networks, which should be consistent with interbank financial network
model and bank balance sheet distributions.
In most of our research cases random graph models are employed and integrated into the
population design and initialization stage of modelling. In the research papers where we have
employed Eurace model (Ozel et al., 2016; Raberto et al., 2017; Petrovic et al., 2018; Raberto
et al., 2018) we have used homogeneous distributions for initial distribution of wealth among
households and firm sizes. This in return enabled us to use uniform random graph models at the
initialization of, e.g., employment relation, deposit allocation and credit networks. However, in
case of the research where we have employed Iceace model (Bjarnason et al., 2015; Erlingsson
et al., 2016), for instance, employment relations have been formed endogenously at the very
first simulation step using the decentralized nature of our labor market mechanism.
On the other hand, in our work on resilience of inter-bank credit markets (Ozel et al., 2018)
stages of layered initialization is reversed: an interbank network configuration is designed algo-
rithmically with desired connectivity and centralization features. The node level link structure
from the configured network is used as input to create stock-flow-consistent balance-sheet dis-
tributions. The research has focused on resilience of network structures against external asset
shocks which has lead us primacy to connection types and then configuration of balance-sheets
consistently prior to Monte-Carlo experiments.
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5.3.3 Assuring steady state initializations
Assuring a steady state1 initialization for a complex agent based models, where there are
multiple type of agents, mechanisms and markets, prior to a simulation run time is a challeng-
ing task. Additionally, heterogeneity, for instance, in speculative behaviors at housing markets
or at financial markets, or at firm production planning generally result in a mis-match at ini-
tialization of agent memory variables, productive capital allocations, etc. Such mismatches are
generally exhibited by large oscillations in macro-economic variables such as GDP per capita
or unemployment levels. Our two-layered initialization as outlined in Section 5.3.1 reduce such
oscillations to some extend but are yet not able to eliminate them completely. An elimination
of such steep and deep oscillations that stem from initialization mismatches would shorten the
transition phases of the artificial economies.
Failing to acknowledge such transitional phase in the models may misguide the interpretation
of simulation results. As we have presented via Figure 3.7b in Chapter 3, transitional and steady
state phases of simulations need to be delimited. In the respective model, since there is neither
population nor technology growth a steady state is regime is safely identified when capital
accumulation reaches to its full capacity as it is observed in the upper panel of Figure 3.7.
In a model where there is an endogenous growth in production technology or population,
it is suggested to run the simulations without any growth until the model reaches to its full
production capacity. The rationale for the suggestion is a heuristic one. The overall objective is
to assure a stable state of the artificial economy as the starting point prior to running multitudes
of Monte-Carlo simulations to examine growth related factors. Decoupling growth dynamics
would also mean decoupling growth related path dependency from initial conditions. The
technological convergence study by Dawid et al. (2017) applies the method. They use one of
such steady state snapshot of the economy as the initial state of their experiments.
In summary, a combination of two techniques can be suggested for the assurance of a steady-
state regime of a simulation stage:
1It should be noted as it can be seen in Figure 3.7 by steady-state we refer to a regime in the artificial economy
where business cycles exist and endogenous and where effect of large oscillations due to improper initialization of
resources in the economy is phased out automatically by model’s internal dynamics.
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• Applying a multi-layered initialization and calibration not only for (i) stock-flow-
consistent balance sheet initialization, and (ii) consistent agent-agent interactions, but
also behaviorally consistent agent memory variables.
• Running the stock-flow consistent model where exogenous variables and growth dynam-
ics are turned off and then using a selected snapshot of the economy from the end of the
transitional phase as the initial state for subsequent experiments.
5.3.4 Incremental calibration
Section 3.3.1, has introduced a methodological novelty that scales up/down an ABM model
by either extending/shrinking the modeling details or components (vertical scalability) or by
changing population size and variations (horizontal scalability). Section 2.1.4 demonstrates a
case where a housing market is added to the base Eurace model. Introduction of new compo-
nents needs to cover recalibration of the base model to be able to accommodate new agents,
agents’ additional memory spaces, behaviors and new agent-agent interactions seamlessly and
in a conceptually sound manner. In that respect, housing market calibration can be considered
as a case-based demonstration on how stylized facts from actual empirical studies and initial
average wage in the model are combined for a consistent recalibration. It should be noted
that as discussed in Section 5.3.1 the initial wage offer functions as the unit of measure for
numerical calibrations for the variables which are represented in terms of mean of exchange
in an economy. This calibration premise has lead us to identify typically observed housing
wealths with respect to average wages in contemporary economies as the reference value dur-
ing re-initialization of the extended model. Such recalibration processes are specifically vital at
being able to compare and contrast simulation findings from the extended model with respect
previous outcomes from the base model.
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5.4 Tools for validation and analysis
An up to date validation practices on ABMs elsewhere within macroeconomics studies have
been surveyed by Fagiolo et al. (2018). The authors further suggest a theoretical framework
that discusses validation approaches via three different dimensions: "(i) comparison between
artificial and real-world data; (ii) calibration and estimation of model parameters; and (iii)
parameter space exploration" (p. 2). As the survey authors acknowledge, validation approaches
within the field are still at an exploration and discovery phase. In this section, I limit the
discussion by pointing out to our hands-on experiences through developing and employing
relatively very advanced models within the field.
5.4.1 Business cycles and stylized facts
Stylized facts, in short, are empirically observed regularities. They serve us to check whether
our model outputs are able to exhibit sufficiently similar patterns to the real world data. We
have employed dynamic correlation techniques and comparison of distributions. For instance,
in our work where we have specifically examined impact of mortgage credits on real economy
(Raberto et al., 2017), we have examined dynamics of business cycles in terms of GDP, loans,
mortgages, investments and consumptions conducting pair-wise cross-correlations between re-
spective time series. Figure 2.13 which is also presented in Ozel et al. (2016) demonstrates that
mortgages in our model is leading the business cycle as it has been reported elsewhere in real
world (European Central Bank, 2013). The appendix of our recent work Petrovic et al. (2018)
provides an extended presentation of statistical analyses of model dynamics with respect to
stylized facts.
5.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
We perform sensitivity analysis exercises in order to check the responses of the model to
variations against exogenous model parameters as well as to population sizes.
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Parameter sensitivity Experiment ranges and intervals of our policy parameters such as mo-
bility friction in Petrovic et al. (2018) as presented in Chapter 3 or equity-to-asset ratio in Ozel
et al. (2016) which has served as a stock-control regulatory instrument, see Chapter 2.1, are
determined after conducting Monte-Carlo simulations (Metropolis and Ulam, 1949) with nu-
merous random seeds. On the other hand, in our work on resilience of different financial
network shocks (Ozel et al., 2018) we have conducted a parameter sensitivity analysis in order
to determine sufficiently small amplitudes of incremental asset shocks on the system where
we could observe bank defaults. Simulation data, on which actual analyses are conducted, are
generated after such test runs.
Population sensitivity Analysis of a model response against differing population size, i.e.,
number of households, firms, banks, etc in the model, contributes to measurement regarding
the stability of the model. In order to demonstrate the stability of the extended version of
Eurace model, for instance, in Ozel et al. (2016), keeping all other parameters constant, we
have run Monte-Carlo simulations with double and half population sizes, with respect to the
population size to be used in dissemination of results. The statistical comparisons and tests on
distributions confirm the stability of the model and have been presented in the appendix of the
respective article.
5.4.3 Analytical validation
Analytical validation is only possible for few small scale models where boundary conditions
and basins of attraction can be studied Fagiolo et al. (2018). Analytical examination of more
complex models can be conducted to some extend when model specification of a baseline
model with uniform distribution of relevant agent variables.
In one of our work, we have compared macroeconomic implications of different mortgage
types (Bjarnason et al., 2015). We have combined model specification regarding households’
mortgage debt repayment schemes and a set of sample simulated data to compare expected
volume of principal payments in the economy under differing mortgage type enforcement
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regimes2. Then consistency of simulation data from Monte-Carlo experiments is compared
against analytical findings3. However, it should be noted that although both analytical and sim-
ulation results foresee the additional mortgages in the economy, it has been the micro-level data
from the simulations that enabled us to examine the impact of additional mortgage repayments
on housing wealth distributions and hence its relevance to policy making.
5.4.4 Statistical measures for controlled groups
Chapter 3.3 have introduced the methodological novelty from our scalable and flexible multi-
country simulation set-up. The set-up enables a modeller to design control and test economies
which are exposed to the same population initialization procedure and that can be run exposed
to the same random seeds. In order to be able to compare and test relative dynamics of test
and control group economies we have devised new statistical measures. Section 3.3.4 provides
detailed specifications of the three new statistics that are introduced by Petrovic et al. (2018):
(i) comparison of averages over seeds, (ii) comparison of means of aggregate variables (iii)
comparison of the mean of the differences.
2See Figure 2 in Bjarnason et al. (2015).
3See the results section in Bjarnason et al. (2015).
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Summary
The major contributions presented in this work are four-fold: (i) design, analyses and dis-
cussion on housing market regulation, (ii) design and development of a scalable multi-country
experiment set-up, (iii) design and development of a novel interbank simulation model, (iv)
and a methodological guideline that has been consolidated through design, development and
validation of large-scale ABMs.
The design and integration of variants of housing markets within closed artificial economies
has served us (i) examine stylized relation between mortgage credits and business cycles,
(ii) experiment with alternative and prudent mortgage regulating instruments, (iii) examine
macroeconomic impacts of different mortgage types, and (iv) investigate impact of policies
towards green finance when speculative lending channel via housing market is prevalent in the
system. Firstly, our models confirm that the dynamics of mortgages is supporting the theory of
endogenous nature of credit money giving a contribution to a debate that has grown stronger
over the last two decades. In general, regulations allowing for a high leverage of the banking
tend to inflate asset bubbles and boost the economy in the short run, while result in bubble
bursts and economic depression in the medium and long run. Secondly, our findings, however,
also suggest that stimulating impact of mortgage credits can sustain growth and stability when
regulated via complementary instruments. Following some recent discussion, a stock control
regulation that targets households net wealth (a stock), instead of income (a flow), is designed
and analyzed. Results show that stock control regulation can be effectively combined with
debt-service-to-income ratio (DSTI) in order to increase the stability of the housing market and
of the whole economy. Moreover, stock control regulation exhibits the interesting property to
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directly affect mortgage distribution among households. Thirdly, we have further examined
regulatory options through enforcement of different mortgage types. Our results suggest that
inflation-indexed mortgages, where interest rate is fixed throughout the term and principal debt
is indexed to consumer price index, can mislead households’ expectations of risk encouraging
them to buy more housing due to their low initial amortizations which, in turn, stimulates hous-
ing prices. The results further hint that in long-run inflation-indexed mortgages create relatively
more uneven housing wealth distribution among households. We also find that the effective-
ness of standard monetary policy tools is diminished when inflation-indexed mortgages are
used. Besides, our simulation results point out that banks partake in the interest rate risk with
fixed rate mortgages but bear little or no risk with adjustable rate, where interest rate follows
the rate of the Central Bank plus a constant spread, or inflation-indexed mortgages. Lastly,
we have examined macro-prudential policies that may help to stimulate banking sector to shift
from speculative lending, the cause of asset bubbles and economic crises, to an energy efficient
production technology. As of the regulatory instrument, we have introduced a differentiation
of capital requirements according to the destination of lending, demanding higher bank capital
in the case of speculative lending via mortgages. Results suggest that the proposed regulation
is able to foster investments and capital accumulation in the short term, improving the energy
efficiency of firms. However, reducing mortgages with a restrictive banking regulation has
a negative impact on total private credit, and thus on endogenous money supply, weakening
consumption and aggregate demand. In the long term, the contraction of total credit becomes
stronger, and the negative outcomes on aggregate demand also affect investment making the
energy efficiency become negligible.
The work on a scalable multi-country experiment set-up has enabled us address the con-
ditions under which two or more countries can benefit from becoming part of a union. Our
results suggest that for similar countries, it is always beneficial to join in a union, although a
lack of mobility frictions can weaken its performance. Even if countries have different produc-
tivities, the performance of the union is in general better than the performance of the isolated
countries. The exception is when the productivity gap between member countries and labor
mobility across borders are both too high. In this case, the union can even exacerbate the
gap between the member states. We have devised and tested a fiscal pool body to measure to
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what extend it could alleviate causes of a structural difference, such as high tech and productive
member versus a low tech and underdeveloped member. Our findings suggests that stronger fis-
cal integration via transfers from surplus countries to deficit countries helps reducing inequality
between such members, supporting a sustainability of the monetary union.
As part of the methodological consolidation effort while studying complex and interactive
mechanisms within ABMs a particular attention is dedicated to network models. A set of al-
gorithms have been developed that creates random or stylized network structures with desired
properties for the initialization of agent-agent connections. In the study where we have created
stock-flow-consistent interbank networks with desired level of network connectivity and cen-
tralization, we have seen that a medium density of connections in regular networks is already
sufficient to induce a ’robust-yet-fragile’ response to insolvency shocks, while the same occurs
in star networks only when the centralization is very high.
Following guidelines are suggested for design and development of large scale agent-based-
models: (i) employment of decoupled initialization phase where stock-flow-consistent network
of balance-sheet structures, as well as, other complex agent-agent interactions can be set-up
ex-ante, (ii) assurance of a steady-state phase, where a stable and stock-flow consistent state
of the model is determined prior to policy experiment via Monte-Carlo simulations, (ii) a well
defined unit of design at the implementation of agent actions, where the focus is on an atomic
sate of an agent, (iv) establishment of an agent behavior library, where previously implemented
atomic agent behaviors can be re-used as the building blocks of a large scale model, (v) a com-
munication protocol, where direct or indirect agent-agent communications are standardized,
(vi) a state transition diagram, where event occurrence periodicities, sequences, synchroniza-
tions, communications and other conditions can be sketched graphically or via a high level
domain specific markup language, (vii) a model configuration tree, where previously imple-
mented components such as markets can be turned on or off via model configuration parameters




1. design and analyses variants of monetary policies within a monetary union that is subject
to technological differences and mobility frictions,
2. policy analysis an economic union with or without a common currency,
3. comparison of an economic union with or without a common fiscal policy.
Methodological research directions:
1. completing the re-engineering and the re-factoring work on the Eurace multi-country
set-up,
2. adding multiple currencies to be able to enable trade between economies with differing
currencies,
3. embedding the interbank-network model within Iceace and Eurace models,
4. implementing the layered initialization phases exclusively within Eurace and Iceace
models,
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